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Abstract 
The widely application of XML has increasingly required high security. XML 
security confronts some challenges that are strong relating to its features. XML 
data integrity needs to protect element location information and context-
referential meaning as well as data content integrity under fine-grained security 
situations. XML data authentication must satisfy a signing process under a 
dependent and independent multi-signature generation scenario. When several 
different sections are encrypted within the XML data, it cannot query the 
encrypted contents without decrypting the encrypted portions. The technologies 
relating to XML security demand further development. 
 
This thesis aims to improve XML security relative technologies, and make them 
more practicable and secure. A novel revocation information validation approach 
for X.509 certificate is proposed based on the XML digital signature technology. 
This approach reduces the complexity of XKMS or PKI systems because it 
eliminates the requirement for additional revocation checking from XKMS or CA. 
The communication burden between server and client could be alleviated.  
 
The thesis presents the context-referential integrity for XML data. An integrity 
solution for XML data is also proposed based on the concatenated hash function. 
The integrity model proposed not only ensures XML data content integrity, but 
also protects the structure integrity and elements’ context relationship within an 
XML data. If this model is integrated into XML signature technology, the signature 
cannot be copied to another document still keeping valid. 
 
A new series-parallel XML multi-signature scheme is proposed. The presented 
scheme is a mixed order specified XML multi-signature scheme according to a 
dependent and independent signing process. Using presented XML data 
integrity-checking pool to provide integrity-checking for decomposed XML data, it 
makes signing XPath expression practicable, rather than signing XML data itself. 
 
A new labeling scheme for encrypted XML data is presented to improve the 
efficiency of index information maintenance which is applied to support encrypted 
XML data query processing. The proposed labelling scheme makes maintenance 
index information more efficient, and it is easy to update XML data with 
decreasing the number of affected nodes to the lowest. In order to protect 
structural information for encrypted XML data, the encrypted nodes are removed 
from original XML data, and structural information is hidden. 
 
A case study is carried out to demonstrate how the proposed XML security 
relative approaches and schemes can be applied to satisfy fine-grained XML 
security in calibration certificate management. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
With eXtensible Markup Language (XML) (Bray et al., 2008) widely applied to 
different areas, security is necessary to be integrated into XML solutions. XML is 
based on text format designing and has tree structure, and it is easier to access 
portions of data using XPath (Berglund et al., 2007). It is natural that data 
integrity, data authentication, information confidentiality, and other security 
benefits should be applied to entire XML data or portions of XML data. Traditional 
security systems can only handle the entire document or message. A new 
requirement of security is needed. XML security should provide security 
assurance of information represented using XML format. XML security must be 
combined with XML data features to keep the advantages and flexibility of XML 
while integrating essential security technologies. This is very important in XML-
based protocols, e.g. the protocol of Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
(Gudgin et al., 2007), and it relies on XML as its message format to provide 
message negotiation and transmission. 
 
Based on the new features and security requirements of XML data, the reasons 
of having XML security mechanism for XML are: XML data provides fine-grained 
access, and it needs to sign, and encrypt portions of XML data rather than in 
whole, e.g. multi-signature to different portions of XML data. Traditional security 
technologies cannot be used directly within XML data and do not provide 
methods relative to XML data content management (Sun and Li, 2005), e.g. 
using XPath to locate portions of XML data content or specifying XML data 
content using Uniform Resource Identifier string (URIs). Traditional security 
technologies play an important role in XML security to provide a set of necessary 
security algorithms and techniques which can be deployed in XML security. 
However, the representation of traditional security is not suitable to XML security 
(Sun and Li, 2005). The format of traditional security technologies is in binary, 
and it requires specialized software for interpretation and extracting the security 




The specifications relative to XML security published by W3C define the basic 
framework and rules that can be utilized by across applications. The basic idea 
for XML security is to reuse the algorithms, approaches, concepts, and 
techniques of traditional security systems. The tools and methods which can be 
used to support extensible integrating XML have been introduced. This idea 
enables existing infrastructures and across security deployment to interoperate 
with XML security. By using existing technologies and XML relative tools, XML 
security minimizes additional applications to satisfy security requirements for 
XML data (Hirsch, 2002). 
 
There are four major topics relative to XML security. 
• XML data integrity 
XML data integrity ensures that both XML data structure and data content are 
not destroyed or changed during transition or storage, and this can be 
ensured using hash value checking. This may happen when XML data is 
transmitted over the internet, such as from a server to a browser, and XML 
data is stored in a database system, or processed by intermediaries. 
 
• XML data authentication 
Identity authentication provides assurance about the claimed identity of an 
entity. In other words, it is to prove the claimed identity to a verifier. XML data 
authentication is that the entity is responsible for the creation of a set of XML 
data, which is the whole XML data or portion of XML data, is the one claimed. 
XML data authentication is usually ensured using digital signature.  
 
• XML data confidentiality 
XML data confidentiality ensures that XML data structure, data content or 
other sensitive information in XML data may only be accessed by legitimate 
parties. Confidentiality is generally associated with access control 
mechanisms or encryption technologies. Compared to access control 
mechanism, the encryption technology is essential in application, for example, 
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Accountability is used to record the responsibility of the individuals belonging 
to the organization for which a policy regarding XML data security has been 
established (Brandt and Bonte, 2000). This can be ensured using access 
control mechanism, such as assigning the role to control user’s accountability.  
 
These topics are not separate. XML key management (Hallam-Baker and 
Mysore, 2005) provides the basic key requirements for XML data integrity, 
authentication, and confidentiality. XML data integrity is used to generate hash 
value which actually is signed in XML signature. XML data integrity is the 
fundamental for XML data authentication. Based on the specification of 
“Decryption Transform for XML Signature” (Hughes et al., 2002), XML signature 
and XML encryption can be implemented independently, or encrypt entire or 
portions of a signed XML data. 
 
The thesis focuses on XML security in XML data integrity, authentication, and 
confidentiality. In particular, it mainly focuses on improving technologies relative 
to XML data integrity, XML signature, and XML encryption. 
1.1 Motivation and challenges  
XML security specifications published by W3C have addressed XML data 
integrity, XML digital signature, and XML encryption (Bartel et al., 2008; Imamura 
et al., 2002). XML data integrity is the basis for XML signature generation. W3C 
adopts DOM-HASH (Maruyama et al., 1999) to generate hash values for 
ensuring XML data integrity. Without considering XML data structure integrity, 
and context-referential integrity, it will result that a signature can be copied to 
another document still keeping valid signature verification. XML data integrity is 
the main reason leading to limitation in XML signature. Existing integrity solutions 
for XML data have not considered the features relative to XML data. Most of XML 
data integrity models describe controls for achieving hash values, but no attempt 
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is made to define a model for XML data integrity combined with XML data 
features. 
 
XML signature specification supports to build a single signature or multiple 
signatures. With XML signature, users can sign the same content or different 
portions of XML data. With the single digital signature generation and verification, 
XML signature is useful and practicable. When several users participate in multi-
signature generation, XML signature specification cannot handle a multi-
signature generation with a mixed dependent and independent way since it only 
supports a parallel multi-signature generation. Existing XML multi-signature 
schemes only provide broadcast (parallel) signature-generation scenarios. It 
cannot satisfy the signing process under a dependent multi-signature-generation 
situation. 
 
XML encryption is used to ensure XML data confidentiality, and it provides a 
flexible approach to encrypt any portions of XML data. Figure 1.1(a) shows a 
document of customer information. In order to protect credit card information, the 
elements <CreditCard> have to be encrypted. By using XML encryption 
<Customers> 
   <Customer> 
     <Name>…</Name> 
     <Address>…</Address> 
     <CreditCard> 
       … 
     </CreditCard > 
  </Customer> 
  <Customer> 
     <Name>…</Name> 
     <Address>…</Address> 
     <CreditCard > 
       … 
     </CreditCard > 
  </Customer> 




   <Customer> 
     <Name>…</Name> 
     <Address>…</Address> 
     <EncryptedData> 
       … 
     </EncryptedData > 
  </Customer> 
  <Customer> 
     <Name>…</Name> 
     <Address>…</Address> 
     <EncryptedData > 
       … 
     </EncryptedData > 
  </Customer> 
  … 
</Customers> 
 
Figure 1.1 An example of XML encryption result 
(a) (b) 
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technology, the encrypted result is shown in Figure 1.1(b). XML encryption 
supports to encrypt portions of XML data, and this can be found in Figure 1.1(b). 
However, the query of the information which resides in the cipher blocks has not 
been addressed in XML encryption technology when XML data is encrypted.  For 
instance, only the cipher blocks in Figure 1.1 (b) can answer information relating 
to bank information. 
 
Existing approaches are index-based scheme for encrypted XML data querying. 
Management of index information is not considered by researchers. It is a time-
consuming task to maintain index information for frequently changed XML data. It 
needs to consider efficiency of index information updating when an index scheme 
is deployed (Ünay and Gündem, 2008). In addition, the structural information 
leakage has not been considered within existing solutions. 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to improve XML security related technologies, and 
make it more practicable and secure. In order to reach this aim, there are several 
objectives:  
 
• To present an approach to easily validate X.509 digital certificate 
revocation information. 
 
• To present the XML data integrity requirements combined with XML data 
features.  
 
• To present a solution for XML data integrity protection, and improve the 
efficiency of hash value generation for XML data. 
 
• To build an XML multi-signature scheme, which is a mixed-signing order 
scheme including both series and parallel to satisfy a dependent and 
independent signing process. 
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• To present an index mechanism which can exactly locate a block of 
cipher text while users submit a query, and eliminate unnecessary 
decryption when query an encrypted XML data. The index information can 
be updated efficiently. In addition, this index mechanism will not disclose 
the structural information of XML data. 
 
• To implement a prototype of proposed approaches and schemes 
combining with existing XML security specifications. 
1.3 Research approach 
This research started with an extensive literature review of the sate-of-the-art in 
XML security in XML data integrity, entity authentication, XML data authentication 
and XML confidentiality.  
 
• Approaches or schemes development 
To address the aim and objectives highlighted in section 1.2, this research 
decided to use the concatenated hash function to model XML data integrity. 
The traditional hash functions, such as SHA1 or SHA2 cannot protect the 
relationship of different XML elements in XML data, e.g. parent-child 
relationship, sibling relationship. However, the traditional hash functions can 
be used to generate hash value for individual XML element. It needs a 
mechanism to assemble the hash value of individual XML element to protect 
the relationship between different XML elements. Similar to Merkle hash 
function (Merkle, 1989), concatenated hash function also focuses on hash 
value generation processing for tree-based data structure. Merkle hash 
function is based on binary tree, in contrast, concatenated hash function is 
based on arbitrary tree structure, and it is more suitable to handle XML data.  
Digital signature is used to ensure XML data authentication in a hierarchical 





• Correctness proving 
The correctness of proposed approaches or schemes is proved to confront 
the proposed aim and objectives. The correctness proofs of XML data 
integrity approach are expressed by three theorems. As proposed XML multi-
signature scheme, the correctness is proved by using strict mathematic 
method. 
 
• Security analysis 
The security of proposed approaches or schemes is also analyzed. The 
proposed XML data integrity approach is based on concatenated hash 
function. The security issue in proposed integrity approach is avoided 
because the approach is based on collision-resistant one-way hash function. 
The proposed XML multi-signature scheme is based on discrete logarithm 
(DL) problem, so it has a high security. The thesis also describes how the 
proposed encrypted XML data query scheme avoids inference attack. 
 
• Testing and evaluation 
The proposed approaches or schemes are strictly tested and verified to 
evaluate its performance and efficiency over existing solutions. The testing 
and evaluation cases are generated from XMark and DBLP dataset. The 
testing mainly focuses on correctness and functionality proving of proposed 
approaches or schemes. The evaluation mainly focuses on efficiency 
comparison between existing solutions. In this research, testing and 
evaluations were continuously being undertaken during every major phase to 
ensure that it has a good functionality and stability. Researchers in the School 
of Computing & Engineering have given some advices for evaluation, as well 
as whether it meets the aim and objectives of the research. Further revisions 
for the proposed approaches or schemes might take place based on the 





• Prototype implementation 
A prototype for XML security was developed in the C#.net language. This has 
facilitated the refinement and completion of the approaches and schemes 
with improved understanding on some implementation issues. The system 
also served as a demonstration of capabilities of the final system with 
feedbacks from various tests. 
 
1.4 Arrangements of this thesis 
Chapter 1 introduces the motivation and challenges of XML security in XML data 
integrity, authentication and confidentiality. The aim and objectives are described. 
The research approaches are also demonstrated. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the background knowledge relative to traditional security 
technologies, the common tools which has been deployed in XML security 
specifications, especially XML security specifications or standards including XML 
key management, XML signature syntax and processing, XML encryption syntax 
and processing published by W3C or OASIS. 
 
Chapter 3 is literature review. The contents of literature review mainly focuses on 
existing ideas and solutions relative to revocation information validation 
approaches for X.509 digital certificate, XML data integrity, the theories and 
schemes of multi-signature for ensuring XML data authentication. The 
investigation of schemes for index-based encrypted XML data query processing 
is also illustrated. 
 
XML key management is the basic requirements for XML security technologies. 
In order to alleviate the burden of revoked certificate validation, Chapter 4 
introduces an improved X.509 digital certificate based on XML signature 
technology. The improved X.509 digital certificate can be utilized combined with 
XML key management specification with a high efficiency. 
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Chapter 5 analyzes the XML data integrity. Based on presented XML data 
integrity requirements, an integrity model CSR (‘C’ for content integrity, ‘S’ for 
structure integrity, and ‘R’ for context-referential integrity) for XML data is 
proposed in this chapter. The functionality of this model is tested to meet the XML 
data integrity requirements. The efficiency of this model is also evaluated. 
 
Chapter 6 introduces the series-parallel signing group, which intends to generate 
a multi-signature with a dependant and independent signing process. In order to 
make XML data integrity-checking possible, the XML data integrity checking-pool 
is presented in this section. Based on Lu’s XML multi-signature scheme (Lu and 
Chen, 2004), combined with series-parallel signing group and XML data integrity-
checking pool, a series-parallel multi-signature scheme for XML data 
authentication is proposed.  
 
Chapter 7 introduces a number list based interval labeling scheme for XML data. 
Based on presented labeling scheme, an index-based scheme for encrypted XML 
data query processing is proposed with considering the efficiency of index 
information maintaining. 
 
Based on approaches and schemes proposed in previous chapters, Chapter 8 
implements a case study of XML security in calibration certificate management. 
The system architecture for calibration certificate management is introduced. The 
detailed algorithms or processes relative to XML security are also described.  
 
Chapter 9 focuses on the summary of this research and contribution to 
knowledge. A discussion for the future work is also described. 
 26
Chapter 2 Background 
This chapter firstly introduces the traditional security techniques and protocols, 
and then briefly introduces the XPath language. XML security specifications 
published by W3C and OASIS are also described. In particular, XML key 
management, Canonical XML, XML signature and XML encryption specifications 
established by the W3C are discussed.  
2.1 Security techniques and protocols 
2.1.1 Cryptographic hash functions 
Cryptographic hash functions are modelled based on one-way functions, which is 
easy to generate an authentication code. A cryptographic hash function is 
                                                       )(Mhy =                                                    (2.1) 
where, h  is a hash function, M is a message, y  is a hash value (Stallings, 
2006). A cryptographic hash function has some properties as follows. 
 
• The input of h  can be a block of data of any size 
• h  produces a fixed-length output, and it is called hash value, or message 
digest. 
• For any given value y , it is computationally infeasible to find M  such that 
yMh =)( . This is referred to as the one-way property. 
• Given a message M , it is difficult to find 'M  such that 'MM ≠  and 
)()( 'MhMh =  (Stallings, 2006).  
• It is difficult to find any pair ( M , 'M ) such that )()( 'MhMh =  (Stallings, 
2006). 
 
Widely used cryptographic hash functions are MD5, and the SHA series of 
functions. However, the collision has been found in hash function MD5, SHA-1 
and RIPEMD-160, and they are now considered insecure. SHA-256 and other 
hash functions are believed to be secure. A summary of existing hash algorithms 
are listed in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Hash algorithms  









512 128 64 239 (Wang et al., 2005a) 
SHA-1 (FIPS180-
2, 2002) 








1024 512 80 No 
RIPEMD-160 
(Dobbertin et al., 
1996) 
512 160 80 251 (Mendel et al., 2006) 
 
It is shown that MD5, SHA-1 and RIPEMD-160 are not good choice for 
generating message digest because of collision attacks (Cid 2006). Although the 
drawback of SHA-256 and SHA-512 is certainly slower than MD5 and SHA-1, 
until now, no collision has been found in SHA-256 and SHA-512 as shown in 
Table 2.1. SHA-256 and SHA-512 can be used as a replacement for MD5 and 
SHA-1. NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) also recommends 
using SHA-256 in practical applications. Based on this fact, hash functions still 
can be used to ensure security in applications. 
2.1.2 Symmetric cryptography 
Bijection is used as the basis of cryptography, for encryption (Smart, 2010). 
Bijection is a mathematical function which is one-to-one (injective) and onto 
(surjective). In particular, if YXf →: is a bijection, then for all Yy ∈ , there is a 
unique Xx ∈ such that yxf =)( . This unique x is given by the inverse function 
XYf →− :1 . 
 
If f is an encryption transformation, then 1−f is the corresponding decryption 
transformation. If a non-injective function were used as an encryption 
transformation, it would not be possible to decrypt to a unique plain text. 
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The traditional way of encrypting messages is called symmetric key encryption. 
Symmetric-key algorithms use a single secret key which must be shared and kept 
private by both sender and receiver for both encryption and decryption. To use a 
symmetric encryption scheme, the sender and receiver must securely share a 
key in advance. 
 
This symmetric encryption scheme assumes that the sender and the recipient 
share the knowledge of a secret key K  and an encryption algorithm sA  to the 
message M . A message can be encrypted by 
                                               ),( KMAC s=                                                    (2.2) 
 
The secret message C  is decrypted by applying the inverse algorithm 1−sA  to the 
secret message C  with the key K : 
 
                                               ),(1 KCAM s−=                                                  (2.3) 
 
Symmetric-key algorithms can be divided into stream ciphers and block ciphers. 
Stream ciphers encrypt the bits of the message one at a time, and block ciphers 
take a number of bits and encrypt them as a single unit. Table 2.1 summarizes 
the commonly used symmetric-key algorithms. 
 
Table 2.2 Symmetric-key algorithms 
Algorithms Block size (bits) Key size (bits) 
DES (Kammer, 1999) 64 56 
AES (NIST, 2001) 128 128, 192, 256 
Triple DES (Barker, 2004) 64 168 
 
The commonly used block ciphers are Data Encryption Standard (DES), 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), and Triple DES as shown in Table 2.2. 
The DES is a block cipher that was selected by the National Bureau of Standards 
as an official Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) for the United 
States in 1976 (Kammer, 1999). It is based on a symmetric-key algorithm that 
uses a 56-bit key. DES is now considered to be insecure for many applications, 
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and this is chiefly due to the 56-bit key size being too small. The AES is a 
symmetric-key encryption standard adopted by the U.S. government (NIST, 
2001). The standard comprises three block ciphers, AES-128, AES-192, and 
AES-256. Each of these ciphers has a 128-bit block size, with key sizes of 128, 
192, and 256 bits, respectively. Triple DES (3DES) applies the DES cipher 
algorithm three times to each data block. Triple DES was designed to provide a 
relatively simple method of increasing the key size of DES to protect against 
brute force attacks, without designing a completely new block cipher algorithm 
(Barker, 2004). 
 
2.1.3 Asymmetric cryptography 
The distinguishing technique used in public key cryptography is the use of 
asymmetric key algorithms, where the key used to encrypt a message is not the 
same key used to decrypt it. Each user has a pair of cryptographic keys—a public 
key pubK and a private key privK . The private key is kept secret, while the public 
key may be widely distributed. Messages are encrypted with the recipient’s public 
key and can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key. The keys are 
related mathematically, but the private key cannot feasibly be derived from the 
public key (Diffie, 1976). Table 2.3 lists the usage of key pairs with different 
security purposes. 
 
Table 2.3 A pair of cryptographic keys 
Security purpose Kind of key 
Send an encrypted message Use the receiver’s public key 
Decrypt an encrypted message Use the receiver’s private key 
Send a signed message (signature generation) Use the sender’s private key 
Verify a signature (and authenticate the sender) Use the sender’s public key 
 
In asymmetric cryptography, each user has a private key privK , and a public key 
pubK . A plain-text message M  encrypted with the public key pubK  can only be 
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decrypted with the private key privK . The cryptographic algorithm eA  is used for 
encryption, and dA  is used for decryption. In some public key encryption 
schemes, e.g. RSA, the same algorithm can be used for both encryption and 
decryption (i.e. de AA = ). The encryption and decryption is performed 
                                         ),( pube KMAC =                                                      (2.4) 
                                         ),( privd KCAM =                                                     (2.5) 
 
Similarly, a message 'M that is encrypted with the private key privK  can only be 
decrypted with the public key pubK : 
 
                                       ),( '' prive KMAC =                                                     (2.6) 
                                       ),( '' pubd KCAM =                                                     (2.7) 
 
There are two main branches of public key cryptography are public key 
encryption and digital signature. 
 
• Public key encryption 
A message encrypted with a receiver’s public key cannot be decrypted by 
anyone expect a possessor of the matching private key. This is used for 
confidentiality. RSA (which stands for Rivest, Shamir and Adleman who 
first publicly described it) is the first algorithm known to be suitable for 
encryption as well as signing. RSA is believed to be secure given 
sufficiently long keys and the use of up-to-date implementations. The RSA 
algorithm involves three steps: key generation, encryption and decryption 
(Stallings, 2006). 
 
Step 1: key generation 
1. Select qp, , where p and q are both prime, and qp ≠ . 
2. Calculate qpn ×= ,where n is used as the modulus for both the public 
and private keys. 
3. Calculate )1)(1()( −−= qppqϕ , whereϕ is Euler’s totient function. 
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4. Select an integer e such that )(1 qpe ϕ<< , and 1)),(gcd( =enϕ (this 
means that e and )( pqϕ share no divisors other than 1). 
5. Calculate ))1()1mod((1 −×−= − qped , where d is kept as the private 
key exponent. 
6. },{ neK pub = . The public key consists of the modulus n and the public 
exponent e . },{ ndK priv = . The private key consists of the modulus 
n and the private exponent d which must be kept secret. 
 
Step 2: encryption 
Each message )( nMM < , the ciphertextC corresponding to: 
                                            nMC e mod=                                           (2.8) 
 
Step 3: decryption 
The original message M can be recovered by using private key exponent 
d by the formula 2.9 computation: 
                                            nCM d mod=                                          (2.9) 
 
• Digital signature 
A digital signature (Pfleeger, 1997) is an emulation of a real, physical 
signature. A digital signature is a proof that the sender makes the 
message, and everyone can identify the message belonging to the sender 
with the sender’s public key. Public key encryption algorithms are suited 
to digital signatures, like RSA. An encryption using a private key of the 
user serves as a signature that only the owner of the private key can be 
generated, and everyone with the public key can verify. Another 
commonly used algorithm for digital signature is Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA). The DSA is based on the difficulty of computing discrete 
logarithms. The DSA algorithm involves three steps: key generation, 
signing, and verifying (NIST, 2006). 
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Step 1: key generation 
The key pair is generated for a set of domain parameters gqp ,, , 
where qp, are two large prime numbers such that )1(| −pq , g is the 
generator of the cyclic group of order q in *pZ (selects an element *pZh ∈  
and computes phg qp mod/)1( −= such that 1≠g ). User’s private key is a 
randomly selected integrity )0( qxx << . User’s public key y  is calculated 
by using pgy x mod= . 
 
Step 2: signing 
Let H be the hashing function, such as SHA1, and M the message to be 
signed. 
1. Generate a random per-message value )0( qkk << . 
2. Calculate qpgr k mod)mod(= , and qxrMHks mod)))((( 1 += − . 
3. The signature is ),( sr  
 
Step3: verifying 
1. Reject the signature if either qr <<0 or qs <<0 is not satisfied. 
2. Compute qsw mod)( 1−= . 
3. Compute qwMHu mod))((1 ×= , and qwru mod)(2 ×=  
4. Compute qpygv uu mod)mod)(( 21 ×= . 
5. The signature is valid if rv = . 
 
2.1.4 Public key infrastructure 
The definition of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is “the set of hardware, 
software, people, policies and procedures needed to create, manage, store, 
distribute, and revoke public key certificates based on public key cryptography” in 
the IETF PKIX Roadmap (Arsenault and Turner, 1999; Goyal, 2004b). PKIX 
(Public Key Infrastructure (X.509)) is an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
effort to standardize such a PKI. 
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2.1.5 X.509 certificate 
In the terminology of PKIX, a public key certificate is defined as “a data structure 
containing the public key of an End-Entity and some other information, which is 
digitally signed with the private key of the certificate authority (CA) which issued 
it” (Arsenault and Turner, 1999). 
 
A public key certificate is applied to provide evidence of a legitimate key, and it is 
a document containing serial number, public key information, and identity – such 
as the name of a person or email address, and these information is signed by a 
trusted authority, e.g. a CA (Schneier, 1995; Georgiadis et al., 2002).  
 
One of the most popular standards for public key certificates is contained in the 
ITU (International Telecommunication Union) X.509 standard. The X.509 
standard (ITU, 1997; Ford and Baum, 1997) provides an authentication 
framework with public key certificate distribution to the X.509 directory standards 
series (ITU, 1997). The X.509 standard specifies how identity authentication 
information is generated, illustrates how identity authentication information can be 
retrieved from a server, and also defines approaches in which applications may 
utilize the identity authentication information to perform authentication verification 
process (Georgiadis et al., 2002). 
 
ITU-T X.509 was firstly published in 1988 as part of the X.500 Directory 
recommendations, and it defines a standard certificate format. The certificate 
format in the 1988 standard is called the version 1 (v1) format. X.509 is based on 
the use of public-key cryptography and digital signatures. The standard does not 
dictate the use of a specific algorithm but recommends RSA. The digital signature 
scheme is assumed to require the use of a hash function. However, the standard 
does not dictate a specific hash algorithm. The 1988 recommendation included 
the description of a recommended hash function; this algorithm has since been 
shown to be insecure and was dropped from the 1993 recommendation (Housley 
et al., 2002). 
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When X.500 was revised in 1993, resulting in the version 2 (v2) format. The 
X.509 version 2 format does not convey all of the information that recent design 
and implementation experience has shown to be needed. Ford lists the following 
requirements not satisfied by version 2 (Ford, 1995). 
• The Subject field is inadequate to convey the identity of a key owner to a 
public-key user. 
• The Subject field is also inadequate for many applications, which typically 
recognize entity by an e-mail address, a URL. 
• There is a need to indicate security policy information. This makes an 
application easily to relate a certificate to a given policy. 
• It needs to limit the damage, which may result from a faulty or malicious 
CA, by setting constraints of a particular certificate. 
• It is important to be able to identify different keys used by the same owner 
at different time. 
 
In response to these new requirements, the X.509 certificate version 3 (v3) was 
developed. The v3 version extends the v2 format by adding provision for 
additional extension fields. Particular extension field types may be specified in 
standards or may be defined and registered by any organization (Housley et al., 
2002). 
 
In the X.509 structure, a trusted CA assigns a distinguished name (DN) to the 
user who holds a public key certificate (Schneier, 1995). The CA issues 
certificates signed under the CA’s private key. When a user A wishes to 
communicate with a user B, A obtains B’s certificate from a directory (or by 
another method) and verifies its authenticity with the CA’s public key.  
2.2 XPath expressions 
In order to retrieve information from encrypted XML data, XML Path Language 
(XPath) should be deployed within a query. The XPath language is a 
specification for addressing nodes of an XML data in XPath data model (XDM) 
proposed by W3C. Using XPath, an XML document as well as atomic values, e.g. 
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integers, strings, and booleans are represented as a tree structure. It also offers 
an expressive way to locate nodes within the tree (Berglund et al., 2007). 
 
A path expression contains of a series of path steps, which is separated by "/" or 
"//", and usually beginning with "/" or "//", where, “/” denotes parent-child operator, 
and “//” denotes ancestor-descendant operator. Such a path can be either 
absolute path, which starts from the root of the XML data tree, or relative one 
starting with known context nodes (Berglund et al., 2007).  
 
A wildcard operator (“*” or “@”) is also allowed to be used in an XPath. A 
wildcard operator can match any element or attribute node of the context node in 
XML data tree. In addition, a predicate expressed in square brackets (“[ ]”) can 
also be used to refine the selection operation in XPath expression (Jonker and 
Feng, 2008). 
2.3 XML Key Management  
Public key provides trustworthy of client’s identity, and it can be used to establish 
secure communication between different clients. Public key information is 
provided by a digital certificate based on PKI. Deployment of PKI is a complex 
task because the PKI must reflect the real word trust relationship which is 
complex and subtle (Hallam-Baker and Ford, 2001). The complexity limited the 
application of PKI. 
 
In order to support a client to make use of public key management, and further 
support public key management in XML digital signature and XML encryption, the 
W3C and Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) published specification of XML 
Key Management (Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005). 
 
The XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) provides public key 
management to support XML applications (Hirsch and Just, 2003). XKMS is not a 
substitute for a PKI. It is expected that a client can make use of key management 
functionality. It is also expected that the deployments of XMKS allows clients to 
interoperate with X.509 PKI already deployed (Hallam-Baker and Ford, 2001). In 
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addition, the XKMS is suitable for use in conjunction with the W3C 
Recommendations for XML Signature and XML Encryption (Hallam-Baker and 
Mysore, 2005). 
 
The XML Key Management Specification consists of two parts: the XML Key 
Information Service Specification (X-KISS) and the XML Key Registration Service 
Specification (X-KRSS).  
2.3.1 X-KISS 
X-KISS specifies a protocol to resolve public key information contained in 
element of <ds: KeyInfo> (Hallam-Baker and Ford, 2001). This element is applied 
to identify a public key in XML signature. X-KISS provides two services as 
follows: 
 
• Locate service 
The locate service resolves a <ds: KeyInfo> element but does not require the 
service to make an assertion concerning the validity of the binding between 
the data in the <ds: KeyInfo> element (Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005). 
When a client submits a locate request, the locate service processing is 
shown in Figure 2.1 as described by W3C (Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005). 
 
 
A recipient receives a signed XML data from another user which specifies 









  … 
HTTP/1.1  
X.509Certificate 
Figure 2.1 Location service provides name resolution 
(Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005) 
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value from the XKMS service by using the locate service. The recipient sends 
the element of <ds:KeyInfo> to the location service, and the locate service 
returns the corresponding <KeyValue> to the recipient. 
 
• Validate service 
The validate service allows the client to obtain an assertion specifying the 
status of the binding between the public key and the relative identity 
information, such as a name or a set of other attributes (Hallam-Baker and 
Mysore, 2005). Unlike locate service, the validate service makes sure the 
data returned is valid and bound to the same public key. Figure 2.2 described 
by W3C shows the validate service. 
 
When a user holds a signed XML data and relative X.509 certificate, it is not 
known whether the certificate is trustworthy. In order to determine this, the 
certificate needs to be sent to an XKMS validate service, and the service 
returns back the validating results. The validate service establishes a 
certificate trust path, and then validates each certificate in the path against 
the relevant CRL. If all certificates in the path are valid, the validate service 
responses a positive result. The client is only informed the validation results 
by validate service, and shielded from this complex process. Although this 
approach reduces the complexity for a client, it will increase the burden of the 






   <…> 
Result=Valid 
<Keybinding> 
   <KeyID> 
   <ds:KeyInfo> 
Figure 2.2 Key validation service 
(Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005) 
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2.3.2 X-KRSS 
XML Key Registration Service Specification (X-KRSS) specifies a protocol for a 
trust service that permits management of information bound to a public key 
(Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005). X-KRSS supports all the following 
functionalities associated with the public key: 
 
• Registration 
The registration service supports binding a public key to a specific identity, 
such as a name, email address. The key pair can be generated by either 
client or registration service. If the key pair is generated by client, it also 
needs additional information to prove possession of private key (Hallam-
Baker and Mysore, 2005).  The registration request should be authenticated 
by the client, and this can be done by a digital signature.  
 
 
A client generates a key pair and registers the public key. The identifier is the 
email address. The request message should contain the elements of 
<ProofofPossession> and <Keyauthentication> as shown in Figure 2.3 by 
W3C (Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005).  
 
• Reissue 
The registration service permits clients to reissue key bindings previously 
issued (Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005). The reissue process is similar to 
Client Server 
<RegisterResult> 
   <KeyBinding> 
<RegisterRequest> 
  <PrototypeKeyBinding> 
   <Authentication> 
   <ProofofPossession> 
Figure 2.3 Registration of key binding 
(Hallam-Baker and Mysore, 2005) 
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the initial registration process. Clients only need to submit a reissue request. 
The registration service accepts the request and returns the response. 
 
• Revocation 
A registration service permits clients to revoke a key binding previously 
issued. An authorized client may request that the trust service revokes a key 
binding. This is necessary because the key has been compromised or 
because information contained in the key binding is incorrect (Hallam-Baker 
and Ford, 2001). Sufficient information must be included in the request to 
identify the key binding to be revoked such as key binding ID for evidence, 




When the key pair is created by the registration service, private key recovery 
is essential because clients may lose their private key and require accessing 
to their encrypted data (Hallam-Baker and Ford, 2001). The registration 
service provides functionality of recovery a private key to a client under this 
situation. 
 
2.4 Canonical XML 
The specification “Canonical XML 1.1” provides an approach for creating a 
unique physical representation of an XML data which accounts for permissible 
changes (Boyer and Marcy, 2007). This specification is used to guarantee that 
logically-identical XML documents give identical XML signatures. XML 
Canonicalization (Canonicalization is often simply called “c14n”) discards 
irrelevant details from an XML data and supplies a non-ambiguous octet 
representation. If two XML data have the same canonical results, then the two 
XML data are logically equivalent in a given context.  
 
Canonical XML is used by XML signature to create a unique representation of an 
XML data or a subset. This unique representation is necessary to compute a 
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cryptographic hash value which to be signed, because the hash function is 
sensitive to any character changing. XML 1.0 is so flexible in document formats 






Both code fragments in (1) and (2) above represent an empty element. They are 
different in byte representation, but are equivalent as XML data. The XML 1.0 
specification allows equivalent XML data to be expressed in multiple formats in 
terms of attribute occurrence sequence, naming space definitions, and blank 
character handling, among others. 
 
The digital signature is generated based on hash value of byte representations 
for XML data. Because of the flexibility of the XML 1.0 specification described 
above, signing the logically equivalent contents may lead to failed signature 
verification. Against this background, the canonical XML specification, which 
provides for canonical forms that are equivalent to XML data formats, was 
established ahead of XML signature specifications. Based on the canonical XML 
specification, an XML data is need to be converted to a canonical form before 
XML data is signed and verified (Weerasinghe et al., 2006).  
 
The changes for canonical XML have been summarized into two different 
categories, the first is relative to content changes and the other is the structure 
change for document subset. 
2.4.1 Content changes for canonical XML 
• Character encoding: c14n always uses the UTF-8 as character encoding 
scheme. 
• Line breaks: all line endings are normalized to #xA. 
• Attribute values: attribute values are normalized to the XML 1.0 
specification. All attribute values are delimited by double quotes. 
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• The replacement of references for character and parsed entity. 
• CDATA sections are converted into text content. 
• XML declaration and DTD removed: both XML declaration and document 
type declaration are omitted from canonical XML. 
• Empty elements: use start-end tag pairs replace empty elements. 
• White space: all white space in character content is retained. White space 
within start and end tags are reduced to a single space. 
• Special characters: use character references to replace special 
characters in character contents. 
• Namespace declarations: each element’s superfluous namespace 
declarations bas been removed. 
• Default attributes: default attributes for particular elements must be added 
to respective elements. 
• Lexicographic: the namespace declarations and attributes of elements are 
arranged as lexicographical order. 
2.4.2 Structure changes for document subsets 
Some applications require a physical representation for an XML document 
subset. Figure 2.4 illustrates the process of canonical document subset. Figure 
2.4 (a) shows the XML tree with selected nodes which will be included in 
document subsets. Figure 2.4 (b) shows the canonicalized document subsets. 
 
 
The selected nodes are A (/A), D (/A/B/D), F (/A/F), H (/A/F/H), K (/A/I/J/K), where 
the bracketed content is the XPath string of each selected node in Figure 2.4 (a). 
A 
B F I 
C D G H J 
E K L 
A 
D F K 
H 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2.4 Document subset canonicalizing 
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The changes are that nodes become direct children of their visible ancestor when 
their parent node has not been selected. As shown in Figure 2.4, the node K 
becomes a child of node A, and node D becomes a child of node A.  
 
Exclusive XML Canonicalization is one of the XML canonicalization 
specifications. It has been established considering special situations. In 
consideration that signed XML data A will be inserted as a child element of XML 
data B. Because of canonicalization, the name space of XML data A will be 
changed when XML data B is converted according to the canonical XML 
specification. This will result an invalid XML signature verification for XML data A. 
The exclusive XML canonicalization specification, which is based on canonical 
XML specification, was established to avoid this problem (Weerasinghe et al., 
2006). This specification is particular important for Web Services Security, which 
specifies XML-signed SOAP messages. 
2.5 XML signature 
XML signature is a digital signature technology that is optimized for XML data. 
The practical benefits of this technology include partial signature, which allows an 
electronic signature to be written on specific tags contained in XML data, and 
multi-signature, which enables user to generate more than one signature within 
the same XML data. The use of XML signature can solve security problems, 
including falsification, spoofing, and repudiation. 
 
XML signature was established as a formal version of W3C recommendations in 
Feb. 2002 (Bartel et al., 2008). W3C has also established related specifications 
that need to be fulfilled when XML signature is actually deployed. The 
specifications relative to XML signature are listed: 
 
• Canonical XML Version 1.0: W3C Recommendation 03/15/2001 (Boyer, 
2001). 
 
• Exclusive XML Canonicalization Version 1.0: W3C Recommendation 
07/18/2002 (Boyer et al., 2002a). 
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• XML-Signature XPath Filter 2.0: W3C Recommendation 11/08/2002 
(Boyer et al., 2002b). 
 
Based on specifications above, the W3C published the first edition and the 
second edition of XML digital signature specification in 2002 and 2008 
respectively. 
 
• XML-Signature Syntax and Processing: W3C Recommendation 
02/12/2002 (Bartel et al., 2002). 
 
• XML Signature Syntax and Processing (Second Edition): W3C 
Recommendation 10/06/2008 (Bartel et al., 2008). 
 
2.5.1 Structure of XML signature 
XML-Signature Syntax and Processing specification provides the rules for XML 
signature. It defines signature in XML format, the approach for signature 
generation, and method for signature verification. Figure 2.5 shows the structure 
of the element <SignedInfo>.  
 
 
A structure of XML signature is that the <Signature> element lies at the top of the 
document. The element <Signature> contains the element of <SignedInfo>, 
which includes references to the algorithms applied to XML signature generation 
and the target in XML data (Weerasinghe et al., 2006). It also holds hash value 
ds:SignedInfo ds:SignatureMethod 
ds:Reference using URI 






Figure 2.5 Structure of SignedInfo in XML signature 
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and other information. An element of <SignatureValue> includes the signature 
result, and public key information is contained in <KeyInfo> element, which to be 
used when the XML signature is verified. When considering the characteristics of 
XML signature, the <Reference> element is particularly important. Multiple 
<Reference> elements may be contained in the <SignedInfo> element. This is 
used to identify XML data segments at any location in XML data to be signed. 
With this advantage, multi-signature is also supported through simply repeating 
XML signature. However, this kind of multi-signature will increase the size of 
signature results. The signing process only can be executed with an independent 
way, and the signing process for users’ dependent relationship cannot be 
supported. 
 
Figure 2.6 shows algorithms deployed in XML digital signature. The signature 
algorithms deployed in XML digital signature are RSA and DSA. XML signature 
permits one to deploy one-way hash functions to get a hash value using SHA-1, 
and recommends using HMAC-SHA1 to get a MAC. Although the integrity 
method has been introduced, XML signature scheme does not provide how to 










Canonical XML with comments 









      Element                                               Algorithms                                       Requirement 
Figure 2.6 Algorithms for XML digital signatures 
correspondence with different elements according to 
W3C specification 
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exactly one <SignedInfo> element to indicate what is signed by the signature. 
The signature is an intermediary list of hash values. Generation of the 
<SignedInfo> does not require the usage of a private key, as only hash values 
are generated. The <SignedInfo> is the final object which is being signed by the 
cryptographic signature.  
2.5.2 Enveloping, enveloped and detached signatures 
XML signature supports three kinds of signature representation forms: 
enveloping, enveloped, and detached. These terms for XML signature refers to 
the relationship between signed contents and signature. The properties and 
limitations of the three kinds of forms are as follows. 
 
• Enveloping signature 
An enveloping signature is an ancestor of the signed contents in the XML tree 
as shown in Figure 2.7.  
 
The major feature of an enveloping signature is that only one data object is in 
signed contents. The signed contents and signature form a single object. The 
application must strip away the signature-envelope before handling signed 
contents within enveloping signature. The advantage of this kind of signature 
approach is that the signature and signed content form a single entity which 
can be handled easily during transport. There is no problem to miss the 








Figure 2.7 Enveloping signature 
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• Detached signature 
A detached signature means that the signature is separated from the signed 
contents. The signed contents are outside of the signature element. A 
detached signature has no parent/child relationship to the signed contents. 
There are two situations as shown in Figure 2.8: the signature and the signed 
contents reside in separate files, or the signature and the signed contents 
reside in the same XML document but have no parent/child relationship, 
usually both are siblings.  
 
The major feature of detached signature is that signature is not merged into 
signed contents. In XML signature specification, the signed content is 
identified using URIs. This provides a binding between signature and signed 
contents, and it makes the selection of signed object more flexible, e.g. the 
object on a web server or in any directory can be accessed by a URIs.  
Different from enveloping signature, if the signer sends only the signature, the 
verifier still can access the signed contents via URIs mechanism. Without 
protecting elements’ context-relationship, this flexibility can lead to a result 
that a signature can be copied to any XML data still keeping valid signature 
verification. 
 
• Enveloped signature 
An enveloped signature is a descendant relative to the whole or parts of 
signed contents in the XML tree as shown in Figure 2.9. Enveloped signature 
introduced by XML signature is that the signature is placed inside the signed 











signatures can only sign XML data. This kind of approach changed the 
structure of the original XML data. This is the reason that XML signature 
provides a transform mechanism to select portions of signed XML data. 
 
2.6 XML encryption 
XML encryption specification was established by the W3C as a formal version of 
W3C recommendations in December 2002 (Imamura et al., 2002). The W3C also 
established related specifications that solve problems raised when XML 
encryption and XML signature are used in combination. The specifications 
relative to XML encryption are listed: 
 
• XML Encryption Syntax and Processing: W3C Recommendation 
12/10/2002 
 
• Decryption Transform for XML Signature: W3C Recommendation 
12/10/2002 
 
XML encryption is an encryption technology that is optimized for XML data. This 
specification provides format for using XML and processing rules regarding to 
encryption and decryption. Its practical benefits include partial encryption, which 
encrypts specific tags contained in XML data, multiple encryption, which means 
that data can be encrypted multiple times, and even more complex encryption, 






Figure 2.9 Enveloped signature 
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portions of data. The use of XML encryption also facilitates to solve security 
problems, including XML data eavesdropping. 
 
XML encryption offers various benefits. An XML element containing XML 
encryption information can act as a container for encrypted data or as a container 
for encrypting key or both. XML encryption is capable to encrypt the whole XML 
data or portions of it within an XML document (Geuer-Pollmann, 2002). XML 
encryption allows direct inclusion of the encrypted contents into the container or 
to reference the encrypted contents via the transform mechanism. XML 
encryption offers key management facilities for symmetric wrapping of private 
keys, private key transportation, and key agreement using Diffie-Hellman. 
 
 
The structure for XML-encrypted data is shown in Figure 2.10 as described by 
W3C. The <EncryptedData> element lies at the top of encrypted results. 
<EncryptionMethod> element is the child element of <EncryptedData>. The 
element of <EncryptionMethod> contains algorithms information for encryption 
result generation. The decryption key information is contained in element 
<KeyInfo>, which is used to decrypt encrypted-data. The <CipherData> element 
is the final encrypted value. If hybrid encryption is used, the structure can also 
<EncryptedData Id? Type? Encoding?> 
   <EncryptionMethod/> 
    <ds:KeyInfo> 
      <EncryptedKey/> 
      <AgreementMethod/> 
      <ds:KeyName/> 
      <ds:RetrievalMethod/> 
    </ds:KeyInfo> 
    <CipherData> 
      <CipherValue/> 
      <CipherReference URI/> 
    </CipherData> 
    <EncryptionProperties/> 
</EncryptedData> 
 
Figure 2.10 Structure for XML encryption 
(Imamura et al., 2002) 
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include the <EncryptedKey> element, which contains the key-encryption key. 
URIs can be used to specify what has been encrypted. This indicates that XML 
encryption provides a flexible method to identify the encrypted objects. The 
detailed element in XML encryption and related algorithms is shown in Figure 
2.11. 
 
The value of element <EncryptionMethod> is the identifiers of block encryption 
algorithms. The major block encryption algorithms deployed are 3DES, AES-128, 
AES-256, AES-192. Key Transport algorithms are used to specify the encrypting 
and decrypting keys. Key transport algorithm includes RSA-v1.5 and RSA-OAEP 
(Imamura et al., 2002).  
Block Encryption 
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Figure 2.11 Algorithms for XML encryption correspondence 
with different elements according to W3C specification 
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In order to judge the sequence of XML signature and XML encryption for the 
same portions of XML data, the specification of “Decryption Transform for XML 
Signature” was established (Hughes et al., 2002). Generally, signing an 
encrypted XML data is meaningless in practice. When user encrypts the whole or 
portions of signed XML data, it needs to identify the encrypted object for 
decrypting. This specification provides an approach to solve the problem. This 
has been established by the W3C’s XML encryption working group as an 
additional specification with regard to the conversion processing that is performed 
on XML signatures. 
2.7 Summary 
Traditional security technologies are the basis of XML security. This chapter 
mainly introduces the traditional security techniques that are utilized in XML 
security specifications. The XML security relative specifications published by 
W3C and OASIS are the core of XML security technology, such as XML key 
management satisfies key requirements for signature or encryption, XML 
signature provides XML data authentication, and XML data confidentiality is 
ensured using XML encryption technology. 
 
XML key management specification provides public key management to support 
XML security applications. The validation for digital certificate is a bottleneck, and 
it increases the burden of the server. Without considering elements’ context 
relationship which can be ensured by XML data integrity, an XML signature can 
be copied to another XML data still keeping successful signature verification. In 
addition, simply repeating XML signature to generate multi-signature will increase 
the size of signature results, and this kind of multi-signature cannot support a 
dependent signing process. Although XML encryption specification offers some 
benefits, how to locate the information contained in cipher text has not been 
addressed. After several rounds encryption, only the plaintext can be queried 
while the information residing in cipher block cannot be identified. The issues 
mentioned above will be investigated in detail in next chapter. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review 
This chapter analyzes the revocation information validation approach for X.509 
digital certificate. XML data integrity and relative solutions are investigated. The 
XML multi-signature schemes are analyzed. The approaches for encrypted XML 
data query processing are also investigated.  
3.1 Revocation information validation for X.509 certificate 
Certificate revocation is the action of declaring a certificate invalid before its 
validity expired. There are two major approaches to check validity of a certificate 
status, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), and Online Certificate Status Protocol 
(OCSP). 
 
CRL is a list issued and digital signed by a certificate authority (CA), and it 
contains the serial number of certificates that they should not be used if they 
have been revoked before their expiration date. This list is dated and also has an 
expiration date. User must download a new CRL after it’s expired. However, 
CRLs are too bandwidth and cannot support a good degree of timeliness (Myers 
et. al, 1999; Micali, 1997, Goyal, 2004a; Arnes, 2000; Benjumea et al., 2007; 
Goyal, 2007; Wazan et al., 2008). Several CRL relative approaches have been 
proposed to improve the efficiency of digital certificate validation. Certificate 
Revocation System (CRS) enables system to answer the user query with a high 
efficiency (Micali, 1997; Micali, 2002; Goyal, 2007). The basic idea of CRS is as 
follows. For certificate creation, the CA selects two random numbers 0Y and 0X , 
and computes )( 0YHY = , where H is a hash algorithm such as SHA1. 
Let )(),...,(),( 3643651201 XHXXHXXHX === , where H is a hash algorithm, 
the number 365 denotes the number of days in the year. Y and 365X  are included 
in the certificate and signed along with the other usual information. 
36400 ,...,, XXY  keep secret by CA. When the CA receives a validation request on 
the i th day, CA makes two choices with checking CRL. If the certificate is 
revoked, the CA releases 0Y , which can be verified by hashing and comparing 
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with Y specified in the certificate. If the certificate is still valid, the CA 
releases iX −365 which can be verified by hashing i times and comparing with 365X  
specified in the certificate. However, CRS is difficult to be deployed in distributed 
querying systems (Goyal, 2007). The communication between CA and directory 
is too frequent, which shoots up the overall bandwidth cost of the system (Naor 
and Nissim, 1998; Aiello et al., 1998; Goyal, 2007). 
 
Certificate Revocation Tree (CRT) is another well-known approach for certificate 
revocation solution (Kocher, 1998; Goyal, 2007). A CRT is based on the Merkle 
hash function (Kocher, 1998). The tree leaves contain the serial number of the 
revoked certificate which is included in a relevant CRL. The root of the tree is 
signed by the CA. The certificate status proof for a certificate with serial number 
consists of the path node siblings from the root to the appropriate leaf, in addition 
to the signature on the root of the tree. Although the communication is low, the 
data volume to be downloaded is still large. The overall cost is still relatively high. 
 
The OCSP is another certificate revocation solution designed by IETF (Myers et 
al., 1999). The protocol requires the security client to send a request to an OCSP 
responder which is the server returning status information about a specific 
certificate when asked. OCSP is an online service, and it has a high degree of 
timeliness. Because the CA is required to create a signature for each query, 
OCSP increases the communication burden between server and client (Goyal, 
2007). 
3.2 XML data integrity 
General applications of data integrity could exist in many domains, including e-
government, e-commerce, e-financial services, e-business, e-banking, e-learning, 
e-healthcare, mobile communications, heterogeneous networks, digital factories, 
multi-agent systems, and grid computing (Wu et al., 2002; Chen and Lu, 2004; 
Rushinek, 2002; Boritz and No, 2005; Jones et al., 2000; O’Neill, 2007; Yee et 
al., 2006; Blobel, 2004; Dankers et al., 2002; Ekelhart et al., 2008; Karnouskos, 
2005; Woerner and Woern, 2005; Oliveria et al., 2006; Cody et al., 2008). Wu 
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and Chen described the need for data integrity when official documents are being 
transmitted between government agencies for e-government in Taiwan (Wu et al., 
2002; Chen and Lu, 2004). O’Neill pointed out the importance of data integrity 
through an assessment of a bank’s web service (O’Neill, 2007). IBM gives an 
example of data integrity as follows: assume the data is a funds transfer and the 
hacker alters a random piece of the data that happens to be the account number. 
When the bank decrypts the data, the account number is not a valid account; 
therefore, the data tampering is detected and the transaction is not completed. 
However, assume instead that the data altered by the hacker is the amount of 
money and, changed it from 1000 units to 9000 units (IBM, 2008). In this case, the 
transaction would be completed using the incorrect amount. Research into this 
area would be of great benefit. 
 
There are two approaches to ensure integrity for XML data. The first tries to add 
additional elements in XML data to record the integrity information. Hussain 
maintained the integrity of XML signatures using the manifest element (Ekelhart et 
al., 2008; Hussain and Soh, 2004). Mclntosh presented an element position 
attack, and solved this problem by adding additional objects in XML data 
(Mclntosh and Austel, 2005). Another approach is based on hash function 
mechanism. 
 
Mclntosh summarized the context dependent semantics for XML data integrity 
with examples. The context dependent semantics for XML data integrity has been 
summarized into three situations: 
 
• Simple ancestry context 
It means that an element has a specific position in an XML document. From 
the element’s name, value, attributes, and its ancestors or children’s name,   
the semantic meaning of this element can be completely derived (Mclntosh 




• Sibling value context 
This situation means that the element has sibling elements with the same 
name but with different semantic meanings (Mclntosh and Austel, 2005). 
 
• Sibling order context 
The element’s semantics are relative to their order in sibling elements. If the 
order of sibling has been changed, it also affects the semantics of the 
element. 
 
In order to prevent authorizing the access requests with a mistake, Mclntosh 
suggested that properly specified and enforced security policy should be 
deployed. For an optional element context, an absolute XPath expression 
references should be considered to adding specification of security policy. 
Although Mclntosh presented sibling value context and sibling order value 
context, he has not proposed proper approach to handle it. Without cryptography, 
this kind of method is easily attacked by a hacker. 
 
The second approach is based on a cryptography mechanism, and adopts a hash 
function to ensure integrity. DOM-HASH is the first algorithm proposed by 
Maruyama to calculate a hash value for XML data (Maruyama et al., 1999). In this 
algorithm, MD5 and SHA1 were adopted to generate hash values with four 
different node types related to XML data. The four node types include element, 
attribute, processing instruction (PIs), and text. The detailed algorithm is as 
follows. 
).||.||.||.()( attrvpivtextvelemvhvdos =  
where, v is the element set of XML data, h is a collision-resistant one-way hash 
function. 
 
This approach only satisfies the contents integrity of the XML data. It does not 
provide integrity for subset of DTD (Brown, 1999). 
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Similar to DOM-HASH, the XHASH algorithm has been proposed by Brown. The 
XHASH makes use of two parameters: the first is the hash function such as 
SHA1; the second (optional) can be used to determine how non-significant space 
characters will be handled by default (Brown, 1999). The values for this attribute 
are set as ‘default’ and ‘preserved’, and it is difficult to specify the non-significant 
space characters which should be discarded (Brown, 1999).  
 
Devanbu adopted the DOM-HASH and the Merkle hash function to maintain the 
integrity of XML data queries (Devanbu et al., 2001). The aim of Devanbu’s 
scheme is to assure that the client can obtain complete and correct answers 
corresponding to their queries. The hash value of the XML document is 
generated by using Merkle hash function. When client obtains a queried result, 
the correctness can be verified by checking the related hash value. 
 
Bertino also adopted the Merkle hash function to handle integrity of XML 
documents publishing (Bertino et al., 2004). These two approaches provide a 
solution to generate hash values of XML data based on the Merkle hash function.  
 
The XML data and the Merkle hash function defined by Bertino: 
Let ),,,( EErVd ∅=  be an XML data, whereV  is a set of nodes in XML data d , 
r is the root node of XML data d , E is the set of edges, and Eφ  is the edge 
labelling function. h is a collision-resistant hash function (Bertino et al., 2004). Let 
HS be the co-domain of h . The Merkle hash function associated with d  denoting 


















where, aV is the leaf node in XML data d ,  eV  is the non-leaf node in XML data d  
‘||’ denotes the concatenation operator, ),( vNchild c is used to obtain the children 
of an element, and )...1( nN c ∈ is the child of node v  (Bertino et al., 2004). 
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The integrity approach proposed by Bertino can ensure both the schema and the 
contents of an XML data. On the one hand, a subject can verify that contents of 
an XML data have not been altered, e.g. that no modification occurs at the value 
of an element’s content, or the value of a relative attributes. On the other hand, a 
subject is able to verify that the XML data schema has not been modified. Attacker 
altering the name of an attribute or an element tag can be revealed. Based on 
cryptography, this kind of approach has a higher security level than the first 
approach. However, the element’s attribute integrity has been ignored in this 
approach (Carminati et al., 2005). Because of using Merkle hash function, the 
virtual nodes will be increased when generating a hash value from bottom-up for 
XML data, and this will lead to a low efficiency.  
 
W3C published XML signature specifications in 2000 (Second Edition in 2008) 
(Bartel et al., 2008; Reagle, 1999). This specification provides the format for data 
integrity expressions in XML signatures, and gives the optional algorithm to 
generate hash values, such as SHA-1, SHA-256. However, signed resources can 
be copied to another document but still keeping signature valid, and this can be 
utilized by an attacker to generate an authorized XML data. 
 
Figure 3.1(a) and (b) are two different invoices for the book order. The authorized 
entity signed the payment £160 in Figure 3.1(a). Figure 3.1 (b) also contains an 
element <Payment> with value £70. An attacker may change the payment from 
<Books> 
  <Title>XML Security</Title> 
  … 
  <Amount>20</Amount> 
  … 
  <Payment>£160</Payment> 
  … 
  <Signature> 
  … 




  <Title>XML Technology</Title> 
  … 
  <Amount>5</Amount> 
  … 
  <Payment>£70</Payment> 




Figure 3.1 An example of forging a signature 
(b) 
<Books> 
  <Title>XML Technology</Title> 
  … 
  <Amount>5</Amount> 
  … 
  <Payment>£160</Payment> 
  … 
  <Signature> 
  … 





£70 to £160 in Figure 3.1(b), and copy the signature from Figure 3.1 (a) to Figure 
3.1 (b). The forged document is shown in Figure 3.1 (c). In the forged document, 
the signature still keeps valid. 
3.3 XML multi-signature schemes 
3.3.1 Multi-signature schemes for non-XML data 
Multi-signature schemes for non-XML data include extended DSA, RSA, or 
ElGamal schemes, signing sequence, broadcast signing architecture, 
distinguished signing authorities, and order specify. Table 3.1 lists the 
advantages and disadvantages of these schemes. 
 
Table 3.1 Multi-signature schemes for non-XML data 
Approach Advantages Disadvantages 
Extended DSA, RSA, or EIGamal Easy to be 
implemented 
The size of multi-
signature results grows 
with the increasing 
numbers of signers. 
Improved extended DSA, RSA, or 
EIGamal (Itakura and Kiesler, 
1990; Harn and Kiesler, 1989; 
Kiesler and Harn, 1990; Ohta and 
Okamoto, 1991;  Boyd, 1991) 
The size of multi-
signature results 
has nothing to do 




Verifying the signature 
with the knowledge of 
signing sequence. 
Undistinguished signing authorities 
(Harn, 1994a; Harn, 1994b; 
Hardjono and Zheng 1992; Michels 
and Horster, 1996) 
Signing and 
verifying process is 
independent to the 
sequence of signing 
process. 
All signers sign the 
same message. 
Distinguished signing authorities 
(Harn, 1999; Wu et al., 2001; 
Mitomi and Miyaji, 2000; Wu and 
Hsu, 2002; Huang and Chang, 
2005; Yamamoto and Ogata, 2007) 
Sign the message 
which who is 
responsible for. 
The signing order is 
not a mixed sequential 
and broadcasting way. 
 
Signing order specified (Doi et al., 
2000; Tada, 2002; Burmester et al., 
2004; Wang et al., 2006; Yang et 
al., 2006) 




Inflexibility in adding or 
deleting signers. 
 
One of approach to construct a multi-signature for a message is to repeat the 
scheme of DSA, RSA, or ElGamal. The major drawback of this approach is that 
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the size of a multi-signature result grows with the increasing of the number of 
signers (Wu et al., 2001). 
 
In order to overcome the drawbacks mentioned above, Italura and Nakamura 
presented a multi-signature scheme based on the RSA scheme (Itakura and 
Kiesler, 1990). In this scheme, the size of a multi-signature result has nothing to 
do with the numbers of signers. However, the signers have to follow the 
predefined signing sequence to sign the document, and verify the signature with 
the knowledge of signing sequence. Similar schemes also have been proposed 
by (Harn and Kiesler, 1989; Kiesler and Harn, 1990; Ohta and Okamoto, 1991; 
Boyd, 1991), which are based on extended RSA, DSA, or ElGamal schemes with 
sequential multi-signature. 
 
Harn proposed a multi-signature scheme based on a modified ElGamal digital 
signature. In this scheme, the signature-generation and verification process is 
independent of the sequence of signing process (Harn, 1994a; Harn, 1994b). 
This scheme is known as multi-signature scheme which is based on broadcast 
architecture. The similar schemes can be found in (Hardjono and Zheng 1992; 
Michels and Horster, 1996). In these schemes, all signers sign the same 
message, and it was defined as “undistinguished signing authorities” by Harn 
(Harn, 1994b). It was defined as “distinguished signing authorities” if signers can 
sign different portions of a document.  “Undistinguished signing authorities” 
indicates that all signers have the same responsibility for the signed document. 
“Distinguished signing authorities” indicates that signers have different 
responsibility for different portions of the signed document. However, multi-
signatures with distinguished signing authorities are needed in applications, e.g. 
a company publishes a document that may involve the financial department and 
engineering department to sign different sections of the document (Huang and 
Chang, 2005).  
 
A multi-signature scheme which has distinguished signing authorities proposed 
by Harn in 1999 (Harn, 1999). In this scheme, signers can only sign the message 
which he is responsible for. However, Li discovered an efficient insider attack on 
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Harn multi-signature scheme in 2000 (Li et al., 2000). Wu proposed a “delegated 
multi-signature scheme with document decomposition” in 2001 (Wu et al., 2001). 
Wu’s scheme is more efficient in multi-signature-generation and verification. 
However, Lu and Chen pointed out that Wu’s balanced strategy to delegate 
subdocuments to qualified signers is problematic, because each signer should 
sign the portions of the document that they are responsible for rather than the 
portions of the documents based on some balanced strategy (Lu and Chen, 
2004). Mitomi proposed a general model for multi-signature with message 
flexibility in 2000 (Mitomi and Miyaji, 2000). Yamamoto improved Mitomi’s 
scheme in 2007 (Yamamoto and Ogata, 2007). Wu proposed an ID-based multi-
signature scheme with “distinguished signing authorities for sequential and 
broadcasting architectures” in 2002 (Wu and Hsu, 2002). Huang presented 
“multi-signatures with distinguished signing authorities for sequential and 
broadcasting architectures” in 2005 (Huang and Chang, 2005). Although these 
models considered message flexibility, they have not considered the signing 
order in a mixed sequential and broadcasting way. 
 
To date, signing order specified multi-signature schemes are Doi’s model in 
2000, Tada’s model in 2002, Burmester’s model in 2004, Wang’s model in 2005, 
and Yang’s model in 2006 (Doi et al., 2000; Tada, 2002; Burmester et al., 2004; 
Wang et al., 2006; Yang et al., 2006). There are two different major approaches 
to deal with this directed series-parallel signing graph. Tada and Yang adopt a 
series-parallel group, which are based on directed graphs (Tada, 2002; Yang et 
al., 2006). Another approach presented by Burmester, who also represented the 
group of signers by a graph, and then decomposed the graph to a tree 
(Burmester et al., 2004). There are two obvious disadvantages in these schemes. 
First, the scheme makes the signer order as a signature parameter, increasing 
the complexity of multi-signature algorithm. Second, each signer needs to verify 
the signing order before signing, and update the signing graph or decomposition 
tree after signing. These disadvantages will lead to inflexibility in adding or 
deleting signer group members. 
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3.3.2 XML multi-signature schemes 
As for the XML multi-signature, two schemes have been presented. The first is 
based on a repeated DSA or RSA scheme. The second approach is proposed by 
Lu based on delegated multi-signature scheme proposed by Wu. 
 
• Repeat of DSA or RSA 
This approach is deployed by W3C in XML signature specification (Bartel, 2008). 
The process of repeated DSA or RSA can be described through following three 
steps: 
 
Step 1: Assigning XML data which need to be signed to each signer using XPath 
expression, },,,{ 21 nd MMMX K= , where, ),,1( niiM K= is the data to be 
signed. 
Step 2: Each signer generate signature separately as: ),( 111 prive KMAS = , 
),( 222 prive KMAS = ,…, ),( nprivnen KMAS = , where, iS is the signed result, 
()eA is the encryption function based on RSA or DSA to generate 
signature results, and iprivK  is the private key of the signers. 
Step 3: Assembling the signed results to a single XML data, and 
letting nSSSS ∪∪∪= K21  , where, S  is the final signature. This means 
that the final multi-signature result is a set of individual single signatures. 
 
The major advantage of this approach is easy to be implemented. However, this 
approach increases the XML data size when signers group is big, and cannot 
support multi-signature generation under dependant situation. 
 
• Delegated multi-signature scheme 
Wu has presented the “delegated multi-signature scheme with document 
decomposition” (Wu et al., 2001). In this scheme, a document is decomposed 
into a set of subdocuments and then assigned to signers using a dispatch 
algorithm. The scheme consists of four components (Wu et al., 2001): a group of 
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signers, a system authority (SA), which provides system initialization such as 
system parameters, private key and public key generation. A document 
dispatcher (DD) is used to decompose document and delegate subdocument. A 
signature collector (SC) collects and verifies the individual signatures created by 
each signer. 
 
The scheme consists of the private key and public key generation, the multi-
signature generation, and the multi-signature verification (Wu et al., 2001).  
 
Stage 1: Private key and public key generation 
SA chooses a large prime 5122≥p , a large divisor 1402≥q of 1−p , a generator 
α of order q in )( pGF , and a hash function )()( pGFxh ∈ for any x . After 
publishing hqp ,,, α , SA can accept the registration requested by any signing 
group. Let },,,{ 21 nuuuG K=  be the registered signer group, and ju  is the 
individual signer. After finished registration, SA generates a distinct private key 
and public key pair ),( jj yx for each Gu j ∈ , where qj Zx ∈ and 
py jxj mod
−
= α  













pyY mod  
 
Stage 2: The multi-signature generation stage 
DD decomposes M , which need to be signed, into set of subdocuments, and it is 
denoted as: },,,{ 21 mwww K=Γ . Let jM be the subset of Γ delegated to ju . DD 
assigns jM to ju . The multi-signature generation consists of seven steps. 
 
Step 1: DD sends }),({ jMMh and )}({ Mh to ju and SC, respectively. 
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Step 2: All Gu j ∈  extract jw  from their delegated jM  and cooperatively check 
the integrity of M  by verifying that )||||()( 21 mwwwhMh L= , where “||” is 
the concatenation operator. 
Step 3: Each Gu j ∈  randomly selects an integer qj Zz =  and computes 
            
pr jzj modα=
, 
           




and sends }{ jR to other participant signers and SC. 
Step 4: Each Gu j ∈ computes 






pRR mod , 
           qRMhhxRrMhzs jjjjj mod))||(()||(( +=  
and sends },,{ jjj srM to SC. Here, ),( jj sr is the personal signature of 
M for ju  
Step 5: SC obtains jw  from received jM  and check the integrity of M  by 
verifying that )||||()( 21 mwwwhMh L= . 
Step 6: SC computes R  and verifies ),( jj sr  by checking whether following 
equation holds. 
             ))(mod)(( ))||(()||( pyr RMhhjsRrMhj jjj α=  
Step 7: If the personal signatures generated above are successfully verified, then 
SC computes ∑ ∈= Gu jj qsS mod and publishes ),( SR as the multi-
signature of M forG . 
 
Stage 3: The multi-signature verification stage 
              Any verifier can check the signature by using the following equation. 




This scheme is more efficient in multi-signature-generation and verification. 
However, its balanced strategy to delegate subdocuments to qualified signers is 
problematic. In addition, this scheme only supports parallel signature-generation 
scenarios, and cannot handle a multi-signature generation under a dependant 
situation. 
 
• Lu’s XML multi-signature scheme 
Based on Wu’s delegated multi-signature scheme, Lu presented XML multi-
signature in 2004 (Lu and Chen, 2004). In this scheme, he first proposed signing 
XPath expression instead of XML data itself.  
 
In Lu’s scheme, there are four components: a group of signer G , a system 
authority (SA), document decomposition (DD), and a signature collector (SC) (Lu 
and Chen, 2004). DD decompose a document M into a set of subdocuments 
},,,{ 21 mwww K=Γ  using a set of rules },,,{ 21 mtttT K=  , where it is the XPath 
expression. Via XPath expression, one can easily obtain a subdocument iM . The 
procedure for generating a multi-signature of M forG is as follows. 
 
Step 1: DD sends },),({ jj TMMh  and )}(),({ MhTh  to ju  and   SC, respectively. 
Step 2: All Gu j ∈ extracts iw  from jM delegated to them and then cooperatively 
checks the integrity of M by verifying  )||||||()( 21 mwwwhMh K=  where 
“||” is the concatenation symbol. 
Step3: Every Gu j ∈  extracts it  from jT , computes hash value )(MCw iti = , and 
verifies whether or not every newly computed iw  is identical to the 
received iw . If all iw are successfully verified, each ju randomly selects an 
integer qj Zz ∈ , computes both 
pr jzj modα= , and 
prR jj rThjj mod
)||(
= , and sends jR to other participant signers and SC. 
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pRR mod ,and                                                                           (3.1) 
qRMhhxRrThzs jjjjj mod)))||(()||(( +=  
and sends },,{ jjj srT to SC. ),( jj sr is the personal signature of M for ju . 
Step 5: SC checks the integrity of T by extracting it  from the received jT  and 
verifying whether or not }||||()( 21 mttthTh K= holds. 
Step 6: To verify ),( jj sr  for every ju , SC computes R by Eq.3.1 and checks 
whether or not the following equation holds. 
))(mod)(( ))||(()||( pyr RMhhjsRrThj jjj α=
. 
Step 7: If all personal signatures generated in the previous steps are successfully 









and publishes ),( SR as the multi-signature of M forG . 
 
In Lu’s scheme, the XPath expression is used to transform an XML document 
into subdocument (Lu and Chen, 2004). Let M be the XML data to be 
cooperatively signed by the signers. XML data M can be divided into set of 
subdocuments },,,{ 21 mwww K  using XPath expression, and then signers only 
need to sign the XPath expression instead of XML data itself. This scheme 
decreases the communication overhead, although it has three major 
disadvantages.  
 
First, by division, },,,{ 21 mwwwM K= , the integrity checking for each 
subdocument depends on the formula )||||||()( 21 mwwwhMh K= . This 
indicates that the document must be delegated entirely; otherwise the integrity 
checking will be invalid. Supposing a document consists of five parts, and the 
signers only need to sign three of them. The other two parts have not been 
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delegated, and then the integrity checking will be failed. Second, the 
subdocument integrity check needs the signers to check cooperatively online. 
When the group of signers is small, this is possible, but it is impractical when the 
group of signers is very large. Third, the scheme only provides broadcast 
(parallel) signature-generation scenarios. It cannot satisfy the signing process 
under a dependent multi-signature situation. For example, the company policy is 
set up in a way that the sequence of approval is important and has to be 
respected: before launching a project, the financial department has to approve 
the project. Lu’s scheme cannot deal with this application scenario.  
3.4 Encrypted XML data querying 
With the widely applications of XML, it is necessary to handle sensitive 
information in XML data, and XML data confidentiality becomes an important 
issue (Yang et al., 2006). The sensitive parts of the XML data have to be 
protected in case unauthorized access. There are two approaches to protect the 
sensitive information in XML data, one is using access control mechanism, and 
the other is using encryption technology, especially XML encryption technology. 
Most cases, the access control mechanism can be bypassed and encryption 
technology is a must (Yang et al., 2006).  When XML data is transmitting through 
an untrusted channel, it needs encryption technology to protect sensitive 
information (Fan et al., 2004; Agrawal et al., 2004). However, how to query 
encrypted XML data has not been addressed in XML encryption specification. 
 
Querying encrypted XML data schemes or survey can be found in (Brinkman et 
al., 2004; Feng and Jonker, 2003; Wang and Lakshmanan, 2006; Lee and 
Whang, 2006; Gao et al., 2008; Ünay and Gündem, 2008; Jammalamadaka and 
Mehrotra, 2006; Yang et al., 2006). The basic idea for encrypted XML data query 
is to build index information for encrypted XML data. Two types of index 
information are deployed for encrypted XML data. The first one is the structural 
index information and the other is the value index information (Ünay and 
Gündem, 2008). Structural index is used to determine the XPath matches any 
paths in a submitted query. The value index is used to support the range query. 
These indexes are deployed in either at the server side or client side (Ünay and 
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Gündem, 2008). Maintaining index at the server side can be found in (Feng and 
Jonker, 2003; Wang and Lakshmanan, 2006; Lee and Whang, 2006; 
Jammalamadaka and Mehrotra, 2006) and maintaining index at the client side 
can be found in (Gao et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2006). 
3.4.1 Hash function based index building 
Feng and Jonker built the index information using hash function. The basic idea 
is to augment encrypted XML data with encodings which characterize the 
topology and contents of each XML data, and then filter out candidate data for 
decryption and query execution by examining query conditions against these 
encodings. The searching encrypted XML data is comprised of three phases 
(Feng and Jonker, 2003): query preparation, identify candidate, and query 
execution. 
 
• Query preparation 
In this phase, XML data and DTD are encoded before encryption using hash 
function )( pHashFunc . Each node in path p  is calculated with Base26Value 
and calculated the module of the hash table size, which is assigned by the 
user. The encoding result is a pair of element and relative value ),( valname cc . 
An example is shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2 An example of pairs of element and value with their hash values 
Element/Attribute namec , Value valc  )( namecHashFunc  )( valcHashFunc  
1c = (Name, “Baolong Liu”) 0 1 
2c = (number, 3209446589721205) 1 10 
3c = (Issuer, “HSBC”) 3 0 
4c = (Expiration, “04/12”) 2 25 





• Identify candidate using hashing paths 
Given a query, it can be matched to a path p , and compute the hash value 
for p using the same hash function )( pHashFunc , then consult with the table 
generated in phase 1 to obtain possibly items containing path  p . 
 
• Query execution 
The identified results from phase 2 are decrypted into plaintext, on which the 
query can be executed. 
 
The major contribution of the method is using hash function to generate XML 
data structure encodings. When DTD for XML document has been changed, it 
needs to re-compute all related hash values. In consequence, it is inefficient 
when XML document is updated frequently. In addition, the hash function 
adopted may generate hashing collision, and this needs to be resolved. 
3.4.2 Discontinuous structural index (DSI) 
A discontinuous structural index (DSI) for encrypted XML data has been 
proposed by Wang and Lakshmanan (Wang and Lakshmanan, 2006). The DSI is 
built based on interval-based labeling scheme. In DSI, the root node has been 
assigned the interval [0,1], the children nodes are assigned an interval which 
within the range of their parent’s interval. Two index tables are used for the 
structural index. One of it is the encrypted XML data block as shown in Table 3.3 
(a), and another is the DSI table as shown in Table 3.3 (b). 
 
Table 3.3 Structural index tables 
 (a)                                          (b) 
ID Represented Interval 
 1 [0.27, 0.32] 




In the query processing, the query processor translates the query into encrypted 
form against the structural index table. The processor replaces each element 
Tags DSI index 
PaymentList [0, 1] 
PaymentInfo [0.14, 0.46] 
Name [0.16, 0.2] 
CreditCardInfo [0.27, 0.32] 
… … 
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name in XPath with corresponding encrypted tags in the structural table (Ünay 
and Gündem, 2008). The encrypted block id can be found by joining query the 
two tables. 
 
The major disadvantage of Wang’s scheme is that it increases data size by 
scaling encrypted XML data, and this will increase the time cost in query 
processing. Another disadvantage is that the scheme cannot satisfy the security 
against inference attack. An inference attack is a data mining technique 
performed to analyzing data in order to illegitimately gain knowledge about a 
subject (Krumm, 2007). In scheme DSI, attackers may infer nodes relationship or 
infer whether a node resides in encrypted block by using DSI index. In addition, 
this scheme is not efficient in XML data insertions when the data updating 
frequently (Ünay and Gündem, 2008). 
3.4.3 Query-Aware decryption 
Lee and Whang proposed Query-Aware decryption for encrypted XML data (Lee 
and Whang, 2006). Based on Query-Aware scheme, Xia designed architecture 
for XML encrypted data querying (Xia et al., 2009). In these schemes, the index 
information is kept at the server side. The index information consists of three 
columns. The first column is the key name. The second column is element name, 
and the third is the occurrences, which is expressed as the Dewey number of 
elements in the second column (Ünay and Gündem, 2008). All three columns are 












Table 3.4 Index for payment information 
Key name Element name Occurrences 
Null PaymentList 1 
Null PaymentInfo 1.1 
Null Name 1.1.1 
K1 CreditCardInfo 1.1.2 
Null Address 1.1.3 
K1 Number 1.1.2.1 
K1 Issuer 1.1.2.2 
… … … 
 
The following steps illustrate the querying process. Assuming a client holds the 
key k1, and then submits a query “//PaymentInfo//Issuer”. The query processor 
decrypts the field of key name using k1. The column element name is decrypted 
using k1. The field occurrences of the row associated with element type “Issuer”, 
which is requested in the query, is decrypted by the processor (Lee and Whang, 
2006; Ünay and Gündem, 2008). The position of element type “Issuer” is at the 
node with number 1.1.2.2, and encrypted data element is included in the node 
with Dewey number 1.1.2 (Lee and Whang, 2006; Ünay and Gündem, 2008). The 
node with Dewey number 1.1.2 is returned and decrypted.  
 
Although the scheme proposed by Lee and Whang is efficient to match the XPath 
in querying, it has an important security issue. When a query is being processed, 
the key applied to decrypt index table is disclosed to server, and this may lead to 
potential security problems. Another disadvantage of the work is that it cannot 
support range query without decrypting all encrypted blocks. It will also lead to 
other nodes re-labelled when inserting the new XML data. 
3.4.4 Scheme based on random number 
Encrypted XML data querying is processed by both maintaining index information 
at the server side and the client side proposed by Schrefl (Schrefl et al., 2005; 
Ünay and Gündem, 2008). In the presented scheme, each possible path is stored 
with unique identifier as shown in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5 Each possible path stored at the client side 





PS5 PaymentList/PaymentInfo*/ CreditCardInfo/Number 
… … 
 
There are two kinds of hash results maintained at the server side. First table uses 
path instances as key and the second table uses path values as key as shown in 
Table 3.6 (a) and Table 3.6 (b) (Schrefl et al., 2005; Ünay and Gündem, 2008). 
 
Table 3.6 Index information at the server side 
(a)  
Cryptographic Hash (PI) E(value, k, nonce) Nonce 
H(PS1-1) E(Baolong Liu, k, 10) 10 
H(PS1-2) E(Jack Xia, k, 11) 11 
H(PS5-1) E(3209446589721205, k, 12) 12 
H(PS5-2) E(446534762218 5421, k, 13) 13 
… … … 
 
(b)  
Cryptographic Hash (PS-V) E(PI*, k, nonce) Nonce 
H(PS1-Baolong Liu) E({1}, k, 14) 14 
H(PS1-Jack Xia) E({2}, k, 15) 15 
H(PS5-3209446589721205) E({1}, k, 16) 16 
H(PS5-446534762218 5421) E({2}, k, 17) 17 
… … … 
 
Based on index information above, the querying process is described as follows, 





The client retrieves the path id of 
/PaymentList/PaymentInfo*/CreditCardInfo/Number is PS5 in Table 3.5. The 
client then computes H(PS5-3209446589721205), the value returned is E({1}, k , 
16). Firstly, the client decrypts the reply using key k together with nonce and finds 
out that the answer is as first instance {1} of “PaymentInfo” in the path. Secondly, 
the client filters the card number path and adds the “/name” path to the query. 
The client knows that /PaymentList/PaymentInfo/Name path is PS1. Now the 
query becomes /PaymentList/PaymentInfo[1]/Name which is PS1-1. The client 
executes function H(PS1-1), finally the server returns the encrypted value with its 
nonce E(Baolong Liu, k, 10). Through decryption results returned, the client can 
get the final query results expected. 
 
The approach adopts random number to prevent frequency based attacks, 
because the same plaintext can get different encryption results with different 
random number. One of the disadvantages is the multiple rounds of 
communication between the server and the client when a query is processed, 
and it has a high requirement on bandwidth (Ünay and Gündem, 2008). Another 
disadvantage is that it cannot support range query.  In addition, the computing 
hash function is a time-consuming task, when XML data is changed, it is need to 
re-compute the hash results for XML data, and it will increase the system burden. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has investigated the current situations of XML security. Two main 
approaches for revocation information validation for X.509 digital certificate were 
investigated. CRLs are too bandwidth and cannot support a good degree of 
timeliness. The improved CRLs still has a high data volume download. The CA is 
required to create a signature for each query in OCSP, so the communication 
burden is increased between the server and clients. 
 
Existing integrity models only generate a hash value for XML data content. Using 
Merkle hash function to generate hash values has a low efficiency because the 
 72
process will increase the numbers of virtual nodes, and the hash times will also be 
increased because of increased virtual nodes. Without considering XML data 
features, these solutions cannot protect the structure integrity and context-
referential meaning. This results that a signed XML data can be copied to another 
document but still keeping signature valid. 
 
The main drawback of repeated DSA or RSA of XML multi-signature is that the 
size of a multi-signature result grows with the increasing of the number of 
signers, and the time for verifying the multi-signature is equal to the total time for 
verifying all personal signatures individually. Lu first presented signing XPath 
expression instead of the message itself. In this scheme, the document must be 
delegated entirely; otherwise the integrity checking will be invalid. The 
subdocument integrity checking needs the signers to check cooperatively online. 
When the group of signers is small, this is possible, but it is impractical when the 
group of signers is very large. The scheme only provides broadcast (parallel) 
signature-generation scenarios. It cannot satisfy the signing process under a 
dependent multi-signature situation. 
 
In a scheme for encrypted XML data query based on index information 
mechanism, two major points should be considered. The first is that avoids 
unnecessary encrypted blocks being decrypted, and most of existing scheme 
achieved this objective. Considering frequently changing of XML data, the 
efficiency of index information updating should be considered. The second point 
has not been taken into account by researchers. Most cases in existing 
literatures, the XML document update will lead to a global index information 
updating. There should have a scheme with considering updating efficiency for 
index information. In addition, the sensitive nodes in internal structure of XML 
data are confidential, so simply substituting values by crypto-index may infer the 
structural information to the third party. 
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Chapter 4 XML-based X.509 digital certificate 
A novel revocation information validation approach for X.509 digital certificate is 
proposed based on XML digital signature technology. Two-party identity 
authentication process for presented approach is described. The evaluation is 
also made to verify the efficiency of improved X.509 certificate. 
4.1 Introduction 
X.509 digital certificate plays an important role in identity authentication. Although 
XKMS makes PKI deployment easily, it still needs to check the validation of a 
digital certificate. One of the main concerns associated with digital certificate is 
that mechanism for revocation validation of certificate is required (Nielsen and 
Hamilton, 2005; Rivest, 1998; Housley et. al, 2002; Liu et. al, 2008; Noor, 2008).  
 
Investigation on revocation information validation for X.509 digital certificate has 
demonstrated that existing techniques for certificate revocation validation are the 
bottleneck of a PKI or XKMS system. To alleviate the problem, this chapter 
proposes a novel idea to check certificate revocation information validation by 
using XML signature technology. XML signature technology enables a user to 
sign arbitrary portions of the message. After the XKMS issued a new certificate, 
the certificate owners can add additional information for the latest status of the 
certificate with their signature. Certificate owner’s signature is only used to 
provide evidence for revocation information of the certificate. It does not need to 
query XKMS or CA for revocation information of such certificate because the 
certificate already contains the status information.  
4.2 Structure of X.509 certificate 
The structure of an X.509 v3 digital certificate in XML format is shown in Figure 
4.1 (ITU-T, 1997). 
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Based on the structure of X.509 v3 shown in Figure 4.1, the mathematical symbol 




,,, CAprivApubAApubAA KKIDSKIDCert =                                                (4.1) 
where, ACert is an original X.509 certificate for entity A issued by a CA. 
AID denotes identity of entity A, such as subject name or email address. The 
AID  corresponds to the element <Subject> in Figure 4.1. ApubK , is entity A’s 
authenticated public key from the current date iD to the future date eD , where 
ApubK , corresponds to element <PublicKeyInfo>, iD  corresponds to element 
<NotBefore>, and eD corresponds to element <NotAfter>. “||” denotes the 
concatenation operator. ),( privKMS represents signature algorithm in Figure 4.1. 
M is the message to be signed, and privK  is the private key. The certificate 
provides a binding of identity AID  to public key ApubK ,  with CA’s signature. 
4.3 XML-based X.509 certificate (X-certificate) 
Based on advantages of XML signature technology, the thesis makes an 
improvement on X.509 certificate to improve the efficiency of digital certificate 
<Certificate> 
   <Version/> 
   <SerialNumber/> 
   <AlgorithmID/> 
   <Issuer/> 
   <Validity> 
      <NotBefore/> 
      <NotAfter/> 
   </Validity> 
   <Subject/> 
   <PublicKeyInfo> 
   <PublicKeyAlgorithm/> 
   <SubjectPublicKey/> 
   </PublicKeyInfo> 
   <SignatureAlgorithm/> 
   <CerificateSignature/> 
</Certificate> 
Figure 4.1  Structure for an X.509 v3 certificate 
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revocation validity. The improved x.509 certificate is named as X-certificate. The 
X-certificate contains two parts, the first is the X.509 digital certificate, and the 
second part is the status information added by certificate owner. 
4.3.1 Definition for X-certificate 
The basic idea is that after received ACert from CA, the certificate owner can 
attach revocation information at the end of ACert to generate new certificate xmlC . 









21 ApriviA KTsnsnsnSCert K=
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,,, CAprivApubAApubA KKIDhSKIDT=
         




21 Aprivi KTsnsnsnhS L
 
 
• where, ACert is the certificate issued by CA. This is used to provide the 
binding of entity A to relative public key ApubK , . 
• SN denotes revoked certificates, and },,,{ 21 isnsnsnSN K= . where, isn  
denotes the reference number of revoked certificates. This information 
can be obtained from CA and then checked by certificate owner. 
• T is the timestamp of CA’s signature, and 'T is the timestamp of 
certificate owner’s signature. 
• h is a one-way hash function which is used to generate hash values. 
• ),( privKMS denotes signing function of certificate authority, M is the 
message to be signed, and privK is the private key. The formula (4.2) 
should include two signatures generated by CA and certificate owner 
respectively, they only sign information which they are responsible for.  
 
When a client holds an entity’s certificate, it is an invalid certificate if the series 
number belongs to SN . Otherwise, the client can confirm present status by 
verifying two signatures without querying the CA. If one of the two signatures is 
invalid, the certificate is invalid. When CA’s signature is invalid, it means that the 
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identity is not identical to public key, and when certificate owner’s signature is 
invalid, it indicates that the certificate has been revoked. Compared to using a 
certificate server, the X-certificate’s status checking is off-line, and this approach 
reduces the complexity of XKMS or PKI systems because it eliminates the 
requirement for additional revocation checking from certificate server. 
Correspondingly, the communication burden between server and client is 
alleviated. 
4.3.2 Two-party authentication process based on X-certificate 
A digital certificate records the information necessary for encryption or verifying 
digital signature. The protocol for authentication and confidentiality of X-certificate 
can be described as follows. 
 
• Authentication process for purpose of verifying signature  




Where, AprivK ,  is the private key of entity A. xmlC is the certificate signed by CA 
and certificate owner A. ),( privKMS is the signed information to be transferred to 
entity B. Step 1 can be described as: entity A sends signed information with X-
certificate to entity B. 
 
Step 2: },{ invalidvalidEntityB xmlC→  
With the certificate xmlC , entity B can obtain public key pubK  of entity A. Entity A’s 
signature can ensure the status of pubK . The signature of CA ensures the identity 
of entity A binding to relative public key pubK . Step 2 is that entity B verifies the 
validity of received certificate. This step includes two sub-steps: verify the identity 
and relative public key with CA signature, and check certificate status by verifying 
signature of entity A. If certificate xmlC  received is valid, it can be used to verify 




• Authentication process for purpose of encryption  
Step 1: EntityAEntityB xmlrequestC →  
This process shows that entity B wants to obtain the public key of entity A, and 
send a request to entity A for certificate xmlC . 
 
Step 2: EntityBKEntityA xmlCApriv →)( ,  
This round describes the entity A sending the certificate to entity B the same as 
step 1 for verifying signature purpose, but without additional signed information. 
 
Step 3: },{ invalidvalidEntityB xmlC→  
With the certificate xmlC , entity B can obtain public key pubK of entity A. Entity A’s 
signature can ensure current status of delivered certificate. 
4.4 Evaluation 
4.4.1 Evaluation methods 
The evaluation of X-certificate is divided into two parts. Firstly, the size of the 
required data structure is calculated. Secondly, the transferred data volume in 
revocation is evaluated. 
4.4.2 Size evaluation 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the size of an X-certificate. The size of each field is 
calculated by using software BERViewer v2.1.1 (Available at: 
http://www.freedownloadscenter.com/Utilities/Misc__Utilities/BERViewer_Downlo
ad.html, accessed on October 2010). BERViewer is the software that allows user 
to view encoded files, such as X.509 certificate. It can also analyze each field 
with length and values. 
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Table 4.1 lists the size of different kinds of validation mechanisms, size of X.509, 
and X-certificate. Except for X-certificate, other parameters are the same as from 
the ones proposed by Arnes and Hormann (Arnes, 2000; Hormann et al., 2006). 
The X.509 CRL is downloaded from W3C Server CA 
(http://ca.csail.mit.eud/drl/w3c-server.crl, accessed on October 2010). The 
downloaded “empty” (before any revocation) CRL is about 4 KB. The real size of 
X.509 CRL in Table 4.1 is also calculated by using program BERViewer v2.1.1.  





4.4.3 Efficiency evaluation  
In application, a CA is assumed to manage users between 000,1=N  and 
000,100=N  (Hormann et al., 2006). A typical validity period of the issued 
certificate is one year. For the probability of certificate revocation, this thesis 
takes 10%, i.e. the probability that a certificate will be revoked before its 
expiration. Table 4.2 lists the parameters to be measured. 
Table 4.2 Parameters for evaluation 
Parameters Description Value 
N
 
Certificate users 1,000; 100,000 
P
 
Percentage of certificate revoked 10 
Q
 
Status requests per day per user 1;10;20 
U
 





Percentage of user providing content 10;50 




X.509 v3 certificate 1018 
CRLS
 
X.509 CRL 39, 400 
qOCSPS Re
 
OCSP Request 449 
spOCSPS Re
 






Issuer Validity Subject PKIInfo 
Extensions SigAlgId Signature SN Signature 
8 11 18 193 227 389 552 
552 870 1018 1020 1037 1185 




For CRL model, the data volume transferred during one day depends on the 
parameters U and N . The transferred data volume during one day is determined 
by Eq (4.3) (Hormann et al., 2006). 
                                            
UNPNvCRL )40039( +=
                                     
   (4.3) 
 
In the OCSP scenario, Eq (4.4) is used to determine the data volume created 
during one day (Hormann et al., 2006). 
                                    
QUNSSv spOCSPqOCSPOCSP )( ReRe +=                                       (4.4) 
 
The X-certificate contains the status information, and user does not need to 
request status information from the server, therefore, the data volume of X-
certificate generated is relative to parameter N , P andU . Eq (4.5) describes the 
data volume created using X-certificate during one day. 
                                             NPUv certX 1185=−                                               (4.5) 
  
 
Figure 4.3 shows the total data volume transferred during one day for users of 
1,000. In a situation of 000,1=N , the OCSP scheme is performed worst in most 
of the cases. This means that the usage of OCSP creates the biggest data 
volume. The CRL approach performs better than the OCSP scheme except for 
)5,1(),( =UQ and )10,1( . X-certificate always shows the best efficiency in data 
volume transferring, compared to other two approaches. 
Figure 4.3 Data volume for N=1,000 
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For users of 000,100=N , the CRL model is obviously the most storage cost as 
shown in Figure 4.4. The OCSP performs better, and X-certificate shows again 
the best efficiency because of its simple status information validation approach. 
Because the X-certificate user does not need to query status information from the 
CA, it decreases the times of communication between and clients, and further 
decreases the data volume transferred.  For CRL approach, the data transferred 
contains the user request and the size of CRL, and it increased the total data 
volume. In the OCSP solution, the validation includes request and response 
process, so it increases the data volume transferred. 
 
4.5 Discussion and analysis 
The discussion criteria listed in this section are based on a list of general criteria 
(Hormann et al., 2006; Arnes, 2000; Adams et al., 2001; Zhang, 2003). 
 
• Timeliness 
The timeliness of CRL depends on the length of the period between the 
updating. The direct way to improve timeliness for CRL is to short the update 
period. However, the certificate server’s burden will be increased significantly 
if the CRL is updated frequently. The timeliness of OCSP heavily depends on 
what approach the OCSP responder is used to gather the revocation 
information. Even though OCSP provides real-time replies, the revocation 
information carried may not be fresh if the OCSP responder acquires its 
Figure 4.4 Data volume for N=100,000 
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information through the use of CRL. When a certificate has been invalided, 
the certificate owner is the first entity knowing certificate status. Based on this 
fact, X-certificate can update status information in time. When an entity 




Currently, two types of CRLs exist: base CRLs and delta CRLs. Base CRLs 
maintain a complete list of revoked certificates while delta CRLs maintain only 
those certificates that have been revoked since the last publication of a base 
CRL. The major drawback of CRLs is their potentially large size, which limits 
the scalability of the CRL approach (Komar et al., 2010). The large size adds 
significant bandwidth and storage burdens to the CA and relying party, and 
therefore limits the ability of the system to distribute the CRL. Bandwidth, 
storage space, and CA processing capacity can also be negatively affected if 
the publishing frequency gets too high. OCSP solved the problem of 
scalability experienced by CRL, because it requests certificate status on 
demand and only for specific certificate. The periodic downloading of large 
files is no longer necessary. As to X-certificate, the status information has 
been contained in the certificate contents, it does not need to download 
revocation information, and then the X-certificate has a good scalability. 
 
• Security 
When revocation information generated, it means that the information is from 
an authenticated entity, and non-repudiation. As the CRL is a 2-party 
scheme, only the CA has to be trusted. OCSP is a 3-party scheme, since 
both CA and the OCSP server have to be trusted. The OCSP server has to 
be trusted to gather authenticated revocation information and produce correct 
and digital signed responses to each request. X-certificate also is a 2-party 
scheme. It provides integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation through two 
digital signatures. The signature generated by CA ensures the public key and 
relative identity, and certificate owner’s signature provides revocation 
information. X-certificate can not only provide the binding of public key to 
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relative identity securely, but also can ensure revocation information not 
being forged, e.g. prevent man-in-the-middle attack. 
 
• Simplicity 
Simplicity means that the revocation scheme is easy to be deployed in 
practice. The CRL scheme is easily managed by adding a new entry to 
current revocation list for each update period and distributed this CRL to its 
repository. OCSP specifies the behaviour of the OCSP server and the OCSP 
end-entity. However, the management of the OCSP server is a time-
consuming task, since the number of server can be quite high. X-certificate 
only needs to register at CA after revocation information has been changed 
by owner, and it will not increase additional service compared to CRL and 
OCSP. 
 
• Compatible with XKMS 
The X-certificate proposed in this chapter is an improvement of X.509 
certificate. It still holds the original architecture of X.509 certificate. It can be 
used as an <x.509data> in XKMS without changing. With the X-certificate, the 
X-certificate owner has the same operation as X.509, e.g. it needs to be 
registration, reissue, and so on. It only offers benefits to the certificate users. 
With X-certificate, a client can validate the certificate easily. 
4.6 Summary 
A novel revocation information validation approach for X.509 digital certificate 
was proposed in this chapter. This approach reduces the complexity of XKMS or 
PKI systems because it eliminates the requirement for additional revocation 
checking from XKMS or CA, and in consequence, the communication burden 
between server and client is alleviated. The authentication processes of X-
certificate show that the presented approach can satisfy identity authentication for 
signature and encryption purpose. Through evaluation, the approach has a 
higher efficiency than existing revocation checking solutions, such as CRL, 
OCSP. Analysis indicates that the presented approach is secure. The approach 
is an off-line certificate validation service, and it is easy to be deployed.  
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Chapter 5 XML data integrity based on 
concatenated hash function 
This chapter presents the XML data integrity requirements. Based on the 
presented XML data integrity requirements, the following section builds the 
integrity model for XML data. The specifications for proposed integrity approach 
are described. The testing and evaluation are also executed.  
5.1 Introduction 
Existing integrity models only generate a hash value for XML data content without 
considering XML data features. For non-XML data formats, a user can directly 
generate hash value of the data content to ensure integrity, but protecting data 
content integrity alone is not enough for XML data. Besides data content integrity, 
XML data integrity should also protect element location information and element 
context meaning under a fine-grained security situation. Location information of an 
XML element refers to the position of this element in the XML data (Mclntosh and 
Austel, 2005). An element has an entire meaning related to its position in XML 
data, and will lose original meaning if the position has been changed. XML data 
integrity should also protect location information of an XML element in XML data. 
Another factor which affects the meaning of XML elements is the context 
relationship. The element will no longer have its original meaning without context 
relationship in an XML data, and the thesis defines this as context-referential 
integrity. In other words, an XML element has an entire meaning only related to 
other elements in the same XML data. 
 
This chapter aims to present XML data integrity requirements combined with XML 
data features. Based on the XML data integrity requirements proposed, it 
proposes an integrity model for XML data, and improves the efficiency of hash 




This chapter proposes an XML data integrity model named as CSR. The model 
consists of three parts, and CSR is an acronym for these parts: ‘C’ for content 
integrity, ‘S’ for structure integrity, and ‘R’ for context-referential integrity. The 
three parts are combined with the concatenated hash function. Content integrity is 
protected using the concatenated hash function. Structure integrity is used to 
protect the location information of an element in XML data by hashing an absolute 
path string from the root node.  Finally, context- referential integrity protects the 
integrity of context-related elements. This chapter also describes the combination 
of the model with XML specification, and integrates the model into the XML 
signature.  
5.2  Theory guidance for XML data integrity 
In order to ensure integrity, there are means to ensure the information integrity, 
such as hashes or check-sum mechanisms (Geuer-Pollman, 2004). Both 
approaches can be used to find changes occurring in original message. But 
hashes are focused on malicious attack while check-sums are deployed to find 
coincidental changes (Brandt and Bonte, 2000). 
 
In this thesis, data integrity is ensured by a hash function mechanism. The 
reasons of adopting a hash function as an integrity method is (Geuer-Pollman, 
2004): checksums are usually applied in detecting accidental data changing. 
Checksums provide low security level against a malicious attack because their 
mathematical structure makes them easy to be broken. An example is CRC 
series. A hash function has one-way and collision-resistant features with a 
complex mathematical model, and it provides a higher level security than the 
checksum. 
5.3 XML data integrity model CSR based on concatenated 
hash function 
The integrity model to be presented is referred to the model DOM-HASH and the 
model proposed by Bertino although the construction process is different. The 
integrity model proposed by Bertino is based on Merkle hash function (Bertino et 
al., 2004). The integrity model CSR is constructed based on the concatenated 
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hash function. Just like the Merkle hash function, the concatenated hash function 
also is designed to handle tree structure hash process. The reasons of adopting a 
concatenated hash function to construct the integrity model for XML data is: 
concatenated hash functions can handle arbitrary tree structure, but the Merkle 
hash function mainly deals with binary tree structure (Merkle, 1989). A 
concatenated hash function is more suitable to handle XML data. Concatenated 
hash functions can decrease the numbers of hash processes, so it has higher 
efficiency in hash value-generation for XML data than the Merkle hash function. 
 
The basic idea of integrity model CSR is that content integrity, structure integrity, 
and context-referential integrity are combined with the concatenated hash 
function. This section first presents the requirements of XML data integrity, and 
then describes the model definition. 
5.3.1 XML data integrity requirements 
In order to illustrate the requirement of XML data integrity, an example is given in 
Figure 5.1, and it is a real application document derived from a website. Note that 




002   <Title>Certificate of calibration</Title> 
003   <RefNumber>TDFRG</RefNumber> 
004   <CertificateDate>12/10/2008</CertificateDate> 
005   <Description>A single-mode Fibre Attention...</Description> 
006   <Measurements> 
007     <Description>The measurement of the spectral...</Description> 
008     <Table>Designed figure used in measurement</Table> 
009   </Measurements> 
010   <Results> 
011     <Description>The total attenuation...</Description> 
012     <Graph>Chart related to measurement results</ Graph > 
013     <Table>Figure of measurement results</Table> 
014   <Results> 
   M  
015 </Certificate> 
 
Figure 5.1 A certificate of calibration 
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• Content integrity (CI) 
The XML data contents refer to element name, attribute, and values of an 
element or sub XML data. Content integrity means that XML data content 
will not be changed or destroyed in transmitting or storage. This is ensured 
by generating a hash value of XML data. As shown in Figure 5.1, content 
integrity for element ‘Title’ should include tag name ‘Title’ and its value 
‘Certificate of calibration’. 
 
• Data structure integrity (STI) 
An XML data structure integrity protects the location information of an 
element in XML data (Mclntosh and Austel, 2005). It means that if the 
location of an element in the XML data is changed, it will lead to an invalid 
verification. Location information of an XML element refers to the position 
of this element in the XML data. Element location information consists of 
three parts: parent, level, and order in sibling. This position helps users to 
understand the meaning of the element. An element may have different 
meanings when it is located in different positions in XML data.  As shown 
in Figure 5.1, there are three ‘Description’ elements in line 04, 07, 11. The 
‘Description’ element has a completely different meaning related to its 
location: line 04 is a description for certificate information; line 07 is a 
description for measurement; line 11 is the description for measured 
results. Location information for an XML element is an important aspect 
and needs to be protected. 
 
• Context referential integrity (CRI) 
When adopting XML data format, without considering element context 
relationship, only one element will also lose its original meaning. As shown 
in Figure 5.1, the measurement result has a completely meaning related to 
measurement method or technique deployed in the certificate. The 
element ‘Measurements’ and the element ‘Results’ in Figure 5.1 are 
generated by different responsibilities. It cannot be signed by only one 
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user, or signed together, because each user is only responsible for own 
role. Under this situation, element ‘Certificate/Results’ has a completely 
meaning that is only related to element ’Certificate/Measurements’. It 
means that this kind of testing results occurrence corresponds to a specific 
given measurement. In other words, an XML element has an entire 
meaning only when related to other elements in the same XML data, and 
these elements are defined as context-related elements in this thesis. 
Another example is shown in Figure 5.2. 
As shown in Figure 5.2, the signature is generated on element ‘Payment’. 
However, element ‘Payment’ has a complete meaning that is only relating 
to element ‘Amount’. The context-related element of element ‘Payment’ is 
the element ‘Amount’. 
 
Context-referential integrity is used to protect context-related elements of 
an element in XML data. It will provide a binding between an element and 
context-related elements. This means if context-related elements of an 
element are altered, it will also lead to an invalid verification. 
 
The basic requirement for XML data integrity is that XML data has not been 
changed or destroyed. Considering XML data integrity features analyzed above, 
the detailed integrity requirements for XML data include XML data content, which 
includes element name, value, and attribute, has not been changed, destroyed, 
<Books> 
  <Title>XML Security</Title> 
  … 
  <Amount>20</Amount> 
  … 
  <Payment>£160</Payment> 
  … 
  <Signature> 
  … 
  </Signature> 
</Books> 
 
Figure 5.2 An example of CRI 
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or lost. Element location information, which includes element’s parent, level, and 
order in sibling, should be protected. In order to ensure a complete meaning of 
an element within an XML data, context-related elements should also be 
protected together with this element. 
5.3.2 Definition of integrity model CSR 
In order to develop a model for XML data integrity, this section introduces a 
definition for XML data proposed by Bertino as in definition 5.1.  
 
Definition 5.1 An XML data is tuple ),,,( ddrD EEVVX φ= (Bertino et al., 2004), 
where: 
• 
ae VVV ∪= is a set of nodes, where eV represents elements, and aV  
represents attributes. Each aVv ∈ has an associated attribute value; 
each eVv ∈ may have associated data content. 
• rV is a node representing the document element as called XML data 
root node. 
• VVEd ×⊆ is the set of edges. 
• dEφ is the edge labelling function. 
 
Definition 5.2 Content integrity )(vCI  
XML content integrity should protect name, attributes, value of an element or sub 
XML data. Let DX  be an element or sub XML data, and h  be a collision-resistant 
one way hash function. The )(vCI associated with DX  is a function, and for each 













   (5.1) 
 
Formula (5.1) only provides the hash value for an element or portions of XML 
data, where, eVcontentv ∈. , and aVattributev ∈. . h is a collision-resistant one-
way hash function such as SHA256.  )...1(. nichildv i = denotes v ’s the i th child. 
“||” denotes the concatenation operator. The definition is also based on a 
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concatenated hash function, meaning that all children of an element are 
concatenated together before, generating a hash value. 
 
Definition 5.3 Label for an XML node )(vL  
21)( CCvL =                                                                                                       (5.2) 
where, ∈1C Integer is the level of corresponding node v . )(2 vsiblingC =  is the 
order of sibling nodes, and )(vsibling is the function to get sibling order of 
node v . 
 
The label for element “Certificate\Results\Description” in Figure 5.1 can be 
expressed: 31)\Re\(\ =nDescriptiosultseCertificatL  
 
Definition 5.4 Structure integrity )(vST  
For each Vv ∈ , )),(()( vrpathhvST =                                                               (5.3) 
The result is the hash value of path string related to Vv ∈ , where r is the root of 
XML data. ),( vrpathp = : stringp ∈ , denotes a path from root r to current 
element v . p is an ordered sequence of one or more nodes 
)()(
1
)()( //// 1 vL
m
vLvLrL vvvrp mL∈ , and r is the root node of XML data, 
1v is the child 
of node r , mv is the child of 1−mv , and v is the current element. )(vL is the label for 
an internal node. 
 
The location of an element can be expressed as a path string from root node to 
current node. This path records the level, sibling order, and parent of an element. 
Through hashing this path string, element location information would be protected. 
 
Definition 5.5 Context referential integrity )(vCRI  
Suppose w is the context-related element of an XML data v , wv → , then, 
))(||)(()( wSTwCIhvCRI =                                                                                 (5.4) 
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where Vw ∈ . This definition includes integrity of context-related element content 
and its location information. Context-related elements can be selected by a signer 
before signing an XML data with considering context relationship. 
 
The problem is that the context-related elements only can be selected by user 
instead of generating automatically. Context-related elements defined in this 
section concentrate on the business rules in XML data, such as dependencies, 
relationship attributes, so it is difficult to give common rules to select the context-
related elements in practice, especially when integrity constraints for XML are still 
at infant stage. There are not unified types of integrity constraints for XML data, so 
it is impossible to integrate the integrity constraints for XML data into context-
related elements selection.  Under this situation, selection of context-related 
elements depends on constraints which are defined on the DTD by user. These 
constraints can be captured automatically by the system. With the development of 
integrity constraints for XML data, it is possible to define common rules to capture 
the elements which have the context-related relationship, and this point will be 
discussed in the section of future works. 
 
Definition 5.6 Definition of integrity model CSR 
))(||)(||)(()( vCRIvSTvCIhvCSR =                                                                   (5.5) 
The result of formula (5.5) is a hash value for the XML data. This value consists 
of three parts: )(vCI , )(vST , and )(vCRI , and the three parts are combined by a 
concatenated hash function, where, Vv ∈ is the node set of the XML data. 
)(vCI is a hash value of an element or sub XML data, which is used to protect the 
XML data content. )(vST is a hash value of element location information, which is 
used to protect the position of an element or sub XML data in the XML data. 
)(vCRI is a hash value of context-related elements, and which is used to protect 
context relationship of an element. h is a collision-resistant one-way hash 
function. The combination of these three parts is by string concatenation, i.e., by 
hashing the concatenated string lxx ||||1 K .   
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In case an element copied from an XML data to another document which has the 
same structure as original one, the original XML data creation timestamp is used 
to distinguish them as defined in definition 5.7. This definition is a combination of 
timestamp with integrity model CSR. 
 
Definition 5.7 Let ))(||( vCSRThS = be the hash value that is finally signed.  
Where, T  is an attribute of the creation timestamp related to root node rV  for 
XML data DX . It records the creation time of XML data DX . This value is derived 
from function )( DXCtimestampT = , and it obtains the timestamp of XML data 
creation. 
5.3.3 Integrity analysis 
The integrity proofs are expressed by three theorems. Theorem 5.1 provides the 
evidence of structure integrity, theorem 5.2 proves context-referential integrity, 
and theorem 5.3 proves that a signed XML data cannot be copied into another 
document. 
 
Theorem 5.1 If an element Vv ∈ in XML data DX and
'
DX , and 'DD XX ≠ , without 
considering context-related elements, then )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . 
 
This theorem is used to judge the data integrity when an element copied from 
one XML data to another which has different structure. Because the two XML 
data have different structures, the element location will be changed. From the 
defined integrity model, they will have different hash values and lead to an invalid 
verification. 
 
Proof: In the theorem, because v is the same in XML data DX and
'
DX , and 
without considering context-related elements, there is the same )(vCI , )(vCRI in 
DX and 'DX . If )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ , there must be different )(vST in DX  and 'DX . In 
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other words, v has different location in DX  and 'DX . Location information consists 
of three parts: parent, level, and order of sibling. 
 
Assuming the path from root node to current element v in XML data DX is: 
int,,/...// 2111 ∈= jivvvp ijj  
Assuming the path from root node to current element v in XML data 'DX is: 
int,,/...// 2112 ∈= nmrrrp mnn  
The value of )(vST in XML data DX : 
)/...//())(()( 2111 ijj vvvhppathhvST ==
 
The value of )(vST in XML data 'DX : 
)/...//())(()( 2112 mnn rrrhppathhvST ==
 
Because 'DD XX ≠ , there are two kinds of situations: 
• Different level 
If v has different level in XML data DX and
'
DX , then mi ≠ , and 
)/...//()/...//( 211211 mnnijj rrrhvvvh ≠ . 
Then, )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . It also means element v has different ancestors.  
• Different sibling order 
If v has different sibling order in XML data DX and 'DX , then nj ≠ , and 
)/...//()/...//( 211211 mnnijj rrrhvvvh ≠
 
Then, )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . 
 
Theorem 5.2 An element Vv ∈ in XML data DX and 'DX , if the context-related 
element is 1T  in XML data DX , '1T in XML data
'
DX , and '11 TT ≠ , then 
)()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . 
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The theorem 5.2 is used to check for changes in context-related elements. If the 
same element has different context-related elements, regardless of whether or not 
the two XML data have the same structure, it will lead to an invalid verification. 
 
Proof: If 'DD XX ≠ , from theorem 5.1, then )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠  
If 'DD XX =  and 
'
11 TT ≠  , then the value of )(vCSR in XML data DX  is expressed 
as follows: 
)(||))(||)((||)()(||)(||)()( 11 vCRITSTTCIvSTvCRIvSEvSTvCSR ==  
The value of )(' vCSR in XML data 'DX : 
)(||))(||)((||)()(||)(||)()( '1'1' vCRITSTTCIvSTvCRIvSEvSTvCSR ==  
'
11 TT ≠  means 
'
11 ,TT have different content, or different structure. 
If '11 ,TT have different content, then )()( '11 TCITCI ≠  Thus, )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠  
If '11 ,TT have different structure, then )()( '11 TCITCI ≠ and )()( '11 TSTTST ≠  Thus, 
)()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠  
 
Theorem 5.3 An element Vv ∈ in XML data DX , if DX is signed and copied to 
another XML data 'DX , it will lead to an invalid verification. 
Proof: If DX  and 'DX have not same structure and content, then from theorem 
5.1, there has )()( ' vCSRvCSR ≠ . It will lead to an invalid verification. 
 
If two XML data have same structure and content, they should be the same XML 
data. An element copied from one XML data to another will not affect the 
validation result. However, XML data has its own creating time, which can be used 
to judge the validation of an element in an XML data. Therefore, the integrity 
model combined with timestamp, to prevent an element is being copied 
maliciously from one XML data to another. 
 
Assuming )(vS is the signature related to element v , so the value of )(vS in XML 
data DX : 
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)))(||)(()( 1 vCSRthhvS =  
The value of )(vS in 'DX : )))(||)(()( 2 vCSRthhvS =  
 
If DX and 'DX have a different creation time, )()( 21 thth ≠ , and it will lead to an invalid 
verification. If DX ,
'
DX have a same creation time, and DX has the same structure 
and content as 'DX , this means that DX is the same XML data as 'DX . 
5.3.4 Efficiency analysis 
The following two factors affect the efficiency of model CSR: the node size and 
the depth size. In a aryk − tree with a depth of m , and worst situation, the 
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The time complexity of an iterative hash function h can be described as a function 






= , where D is constant 
(Tamassia and Triandopoulos, 2003). If v is a vertex of XML data DX , )deg(vin  
denotes the depth of vertex v , that is the numbers of predecessors of v  in DX . 
Let S  be a sub-tree of DX . The two components of the integrity cost for S are 
defined as follows. The node size nS  of S  is the number of its vertices. The 
depth size dS  of S  is the sum of the depth of its vertices, that 
is ∑ ∈= Svd vinS )deg( . The rehashing overhead is given by a linear combination 
of the node size and the depth size of S , that 
is dnSv SccSvincvc
'' )deg(|| +=+ ∑ ∈ , where both c and 'c  are constants. The 
verification time is a quantity of the form ∑ ∈+ Sv vincvc )deg(|| ' . 
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5.4 Combination with XML specification 
XML security has two sides: how traditional security technologies can be applied 
to solve security problems existing in XML data and how security technologies can 
be expressed in XML format. Based on the approaches proposed for XML data 
integrity, this section describes how the proposed model is expressed in XML 
format. The XML data content integrity has been described in the XML signature 
specification by W3C, therefore, this section only gives the description for 
structure integrity, and context-referential integrity. 
5.4.1 Specification for structure integrity 
The structure integrity is ensured by three elements as follows.  
• The ‘STIGenerate Algorithm’ is an element, which describes the algorithm 
applied to generate hash values of the location information of an element in 
the original XML data. 
 
• The content of the ‘DigestMethod’ element is the definition of hash algorithm 
adopted in this specification, and the default algorithm is SHA-1. 
 
• The value of the ‘DigestValue’ element is the generated hash value in base64 
encoding. 
An example of structure integrity is 
 
<STI name="structure integrity" xmlns="http://www.example.org"> 
  <STIGenerate Algorithm="http://www.example.org/xmldsig-csr/#STI" />  




Figure 5.3 An example of structure integrity 
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Syntax: Schema for STI 
5.4.2 Specification for context-referential integrity 
Context-referential integrity includes four elements: 
• The ‘CRIGenerate Algorithm’ is an element, which describes the algorithm 
applied to generate the hash values of context-related elements. 
 
• The content of the ‘RelatedNode’ is an element, which is used to record 
the context-related elements. 
 
• The content of the ‘DigestMethod’ element is the definition of hash 
algorithm adopted in this specification, and the default algorithm is SHA-1. 
 
• The value of the ‘DigestValue’ element is the generated hash value in 
base64 encoding. 
<?xml version = "1.0" encoding = "UTF-8"?> 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
    elementFormDefault = "qualified"> 
    <xsd:element name = "STI" type = "STIType"/> 
    <xsd:complexType name = "STIType" mixed = "true"> 
        <xsd:sequence> 
 <xsd:element ref = "STIGenerate"/> 
 <xsd:element ref = "DigestMethod"/> 
 <xsd:element ref = "DigestValue"/> 
       </xsd:sequence> 
       </xsd:complexType> 
       <xsd:element name = "STIGenerate"> 
 <xsd:complexType> 
                 <xsd:attribute name = "Algorithm" use = "optional" type = "xsd:anyURI"/> 
 </xsd:complexType> 
       </xsd:element> 
 <xsd:element name = "DigestMethod"> 
     <xsd:complexType> 
        <xsd:attribute name = "Algorithm" use = "optional" type = "xsd:anyURI"/> 
     </xsd:complexType> 
 </xsd:element> 
       <xsd:element name = "DigestValue" type = "xsd:string"/> 
</xsd:schema> 
Figure 5.4 Schema for STI 
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An example of CRI is as follows. 
 
Syntax: Schema for CRI 
 
<?xml version = "1.0" encoding = "UTF-8"?> 
<xsd:schema xmlns:xsd = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
    elementFormDefault = "qualified"> 
    <xsd:element name = "CRI" type = "CRIType"/> 
       <xsd:complexType name = "CRIType" mixed = "true"> 
 <xsd:sequence> 
                <xsd:element ref = "CRIGenerate"/> 
    <xsd:element ref = "RelatedNode"/> 
    <xsd:element ref = "DigestMethod"/> 
    <xsd:element ref = "DigestValue"/> 
 </xsd:sequence> 
       </xsd:complexType> 
       <xsd:element name = "CRIGenerate"> 
 <xsd:complexType> 
     <xsd:attribute name = "Algorithm" use = "optional" type = "xsd:anyURI"/> 
 </xsd:complexType> 
 </xsd:element> 
 <xsd:element name = "RelatedNode" type = "xsd:string"/> 
 <xsd:element name = "DigestMethod"> 
    <xsd:complexType> 
       <xsd:attribute name = "Algorithm" use = "optional" type = "xsd:anyURI"/> 
    </xsd:complexType> 
 </xsd:element> 
        <xsd:element name = "DigestValue" type = "xsd:string"/> 
</xsd:schema> 
Figure 5.6 Schema for CRI 
<CRI name="context-referential integrity" xmlns="http://www.example.org"> 
   <CRIGenerate Algorithm="http://www.example.org/xmldsig-cri/#CRI" /> 
   <RelatedNode>#myData</RelatedNode> 
   <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" /> 
  <DigestValue>36-C3-C5-A4-02-41-A9-0F-38-B7-C1-7C-7A-A0-A5-DE-      
7D-3A-75-9</DigestValue> 
</CRI> 
Figure 5.5 An example of CRI description 
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5.5 Testing and evaluation 
5.5.1 Evaluation environment 
• Hardware environment 
All the testing and evaluation are performed on a PC with a 2.39 GHz Pentium (R) 
4 processor, 0.99GB of RAM, and the MS Windows XP operating system.  
• Software environment 
The software deployed in the evaluation is listed in Table 5.1. The programming 
language is the C#.net. 
Table 5.1 Software deployed  
Related models Software  
Integrity model CSR Developed 
Integrity model proposed by E. Bertino Developed 
DOM-HASH Built-in package by Microsoft 
XMark The XML Benchmark Project 
5.5.2 Evaluation methods 
• Efficiency evaluation 
Efficiency evaluation aims at comparing the time-consuming of hash value-
generation between different models. In order to evaluate the efficiency of 
proposed model, XMark is used to generate XML data (Schmidt et al, 2001). For 
the XMark dataset, various scaling factors (0-1, incremental step is 0.1) are 
selected to create from 26.5KB to 113MB of documents. The DTD of XMark can 
be found in Appendix B. The compared integrity models are DOM-HASH, 
integrity model proposed by Bertino, and CSR. 
 
• Functionality testing 
In order to test functionality of proposed model based on described XML data 






Table 5.2 Testing criterion description 
Functionality Aims 
XML data content 
integrity 
The XML data content, including element name, value, 
and attribute, must not be modified in transit 
Structure integrity Element location information, including element parent, 
level, and order of sibling, has not been changed 
Context-referential 
integrity 
The model can protect context-related elements of an 
element. The protection of context-related elements 
include content integrity, and structure integrity 
 
The testing cases are categorized by element numbers. There are three kind of 
category: element number is 1, element numbers are equal or bigger than 2, and 
the whole XML data. The reasons of choosing this kind of category are: CSR 
based XML signature will be the same as XML signature when XML data has 
only one element. The algorithms of STI and CRI both are based on iterative, so 
there will no effect on CSR model no matter how many or how deep the elements 
will be hashed. When signing the whole XML data, XML data content integrity 
can ensure the structure integrity and context-referential integrity. Because the 

























Table 5.3 lists 13 testing cases under different situation.  











√ × × 














√ √ √ 
Check all integrity properties with 
one element. 
1.3 
√ × √ 
Check content integrity and 
context referential integrity with 
one element 
1.4 
√ √ × 
Check content integrity and 





√ × × 
Only change content of signed 
information with more than one 
element. 
2.2 
√ √ √ 
Check all integrity properties with 
more than one element. 
2.3 
√ × √ 
Both change content and context- 
related element of signed 
information 
2.4 
√ √ × 
Both change content and location 
of signed information  
2.5 
× × √ 
Only change context-related 









× √ × 
Only change location of signed 
information 
2.7 
× √ √ 
Both change context-related 





√ N/A N/A 












N/A N/A N/A 









√: Denote checking this property ×: Denote without checking this property 
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Based on testing cases and algorithms, the parameters need to be provided 
when executing the test process is listed in Table 5.4. 
 




Doc Null, an XML data The whole XML data need to be handled 
DataSign Null, the whole Doc, 
or portions of Doc 
Elements need to be signed 
Sdata Null, element of Doc, 
or set of elements  
Context-related elements of a signed XML 
data 
Identifier Null, user private key User private key is used to sign XML data 
 
5.5.3 Evaluation results 
The integrity model proposed by Bertino is based on the Merkle hash function. 
The model CSR in this thesis is based on a concatenated hash function. DOM-
HASH is also based on an iterative algorithm. When all of them have the same 
node size, the efficiency depends on the depth of XML data. There are five 
elements on each level in this testing. Let NiH i ∈, be the depth of XML data, and 
the time requirement is expressed as NiHT i ∈),( . The comparison is made 
based on two different hash algorithms, SHA-1 and SHA256 as shown in Figure 
5.7 and Figure 5.8 
 
Figure 5.7 Efficiency comparison based on 
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Figure 5.7 shows that, these models have almost the same efficiency when XML 
data depth is less than 30. When the XML data depth is increased, the 
concatenated hash function-based integrity model CSR has the highest efficiency 
compared to integrity model DOM-HASH and integrity model proposed by Bertino.  
The integrity model DOM-HASH has a higher efficiency when compared to 
integrity model proposed by Bertino, and this is obvious when XML data has a 
higher depth. It can be calculated that the model CSR has 49.03% higher 
efficiency than DOM-HASH, and 74.72% higher efficiency than the integrity model 
proposed by Bertino. Figure 5.8 has the same development trend as Figure 5.7, 
but because the algorithm SHA256 is slower than SHA-1, the total time overhead 
is increased as shown in Figure 5.8. This indicates that although different hash 
algorithms have an impact on efficiency, the integrity model CSR is still the most 
efficient under different hash algorithms, and this is determined by integrity model 
mechanism, having nothing to do with adopted hash algorithms. 
 
Without changing node size and numbers, when these nodes are at the same 
level, and it is defined as XML data width, the model CSR also is the most 
efficiency than others model as shown in Figures 5.9 and 5.10.  Compared to 
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8, XML data depth has a significant impact on XML data 
integrity generation process. 
Figure 5.8 Efficiency comparison based on 




































The reason of this result is the different numbers of hash computations in the 
three models. Figure 5.11 shows the total hash times of the three integrity models 
Figure 5.10 Efficiency comparison based on 
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Figure 5.9 Efficiency comparison based on 
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used in the testing cases. Bertino’s model hashes the leaf node 
with )).(||).(( namevhvalvhh , and there are 3 hash processes for each element. 
DOM-HASH hashes the leaf node with ).||.||.||.( attrvpivtextvelemvh , and there is 
only 1 hash process for each element. In model CSR, the leaf node returned 
directly with 1 hash process, and the non-leaf node will have 2 hash processes. 
 
Based on the Merkle hash function, hashing the leaf node will increase virtual 
nodes, and then increase the node numbers which need to be hashed, which can 
lead to a low efficiency. Based on concatenated hash function, this thesis 
concatenates the child node firstly, and then generates a hash value. It has been 
proved that increasing hash numbers will not improve the security of hash 
function (Joux, 2004). Therefore, the model presented has the same security 
level as DOM-HASH and Bertino’s integrity model, but because of decreased 
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5.5.4 Testing results 
Table 5.5 shows the testing results based on testing cases in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.5 Testing results based on testing cases 
Sample 
No 
XML signature CSR based XML signature 
Signing Verification Signing Verification 
1.1 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
1.2 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
1.3 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
1.4 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
2.1 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
2.2 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
2.3 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
2.4 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
2.5 Successful Valid Successful Invalid 
2.6 Successful Valid Successful Invalid 
2.7 Successful Valid Successful Invalid 
3 Successful Invalid Successful Invalid 
4 Successful Valid Successful Invalid 
 
As shown in Table 5.5, all the testing results correspond to expected result as 
described in Table 5.3.   
 
• XML data contains only one element  
When XML data consists of only one element, it includes all the information 
of structure and context relationship, so CSR based XML signature is the 
same as XML signature as shown in cases 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4, they have 
the same testing results. 
 
• Signing the whole XML data 
When signing the whole XML data, the hash value of XML data content 
should have contained XML data structure integrity and context-referential 
integrity, and hashed result is included in the signed information. CSR based 
XML signature is the same as XML signature, they also have the same 




• Signing portions of XML data when XML data elements are more than 
one element 
When signing portions of XML data, user can make a choice to ensure CI, 
STI, CRI, or all. When changed the contents of signed information, both XML 
signature and CSR based XML signature can detect this change and lead to 
an invalid verification result as shown in cases 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. When 
changing location information, context-related element of signed elements, or 
both of them, XML signature still keeps a valid verification result as shown in 
cases 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7.  CSR based XML signature can detect this change 
and lead to an invalid verification result as shown in cases 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7. 
 
• Signed element copied to another XML data 
When portions of XML data signed, attacker can copy signed XML data to 
another XML data still remaining a valid verification. XML signature cannot 
prevent this situation happening as shown in case 4. CSR based XML 
signature can find this kind of attack and achieve an invalid verification. 
 
Above testing results corresponds to expected result in Table 5.3. Therefore, 
proposed XML data integrity model CSR satisfies the integrity requirements for 
XML data presented previous, and can protect content integrity, element location 
information, and context-related elements for XML data. 
5.6 Analysis and discussion 
In order to summarize the advantages of the XML data integrity model CSR 
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).||.||.||.(),( attrvpivtextvelemvhsvdos =  
Where, v is the element set of XML data, h is a collision-resistant one-way 




















Where v is a sink node, kvv L1 are the successor of v . h is a collision-

































<Manifest> contains the data whose location is going to change and apply an 

















Where, Info(A-B), …,Info(A-M), … is the sub XML data, Info(BCD…M…) is the 









))(||)(||)(()( vCRIvSTvCIhvCSR =  , where, v is the element set of XML 
data, h is a collision-resistant one-way hash function. )(vCI is the content 
integrity of signed elements, )(vST is the structure integrity, and )(vCRI is the 










The similarities of the integrity model CSR compared to existing models mainly 
focus on two aspects. The integrity model CSR adopts a bottom-up iterative hash 
process as with DOM-HASH, Devanbu’s, and Bertino’s integrity model. The 
integrity model DOM-HASH, XHASH, Devanbu’s model, Qiao’s model, and 
model CSR ensure element name, attribute, and value, except Bertino’s model 
ignored the attribute integrity of an element. 
 
As shown in Table 5.6, only the model CSR for XML data provides overall integrity 
protection, including data content, element location information, and element 
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context meaning. Based on this comparison, the major differences of the model 
proposed compared to others are: 
 
• Only integrity model CSR is considering XML data features  
DOM-HASH and XHASH just consider the hash objectives, and the model 
proposed by Devanbu and Bertino focus on the hash value-generation 
process. The model CSR combined the XML data features, such as the 
element location and context-related elements for example. 
 
• Integrity model CSR not only ensure the integrity of data content, but also 
provides a method for hash value-generation process 
The integrity model DOM-HASH and XHASH just provide the integrity objects 
which include element name, attribute, and value, without describing the 
process of hash value-generation process. The integrity model CSR not only 
ensures the integrity of data content, but also describes the hash value-
generation process. Two kinds of element have been involved, the leaf node 
and vertices. It will directly return the hash values of content and attribute if 
the node is the leaf node, otherwise it will iteratively call the function. 
 
• Bertino’s model ignored the integrity attribute 
The content integrity in Bertino’s model is only from )).(||).(( namevhvalvhh . 
This does not consider the integrity attribute. In integrity model CSR, the 
integrity content includes attributevcontentv .||. , and 
valuevnamevcontentv ... ∪= . 
 
• Different hash numbers in the models 
DOM-HASH and XHASH hash the leaf node from ).||.||.( pivtextvelemvh , 
and there are 1 hash processes in total. Devanbu’s and Bertino’s model 
hashes the leaf node from )).(||).(( namevhvalvhh , and there are 3 hash 
processes in total. In integrity model CSR, the non-leaf node returned directly 
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using ).(||).( attributevcontentv  without hash process, and there is only 1 
hash process for leaf node. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter presents overall XML data integrity requirements combining XML 
data features. An integrity model is also presented based on the concatenated 
hash function to protect the requirements presented. The testing results show 
that the integrity model proposed not only ensures XML data content integrity, but 
also protects the structure integrity and elements’ context relationship within an 
XML data. With this approach integrated into XML signature technology, the 
signature cannot be copied to another document still keeping valid. This indicates 
that the presented model overcome the limitations existing in XML signature 
specification. Integrity model CSR not only provides a model for XML data 
integrity, but also provides a method for the hash value-generation process. The 
integrity model has been verified a higher efficiency on hash value-generation 





Chapter 6 A Series-parallel XML Multi-signature 
Scheme for XML Data Authentication 
 
This chapter firstly describes series-parallel signing group and then XML data 
integrity-checking pool is presented. Based on series-parallel signing graph and 
off-line XML data integrity-checking approach, a series-parallel XML multi-
signature scheme for XML data is proposed. The testing and evaluation are also 
executed in this chapter. 
6.1 Introduction 
XML data authentication is important research area related to XML security 
(Bertino, 2001). General applications of data authentication could exist in many 
domains. For example, a user contacting a mirror site would need to 
cryptographically validate the information as genuine, that is, as being the same 
information as if the response had come directly from the source (Polivy and 
Tamassia, 2002; Damiani et al., 2002).  
 
A document is delivered through a hierarchical network of responsibilities with 
different roles and access rights. An example has been given by Leung and Hui 
to describe this situation. The computing department of a university would like to 
renovate its staff room so as to meet the contemporary hardware requirements 
(Leung and Hui, 2001). The requirement has to be approved by the Financial 
Office. The subsequent approval from the Estate Office will depend on the 
signature of the Financial Office (Leung and Hui, 2001). The approval of the 
Estate Office is based on the approval of the Financial Office. Traditional digital 
signature approach focuses on signing the entire document, and the XML 
signature specification is infeasible to make complex workflows secure on an 
XML data with multiple signatures (Leung and Hui, 2001). Under this situation, it 
is necessary to build an XML multi-signature scheme which is compatible with a 




This chapter proposes a series-parallel XML multi-signature scheme based on 
Lu’s model (Lu and Chen, 2004). The series-parallel XML multi-signature scheme 
presented is a mixed-signing order including both dependent and independent 
signing process. In proposed scheme, signers are divided into series or parallel 
subgroups and the members in the signer group can be flexibly managed. The 
signing order is generated before the signing process without a relationship to 
multi-signature scheme.  This scheme uses XPath expression to transform XML 
data, and generates an XML data integrity-checking pool to provide integrity-
checking for decomposed XML data. With an integrity-checking pool, a signer 
can check integrity without cooperation from other signers. XML data does not 
need to be delegated entirely, and signers can complete integrity verification off-
line. If there is a single signer, the scheme is compatible with single XML 
signature. When each subgroup has a single signer, the scheme is compatible 
with a sequential multi-signature scheme. When all signers are in the same 
subgroup, the scheme is compatible with a broadcast multi-signature scheme.  
 
6.2  Theory guidance for data authentication 
There are two mechanisms to ensure data authentication: 
• Message authentication code (MAC) 
MAC, a cryptographic check value, is used to provide data origin 
authentication and data integrity (ISO/IEC, 1997). Both data integrity and 
data origin authentication can only be provided for the receiving entity. A 
third party cannot verify these properties, as both sender and receiver are 
capable to create the MAC (or HMAC). 
 
• Digital signature 
Digital signature allows a recipient of the message to prove the source and 
integrity of the message and protect against forgery (ISO 7498-2, 1989; 
Georgiadis et al., 2002). More specifically, the using of asymmetric 
encryption provides a means to ensure the authentication, also known as 
non-repudiation (Brandt and Bonte, 2000). 
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In this chapter, data authentication is ensured using digital signature. The 
reasons of adopting digital signature as the data authentication method is: digital 
signature can be used to support requirements for non-repudiation. This is 
because access to the private key is usually restricted to the owner of the key, 
which makes it easier to verify proof of ownership. W3C has developed the 
technology of XML signature for XML data authentication. The new scheme 
should be compatible with XML signature specification. 
6.3 A series-parallel XML multi-signature scheme 
6.3.1 Series-parallel signing group 
• Signing order graph 
In order to represent signing orders, among n signers, series-parallel graph is 
deployed, which is a directed acyclic graph as shown in Figure 6.1.  
 
A directed acyclic graph ),( EV=ϕ consists of set V of nodes and a set of 
E edges connecting pairs of distinct nodes. For an edge e between two nodes, 
the initial vertex of the edge is represented by )( VII ee ∈ , and the terminal vertex 
is represented by )( VTT ee ∈ . The signers correspond to the vertices in the 
graphϕ . 
 
• The rules for series-parallel signing group 
Given signers group },,,{ 21 nuuuSG K= , it can be divided into several ordered 











Figure 6.1 Signing order graph 
● 
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1. Given signer group SG , it can be defined as nGGGSG ∪∪∪= K21 , and 
φ=∩∩∩ nGGG K21 , where iG  is the sub set of SG , φ  denotes an empty 
set. The signing order is nGGG ,,, 21 K , and this means that nGGG ,,, 21 K is 
signing in sequential. 
2. For ki Gu ∈∃ )( , mj Gu ∈∃ )( , if mk = , then kji Guu ∈, (= mG ), and ji uu , can sign 
parallel. In other words, the signers who are in the same subgroup can sign in 
parallel. 
3. For ki Gu ∈∃ )( , mj Gu ∈∃ )( , if mk < , then ji uu , should sign sequentially, and 
iu should sign before ju . 
4. For ki Gu ∈∃ )( , mj Gu ∈∃ )( , if mk > , then ji uu , should sign sequentially, and 
ju should sign before iu . 
5.  Only the groups obtained by the rules (1), (2), (3), and (4) are series-parallel 
signing groups. 
 
• Signing order graph conversion to series-parallel signing group 
The following steps illustrate how to convert a signing order graph to a series-
parallel signing group. 
 
Assume nGGGG ∪∪∪= K21 and let φ== ),...,1( nkkG . 
Step 1: With a labelled edge ϕ∈e , where the initial vertex is eI , and the terminal 
vertex is eT . 
Step 2: If GI e ∉ , then let 1GI e ∈ . If GTe ∉ , then let 2GTe ∈ . 
Step 3: If )...1( nkke GI =∈ , and GTe ∉ , then let 1+∈ ke GT . Otherwise, 
assume )...1( nmme GT =∈ . If km ≤ , then move eT from mG to 1+mG , until km > . 
Step 4: Go to step 1 until each edge inϕ has been handled. 
 
According to above algorithm, the signing order graph can be converted to the 
following series-parallel signing group.  
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}{},,{},{},,{ 6454332211 uGuuGuGuuG ====
 
 
This means signers can generate a parallel signature in each subgroup, where 
every subgroup signing is sequential. The converted signing order group of 
Figure 6.1 is shown in Figure 6.2. 
6.3.2 XML data decomposition (XDD) 
XML data is based on the tree structure. DOM is used to define how XML data 
can be accessed, and it is naturally a tree structure representation (Devanbu et 
al., 2001). For integrity verification purpose, the important properties of DOM-
HASH are as follows. 
 
If a signer iu  knows the hash value of a root for an XML data DX , it is possible to 
prove that any sub-tree ist  of the XML data occurs under DX  without revealing 
all of DX and online verification. A iu can generate the hash value of ist by DOM-
HASH the sub-tree ist .  By given the hash value of the sibling of ist  and the 
sibling of all its parents, the signer iu  can compute the hash value of the root 
node. Based on the feature of one-way hash function and comparison of hash 
value, the signer iu can judge whether the sub-tree ist  is included in the XML 
data DX . This process also can be used to prove that a sub-tree ist  is contained 
in another sub-tree jst  without revealing other sub-tree in jst . 
 
Giving an XML data DX , a DTD relative to the XML data and a poolτ with a 
limited number of XPath in DTD, the integrity-checking pool can be defined: 
 
Definition 6.1 XML data integrity-checking pool τ , τ is a tuple 
as )))((),(),(,( pchpcphp , where 
• p is the possible XPath in the DTD. 
},{ 21 uu }{ 3u },{ 54 uu }{ 6u  
Figure 6.2 Converted series-parallel signing order 
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• )( ph is the hash value of each p , and h is a secure one-way hash function. 
• )( pc denotes the content accessed by XPath p , 
• ))(( pch is the hash value of )( pc . 
 
The generation process for XML data integrity-checking poolτ  is: 
1. Generate each possible XPath },...,1{, nippi ∈∈∀  in the DTD, and relative 
hash value )( iph . Insert ip  , content )( ipc , and )( iph into poolτ . 
2. Build DOM-HASH associates a secure hash value ))(( ipch  with each ip , and 
let ))(( ii pchm = . 
3. There could be many sub-trees },...,1{, nisti ∈  relative to XPath ip , and these 
sub-trees can be hashed together using the concatenation hash function 
)||||||( 21 ni stststhm K= to get a hash value each entry ip . 
 
For integrity verification, there is the pool τ with XPath entries, and an integrity 
verification request from a signer with the XPath q . 
1. Match q against each entry inτ . 
2. If the XPath q matches an entry ip  inτ , retrieve the hash value im  relative 
to the entry ip . If there is no corresponding entry matched to q , reject, 
otherwise, go to step 3. 
3. Build hash value 'im  with step 3, check that ii mm
?
'
= . If mm ≠' , then reject, 
otherwise, accept. If signer does not believe in this result after accepting, the 
verification process can be extended to parent verification as shown in step 
4. 
4. Assume 'q is the XPath of q parent, and let 'qq = , then go to step 1. Finally, 




= . If it is not equal, reject, otherwise accept. This is a convincing 
result, because the integrity of whole XML data has been checked. 
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6.3.3 XML multi-signature scheme 
The system has the following roles which are similar to Wu and Lu’s scheme: a 
group of signers, a system authority, an XDD, and a signature collector (Wu et 
al., 2001). SA supports to initialize system parameters, and to generate the 
secret keys and public keys for the group and the individual signer (Wu et al., 
2001). XDD is used to decompose the XML data to a set of sub-data. Individual 
signatures generated by the signers are collected and verified by SC. SC also 
constructs a multi-signature for XML data based on verified individual signature 
(Wu et al., 2001). It is supposed that SA and SC can be trusted by all signers. 
The proposed approach consists of three stages as Wu’s scheme: the stage of 
private key and public key generation, the stage of multi-signature generation, 
and the stage of multi-signature verification (Wu et al., 2001).  
 
1. Common parameters 
The common parameters are similar to those defined in (NIST, 2006) for DSA 
standard to which the group dimension has been added. Assuming a group of 
n signers, the parameters are defined: 
• :, qp Two large prime numbers such that )1(| −pq as defined in digital 
signature algorithm (NIST, 2006). 
• :g Generator of the cyclic group of order q in *pZ (selects an element 
*
pZh ∈ and computes phg qp mod/)1( −= such that 1≠g ). 
• :,,, 21 nxxx K Group members’ private keys. 
• :,,, 21 nyyy K Group members’ public keys such that pgy ixi mod= is 
computed. 
• ),( ii YX  is the key pair for each subgroup kG , where 




ji qxX mod                                                                           (6.2) 




ji pyY mod                                                                          (6.3) 
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• :(.)h A cryptographic hash function (one-way function) such as SHA-1, 
SHA-256. 
 
2. Signature generation and verification 
The procedure for generating a multi-signature of DX  for G   is as follows. 
 Step 1: XDD sends },,{ jD TXτ to ju , and   },,,{ 21 jj pppT K=  
 Step 2: Each Gu j ∈  extracts jDX from DX using jT , and then checks the integrity 
of jDX  usingτ  and the integrity verification process. 
Step 3: If integrity of jDX  is successfully verified, each 
],1[,, NkjGu kj ∈∈ randomly selects an integer qj Zz ∈ , computes 
                     pgr jzi mod= ,                                                                             (6.4) 
and sends },{ jj rT  to other participant signers in the same subgroup and 
SC. 
Step 4: After receiving },{ jj rT , )( jiui ≠ and SC can compute 
prR jj rThjj mod
)||(
=                                                                                (6.5) 
Step 5: Each ],1[,, NkjGu kj ∈∈  computes both 




jk pRR mod                                                                                  (6.6) 
           qRhhxRrThzs kjkijij mod))||)(()||(( τ+=                                           (6.7) 
and sends }{ js to SC. ),( jj sr is the personal signature of DX  by signer 
ju . 
Step 6: In order to verify ),( jj sr for every ],1[,, NkjGu kj ∈∈ , SC computes 
kR by Eq. (6.6) and checks whether or not the following equation holds. 
             pygr kjkjj Rhhj
sRrTh
j mod))(( ))||(()||( τ=                                                        (6.8) 
Step 7: If all personal signatures generated in the previous steps are successfully 






jk qsS mod                                                                       (6.9) 
and publishes ),( kk SR as the multi-signature of DX  by subgroup kG . 
            
The verifier checks the equality to verify the subgroup multi-signature ),( kk SR : 
))(mod)(( ))||(( pYgR kkk RhhSRk τ=                                                             (6.10) 
If Eq. (6.10) holds, then subgroup multi-signature ),( kk SR is successfully verified. 
 
The signature of the whole group (this signature is used to ensure sequential 
signing order): 
Step 1: SC verifies each subgroup multi-signature ),( kk SR , if any of them are 
invalid, then reject, otherwise, go to step 2. 
Step 2: SC computes )||||||( 21 kG SSShS K= , here ]..1[, kiS i ∈ is each subgroup 
signature. 
Step 3: The signature for subgroup 1G : 
           pg k mod11 =σ                                                                                     (6.11) 
          qkXSG mod1111 σρ −=                                                                        (6.12) 
          and sends ),( 11 ρσ to next subgroup. 
Step 4: For subgroup iG , first verifies the signature by 1−iG   through  

















ji σρ σ                                                            (6.13) 
If this generates a failed verification, then reject the signature from 1−iG , 
otherwise, compute 
pg iki mod=σ ,                                                                       (6.14) 
qkXS iiiGii mod1 σρρ −+= −                                                   (6.15) 
Then ),( ii ρσ is the final multi-signature for group SG . 
 Step 5: Verification for final multi-signature: 
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modσρ σ                                                             (6.16) 
6.3.4 Correctness proofs 
Since proposed scheme for subgroup signature is based on Lu’s scheme, 
correctness of the single signature and subgroup signature is as their scheme. 
This section just provides the proofs of correctness of sequential signature for 
subgroup. 
 
Theorem 6.1 If equation (6.13) is true, then the subgroup signature ),( ii ρσ  is 
valid 



































































The Eq. (6.13) is correct. 
 
Theorem 6.2 If Eq. (6.16) is true, then the final signature for group is valid. 
Proofs: Because Eq. (6.16) is a special expression from Eq. (6.13), for ki = , 
then Eq. (6.13) is equal to Eq. (6.16), the Eq. (6.16) is correct, and the sequential 
signature for group is valid. 
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6.3.5 Security analysis 
The security of the proposed scheme is as secure as Wu’s scheme because both 
of them are based on discrete logarithm and one-way hash function. Note that 
there are two particular issues that need to be addressed. The security issues 
related to proposed scheme: 
 
• Issue 1: Forging an integrity verification tableτ  
Assuming (given an XML data and a conforming DTD) that the decomposition 
process is executed correctly, the signer can accept a correct answer and 
reject an incorrect one, unless a collision in the hash function applied in 
decomposition process is found. 
 
Analysis of issue 1:  
Suppose that the signers use the DTD to compute the set of table entries 
which matches their XML data to be signed. Based on repeating the 
computation done by the decomposition process and results in the same hash 
value, the signers can accept correct XML data delegated to them. Now we 
discuss that the signers will reject any incorrect XML data to be signed. If a 
signer received an incorrect XML data delegated to him from an adversary, 
the process of computing the hash value for that entry will be different from 
that used to generate provided hash value. There are two ways to get a same 
hash value for a different XML data. First way is that a hash collision has to be 
found in the process of computing the hash value of delegated XML data. 
Alternatively, a second pre-image is found in the process of computing the 
hash value of delegated XML data. For these two cases, a collision should be 
found in the hash functions to generate the same hash value for different 
information. However, for a secure one-way hash function h , given )(xhy =  , 
it is computationally unfeasible to find 21 xx ≠ , such that )()( 21 xhxh = . The 






• Issue 2: Forging a multi-signature 
The signature generated by the last subgroup is the multi-signature ),,( iiGS ρσ , 
the verification equation is Eq. (6.16). The security of Eq. (6.16) is expressed by 
theorem 6.3. 
 
Theorem 6.3 It is a DL (Discrete Logarithm) problem to calculate  iρ  through 
),( iGS σ , or to calculate iσ  through ),( iGS ρ  in Eq. (6.16). 
Proofs: From Eq. (6.16), it is easy to understand that it is a DL problem to 
calculate iρ  through ),( iGS σ . 


















then Eq. (6.16) can be rewritten as: pCC mod21 σσσ = , then has 
pCC mod)( 1112 −− =σσ                                                                                      (6.17) 




= CC  in )( pGF . Then Eq. (6.17) can be written as: 
pCC mod)( 34 =σσ , so, pCC CC mod)()( 44 34 =σσ                                         (6.18)  
Assume XC =4σ , and CC C =4)( 3 , then Eq. (6.18) can be written as: 
pCX X mod=                                                                                                 (6.19) 
Given ),( iGS ρ , calculation iσ  is equal to obtain X in Eq. (6.19). It is a DL 
problem to obtain X in Eq. (6.19). 
6.3.6 Efficiency analysis 
Let mT , eT , and hT be the time required to perform a modular multiplication, a 
modular exponential, and the one-way hash function h ; respectively.  n is the 
number of signers inG ; k is the number of divided subgroup forG ; and i is the 
signer’s number in subgroup kG . 
 
The time-consuming for generating and verifying an individual signature ),( ii sr is 
identical to Lu’s scheme. The time complexities of both stages are 
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)32)2(( hem TTTnO +++  and )23( hem TTTO ++ respectively. The time 
complexities for generating and verifying a subgroup signature are different from 
the signers in the subgroup, both stages are ))2()1(( hem TiiTTiO +++−  and 
)23( hem TTTO ++ ; respectively. The worst situation is where all the signers are 
in the same group, that is ni = . The time complexities for constructing multi-
signature from subgroup are )3)2(( hem TTTkO +++ and )3( hem TTTO ++ . 
6.3.7 Compatibility with XML Signature Specification 
As described in proposed scheme, each signer Gui ∈ extracts XPath expression 
ip from the set of XPath expressions T delegated to him. “Transforms” element 
can be used to describe ip ’s content to be signed. Other information can also be 
defined in an XML signature. The method applied to generate hash values can 
be described in the “DigestMethod” element. The element “SignatureValue” can 
contain the multi-signature result. The proposed scheme is compatible with the 
XML signature specification. 
 
6.4 Testing and evaluation 
6.4.1 Evaluation environment 
All the testing is performed on a PC with a 2.39 GHz Pentium (R) 4 processor, 
0.99GB of RAM, and the MS Windows XP operating system. The algorithms are 
coded in C#.net.  
6.4.2 Evaluation methods 
Two parameters have been taken into account in the evaluation: the number of 
signers and the number of bits used to generate the common parameters. The 
schemes are compared including the two major XML multi-signatures: repeated 







• Input bits 
The evaluation is categorized to two situations of 160 bits and 256 bits. Which is 
corresponding to hash algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256, and also is the length of 
the parameter q in bits. 
 
• Testing cases 
The testing cases are generated using XMark. The selected scaling factor is 1, 
and created XML data size is 113MB. The XPath is used to assign XML data to 










• Sign order graph 
In the testing, the signer group has 20 members, and the relationship of their 
signature generation is shown in Figure 6.3.  
 
According to approach presented previous, the signing order graph can be 





















Figure 6.3 Signing order graph 
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• Output results 
The output is the execution time of different multi-signature schemes. The time 
taken is after XML data assigned to each signer and stopped after the signature 
generated or validated. 
6.4.3 Evaluation results 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show the execution time overhead corresponding to the 
signing process, while Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the execution time overhead 
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Figure 6.4 Converted series-parallel signing order 
Figure 6.5 Execution time comparison (160 bits signing) 
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Figure 6.5 and 6.6 show that the superiority of the scheme presented in this 
thesis and Lu’s scheme over RDSA increasing with the signers size. Although all 
signers should sign specific XML data, the scheme in this thesis and scheme by 
Lu have almost 50% higher efficiency. The reason for this result is that these two 
schemes only sign the XPath expression, not the XML data itself. Compared to 
sign XML data itself, the XPath expression are significantly smaller. This will 
decrease the time taken to generate the hash value. Compared to Lu’s scheme, 
the two have almost the same efficiency; however, the scheme proposed has 
more functionality and is more practicable in applications. 
 
Figure 6.7 and 6.8 show the superiority of scheme proposed in this thesis and 
scheme proposed by Lu over RDSA in terms of execution times. The increase of 
the size group has less impact on schemes both in this thesis and by Lu. When a 
signature is verified, RDSA should check each signature generated by signers, 
and this leads to a line of increasing verification time. The schemes presented 
both in this thesis and by Lu only need to verify the signature generated by SC, 
so the verification time almost is a constant of about 1.2 seconds. 
Figure 6.6 Execution time comparison (256 bits signing) 
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6.5 Discussion and analysis 
The three models including RDSA or RRSA, the scheme proposed by Lu, and the 














Figure 6.7 Execution time comparison (160 bits verification) 
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Figure 6.8 Execution time comparison (256 bits verification) 
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Table 6.1 Existing schemes comparison 
Comparison 
aspects 




The contents which 
need to be signed 
Difficult to validate 
the contents 
denoted by XPath 
Easy to validate 






With increasing the 
numbers of signers, the 
size of signature results 
will increase significant. 
XML data size 
increase depends 
on signing order  
Without effect on 





An arbitrary number of 
objects can be signed 
An arbitrary 
number of objects 
can be signed 
An arbitrary number 
of objects can be 
signed 




Signed content is 
directly accessible 
Signed content is 
accessible by 
XPath 






Arbitrary data can be 
signed 
Arbitrary data can 
be signed 





URI plus transforms URI plus 
transforms 




Depends on signer 
numbers 
1 or more 1 
 
• Integrity validating 
Before signing the contents, the signer needs to check the integrity of XML 
data to be signed. Repeated DSA or RSA only checks the integrity of 
delegated XML data contents, so the signed results can be copied to another 
document still with a valid verification results. For Lu’s scheme and the 
scheme presented in this thesis, the integrity checking is not only the XML 
data itself but also the XPath expression, which denotes the XML data need 
to be signed. In addition, the presented scheme can ensure that the signed 
results cannot be copied to another document. 
  
• Signer’s number constraint 
Although the three schemes have not limited the signer numbers, the scheme 
of repeated RSA or DSA can increase the size of signature results when 
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signer numbers is increased. It indicates that the repeated RSA or DSA is not 
suitable to a large signer group. 
 
• The numbers of signed objects 
All the three schemes can sign arbitrary numbers of objects. 
 
• Signing order 
The scheme of repeated DSA or RSA and the scheme proposed by Lu only 
support broadcast signature generation. The presented scheme supports a 
natural signing process, e.g. series and parallel. 
 
• Generated signature value 
The numbers of signature value will affect the XML data size. The numbers of 
signature value depends on the signer numbers in approach of repeated DSA 
or RSA, because each signer will generate an independent signature value. 
The number of signature value in approach proposed by Lu depends on 
signing order graph, and the worst situation is the numbers equal to signer 
numbers. The best situation is only 1 signature value. In the scheme 




This chapter proposes a series-parallel XML multi-signature scheme. The 
presented scheme is a mixed order specified XML multi-signature scheme 
according to a dependent and independent signing process. Using presented 
XML data integrity-checking pool to provide integrity-checking for decomposed 
XML data, it makes signing XPath expression practicable, instead of signing XML 
data itself. The proved evidence shows that the scheme is correct, and the 
scheme is secure since it is a DL problem. The evaluation results show that the 
scheme satisfies the functionality of sequential and parallel signing process, and 
has a higher efficiency than scheme of repeated DSA or RSA. This scheme is 
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also compatible with single XML signatures, sequential or broadcast multi-
signature schemes. 
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Chapter 7 NLBILS based encrypted XML data 
querying 
A number list based interval labeling scheme (NLBILS) for XML data is presented 
in this chapter. Based on proposed labeling scheme, a structural index for 
encrypted XML data is illustrated. The testing and evaluation for proposed 
scheme are also executed.  
7.1 Introduction 
Using XML encryption technology proposed by W3C, user can encrypt any parts 
of an XML data. Because of the flexibility of XML encryption, it raises new issue 
for XML data querying.  As shown in Figure 7.1(a), some information of a credit 
card needs to be encrypted, and the customer names should be viewed by 
others. Using the encryption methods described by W3C, only information about 
credit cards can be encrypted, and the result is shown in Figure 7.1(b). 
 
<PaymentList> 
  <PaymentInfo> 
    <Name>Baolong Liu</Name> 
    <CreditCardInfo> 
       <Number>3209 4465 8972 1205</Number> 
       <Issuer>HSBC<Issuer> 
       <Expiration>02/11</Expiration> 
       <Limit>1000</Limit> 
    </CreditCardInfo> 
    <Address>Huddersfield</Address> 
    <Amount>£120.00</Amount> 
  </PaymentInfo> 
  <PaymentInfo> 
   <Name>Jack Xia</Name> 
    <CreditCardInfo> 
       <Number>4465 3476 2218 5421</Number> 
       <Issuer>Lloyds tsb<Issuer> 
       <Expiration>04/12</Expiration> 
       <Limit>500</Limit> 
    </CreditCardInfo> 
    <Address>Manchester</Address> 
    <Amount>£210.00</Amount> 




  <PaymentInfo> 
    <Name>Baolong Liu</Name> 
    <EncryptedData> 
       <CipherData> 
     <CipherValue>A23B45C5 
     </CipherValue> 
       </CipherData> 
    </EncryptedData> 
    <Address>Huddersfield</Address> 
    <Amount>£120.00</Amount> 
  </PaymentInfo> 
  <PaymentInfo> 
    <Name>Jack Xia</Name> 
    <EncryptedData> 
       <CipherData> 
     <CipherValue>C67DR87T 
     </CipherValue> 
       </CipherData> 
    </EncryptedData> 
    <Address>Manchester</Address> 
    <Amount>£210.00</Amount> 
  </PaymentInfo> 
</PaymentList> 
 
Figure 7.1 An example for XML encryption 
(a) (b) 
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This method of encryption can be used for XML data confidentiality. Consider the 
following query: //PaymentInfo[//Issuer = "HSBC"]/Name 
 
Only the issuer of credit card can answer the query above, and the credit card 
information has been encrypted. Without decrypting the contents, this query 
cannot be executed properly. 
 
This chapter proposes a structural index with considering both efficiency of index 
information updating and query processing security. A structural index based on 
number list based interval labeling scheme (NLBILS) is proposed. Proposed 
structural index provides spare space for node insertion, and makes 
management of index information more efficiency, so it is easy to update XML 
data without affecting other nodes.  Value index is based on order preserving 
encryption. With the feature of order preserving, it can support range querying. 
The index information will be encrypted using different keys. User accesses 
different parts of index information according to their keys. It will not disclose the 
structural information and contents to untrusted server. Inspired by XML pool 
encryption (Geuer-Pollmann, 2004), this thesis proposes a novel approach to 
protect structural information for encrypted XML data. The encrypted nodes are 
removed from original XML data, and consist of an encrypted XML data pool. The 
structural information is protected. When user submits a query Q according to 
original XML schema, it will be translated to 'Q  for encrypted XML data with the 
helping of index information. The server will retrieve the query result and return to 
user.  
7.2 Number list based interval labeling scheme (NLBILS) 
7.2.1 Interval-based labeling scheme 
The interval-based labeling scheme is described by Li in 2001 (Li and Moon, 
2001). In this scheme, each node is assigned two values: start position value and 
the end position value. The values are positive numbers during the depth first 
traverse of an XML data as shown in Figure 7.2 (Li and Moon, 2001; Yun and 
Chung, 2008). The step size of increment is set as 3 in Figure 7.2. 
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This technique aims at determining if there exists a relationship 
ascendance/precedence between two given nodes. A pair ))(),(( xsizexorder is 
associated to each node x in the document in such a way that, for each child 
node y of x , 
)()( yorderxorder < and ))()(())()(( xsizexorderysizeyorder +≤+  
 
It has the following property: 
)]()(),([)]()(),([ xsizexorderxorderysizeyorderyorder +⊂+  if and only if y  is 
the child of x . 
 
When inserting a child to an existing node, it is always possible to find an interval 
that satisfies that property above. The computation of a new interval for a sibling 
between two nodes depends on the available remaining space. However, it is 
difficult to predict the XML data updating, it means that it is difficult to reserve the 
space which is used to insert XML data. After data updated several times, the 
space required to contain inserted data will exceed the reserved space, and the 
re-label of the whole XML data is needed (Yun and Chung, 2008). 
7.2.2 NLBILS 
This section improves the interval-based labeling scheme focusing on labeling 
the nodes when there have not enough space for inserting. The basic idea is that 
if there is not enough space for inserting, the labeling process assigns a number 








5 9 13 
17 21 25 29 33 37 
41 
45 
Figure 7.2 Example of interval-based labeling 
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each node in the sub-tree. The labeling result of each node will be consisting of a 
number list with its parent’s nodes label.  
 
Definition 7.1 Number list NL  
Let NL be the number list, and )1(... 21 ≥= npppNL nL , where )...1(, nipi ∈ is an 
integer.  
 
In definition above, if 2=i , this means that the situation of not having enough 
space occurs first time. If 2>i , the situation of low inserting space has happened 
several times, and )1(... 21 ≥nppp nL contains the label of parent node. With the 
number list, it can overcome the space problem of insertion, and avoid to re-
labeling of whole XML data, so improving the efficiency of XML data updating. 
 
Figure 7.3 shows an example of XML data inserting. The sub XML data in 
rectangle will be inserted into original data tree, and there have not enough 
inserting space. The sub XML data will be assigned a new number 27, which is in 
the range of interval-based labeling scheme. Each node in sub XML data will be 
labelled with a new start number. The labeling result of each node in sub-tree is a 
number list. For example, the label of node “Enn1” is (27.1, 27.21), “Fcb1” (27.5, 
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Definition 7.2: Node label The label of each node is denoted as the 3-tuple 
),,( levelrightleft , where left is the left number list of the node, right is the right 
number list of the node, and the level is the depth of the node in the XML data. 
 
Lemma 7.1 (Number list relationship). Given two number lists nssss ... 21 L= , 
nrrrr ... 21 L= , their relationship can be judged by following rules: 
• rs > , if 11 rs > , or )()( 11 ++ >= iiii rsandrs , where ni ,,2 K=  
• rs = , if ii rs = , where ni ,,1 K=  
• rs < , if 11 rs < , or )()( 11 ++ <= iiii rsandrs , where ni ,,2 K=  
 
Lemma 7.2 (Nodes relationships). Given two nodes yx, , let ),,( levelrightleft xxx  and 
),,( levelrightleft yyy are the node label respectively; 
• yx = , if leftleft yx = , rightright yx = , and levellevel yx =  
• x is the parent of y , if leftleft yx < , rightright yx > , and 1−= levellevel yx  
• x is the ancestor of y , if leftleft yx < , and rightright yx >  
• x is the descendant of y , if leftleft yx > , and rightright yx <  
• x is the preceding of y , if leftright yx <  
• x is the following of y , if rightleft yx >  
 
The basic rules for updating are that the lemma 7.2 is still holds. The updating 
includes the insertion process and deletion process.  
1. Insert process 
This process includes two steps: adding a sub-tree into original XML data, 
and labeling the inserted sub-tree. Two situations should be considered when 
labeling inserted sub-tree. If the provided space size is bigger than inserting 
size, the sub-tree to be inserted with integer numbers should be in the range 
of the space. If the provided space size is smaller than the insert size, it 
needs to label the data to be inserted as an interval of parent node.  
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• Space size>Insert size 
Under this situation, the sub-tree to be inserted can be labelled in the range 
of provided space size. Assuming the space size is 100, and n nodes need 
to be inserted ( 100<n ), and incremental size ]12/100[ += nS . Figure 7.4 
shows the case. In Figure 7.4 (a), there are 5 nodes to be inserted, and 
space is 100. Because 100102 <=n , it means that there has enough space 
to insert. The incremental size is 9)]15*2/(100[ =+=S . The inserted result 
is shown in Figure 7.4 (b), and it still holds the lemma 7.2. 
 
• Space size <=Insert size 
The root of the sub-tree to be inserted will be denoted an integer number r , 
and r is in the range of space. The descendants of  r  will be labelled with a 
new data range. Figure 7.5 (a) represents three nodes need to be inserted, 
and space size is smaller than insert size. The root of sbutree denotes an 
integer number “1076” in data range. The descendants of root is labelled with 
a new start as shown in Figure 7.5 (b), and the labelled result of inserted 








   
 
  
Figure 7.4 Insert processing with enough space 
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When space size is equal to 0, the sub-tree to be inserted with its parent will 
be treated as a new sub-tree. Because the parent of the tree to be inserted 
has obtained position in the XML data tree, the inserting process is similar to 
situation of space size smaller than insert size. As shown in Figure 7.6 (a), 
three nodes need to be inserted into data tree, and the insert space is equal 
to 0. The sub-tree combined with parent node (5,10) as a new sub tree, and it 
can obtain insert space as shown in Figure 7.6 (b).  Although this situation 
will lead to re-label portions of other nodes, it decreases the affected nodes 






Figure 7.6 Insert processing with space=0  
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2. Delete process 
The XML data deletion can be treated as removing a sub-tree from the original 
XML data. Because the lemma 7.2 is not broken after deleting a sub-tree, it does 
not need to do additional performance. As shown in Figure 7.7, a sub-tree and an 
element will be delete in Figure 7.7 (a), and Figure 7.7 (b) is the deleted result. 
Figure 7.7 shows that lemma 7.2 will still be hold after deleting process. 
 
7.3 NLBILS based encrypted XML data querying 
7.3.1 XML encryption process 
Christian Geuer-Pollmann presented the idea of XML encryption pool, which 
provides a fine-grained XML encryption (Geuer-Pollmann, 2004). The final aim of 
this method is to encrypt XML data at any granularity. In this research, the 
encryption process is directly adopted from XML encryption pool. In the 
encryption process, the selected nodes to be encrypted are encrypted individually 
under a public key. The encrypted nodes are removed from their original position 
in the XML data, and collected in a pool of encrypted nodes.  Figure 7.8 
describes a graphical representation for presented example in Figure 7.1.  Figure 
7.8 (a) is the original XML data, and Figure 7.8 (b) is the encrypted result, the 
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encrypted data are stored in a pool. This approach can hide the structural 
information of encrypted nodes. As a result, it can prevent the inference of 
structural information. 
 
7.3.2 Index information 
In order to complete the query processing, index information is added on the 
hosted data at the server side. The index information includes two parts a 
structural index and a value index.  
7.3.2.1 Structural index based on NLBILS 
The structural index is set up based on NLBILS that is an effective approach to 
index tree structured data with considering the efficiency of index information 
updating. Because the inverted index has been widely used to index XML data 
(Lee and Whang, 2006), this research adopts inverted index as the structural 
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Figure 7.8 A graphical representation for encrypted XML data 
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Table 7.1 shows the structural index for XML data used in the research. Each 
entry in the table represents (1) a set of key name, (2) an element name, (3) 
encoding results, which is the labelled result using NIBILS, and (4) encrypted 
block id, which indicates the block id of the encrypted XML data. 
 
Table 7.1 Structural index information 
Key ID Element Name Encoding Encrypted 
block ID 
1k  PaymentList Encoding result of “PaymentList” 
element  
EB1 
… … … … 
7.3.2.2 Value index 
This thesis adopts an order preserving hash function presented by Czech (Czech 
et al., 1992) to build value index. 
 
mwfgwfgwh mod)))(())((()( 21 +=                                                                (7.1) 
where 1f and 2f are functions that map string into integers, and g is a function that 
maps integers into [0, m-1] within a unique integer (Czech et al., 1992). 
 
So, )(wh : integer → integer   if w is of type integer, 
          )(wh : string → integer   if w is of type string, 
The source code for implementation above hash function can be found at the 
website http://sourceforge.net/projects/cmph/ (Accessed on October 2010). 
7.3.3 Query processing 
The architecture for encrypted XML data querying is illustrated in Figure 7.9. A 
user encrypts an XML data DX using a public key pubK  and encryption 
function eA . The encrypted XML data are stored in XML encryption pool. Users 
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can publish the encrypted XML data ),( pubDe KXA together with the index 
information. When a query Q needs to be executed on the encrypted XML 
data ),( pubDe KXA , the user translates Q into an encrypted query 'Q . The answer 
to 'Q , i.e., )),((' pubDe KXAQ , consists of set of encrypted blocks. After received 
encrypted block, the user decrypts the encrypted block using decryption 
function d with a private key privK , and obtain expected results, such that 
)()))),,(((( ' Dprivpubded XQKKXAQAQ = . This research use XPath, the core of 
XQuery language for illustrating query processing.  
 
Based on structural index and value index above, the whole index information is 
set as in Table 7.2. The greyed portion indicates that contents are encrypted by 



















Figure 7.9 The architecture for XQuery on encrypted contents 












Table 7.2 Index table for query processing 
 
KeyId Node Name Encoding Value Encrypted block ID 
Null PaymentList (0,3300) null Null 
Null PaymentInfo (100,1600) null Null 
Null Name (200,300) Baolong Liu Null 
1k , 2k  
CreditcardInfo (400,1300) null 
EB1 
Number (500,600) 1n  
Issuer (700,800) 1i  
Expiration (900,1000) 1e  
Limit (1100,1200) 1l  
Null Address (1400,1500) Huddersfield Null 
Null PaymentInfo (1700,3200) null Null 
Null Name (1800,1900) Jack Xia Null 
2k  
CreditcardInfo (2000,2900) null 
EB2 
Number (2100,2200) 2n  
Issuer (2300,2400) 2i  
Expiration (2500,2600) 2e  
Limit (2700,2800) 2l  




Step 1: User submits a query >< KQ,  according to original XML data schema, 
where, Q  denotes an XQuery, and K  denotes user private key. 
 
Step 2: System decrypts the corresponding encrypted blocks of index table using 
user key K . Because the key for encrypted blocks is the same as 
encrypted content, it can judge the user’s accessibility to sensitive 
information. 
 
Step 3: Structural query translation. 
This step can be divided into three sub-steps. 
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First, client obtains index entries which are associated with each path 
node in XQuery by checking the index table.  
 
Second, system lists the encoding value associated with path nodes, and 
prunes away encoding value that do not match structural constraints in 
the query. This means that the remaining encoding value satisfies the 
structural constraints of the XQuery. 
 
Third, system replaces each element name with the corresponding 
encoding value in the structural index table. These encoding values are 
used to obtain the encrypted block id among encrypted XML data. The 
results of the structural index processing are the returned encrypted 
block id. 
 
Step 4: Value-based constraints translation 
The value-based constraints can be defined as a triple of 
>< valueoptag ,, , where },,,,{ =≥>≤<∈op . The value may be plaintext 
or encrypted contents. If it is a plaintext, which can be found in index 
table directly, otherwise, generate order preserving hash value by using 
formula (7.1). The related encoding value is obtained through consulting 
index table. 
 
Step 5: Final results. 
Through previous two steps, the encrypted block which satisfying the 
XQuery can be determined. In this step, system only needs to return the 
related encrypted block or plain text obtained from step 3, and step 4. 
 
Example 7.1 Suppose a client holds a key 2k , and submits a query 
//CreditCardInfo[Issuer=”HSBC”] against the encrypted XML data in Figure 7.8 
(b) using the index information in Table 7.2. The query processor first decrypts 
the index Table 7.2 using the key 2k , and obtains the plaintext of index 
information, which contains elements “CreditCardInfo”, “Number”, “Issuer”, 
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“Expiration”, and “Limit”. With order preserving hash function, the vale “HSBC” is 
converted to 1i . The original query can be translated to 
//CreditCardInfo[Issuer= 1i ]. Through checking the index table, the encrypted 
block EB1 satisfies this condition, and then obtains the encoding result of 
element “CreditCardInfo”. The query can be translated to //[400,1300]. The server 
retrieves the encryption pool and returns the element “CreditCardInfo 
[400,1300]”. The client decrypts it and obtains the final query results. 
7.4 Efficiency analysis for index information updating 
Let D  is the depth of the XML data, M  is the maximal fan-out of the XML data, 
K is the nodes in each sub-tree, and T  is the total nodes in the XML data. The 




















































If there has enough insertion space without relabeling other nodes, the average 
numbers of re-labelled nodes is )(DO . The worst situation is that the whole XML 







fact is that XML data with huge numbers of nodes has relatively small numbers of 
depth (Yun and Chung, 2008), so the structural index updating is efficient. 
7.5 Security analysis 
As to index based encrypted XML data query scheme, the inference attack is the 
usually attack method. Inference attack mainly includes two points for XML data: 
leakage of content of encrypted XML data, leakage of structural relationship 
between two different nodes, and leakage of structural order between two nodes 
(Wang and Lakshmanan, 2006). (1) Leakage of structural relationship between 
two different nodes. By knowing the specific relationship between two nodes 
which may be either parent-child, ancestor-descendent or sibling-sibling, the 
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attacker infers the nature and type of the sensitive information embedded in a 
sub data. (2) Leakage of structural order between two nodes x and y . By 
knowing the specific order of x and y , which is either y  is to the left of x  or right 
of x . The attacker infers sensitive information such as a temporal relationship 
between x and y . With XML encryption pool, these two kinds of structural attack 
can be avoided. The encrypted XML data has been removed to a pool, it cannot 
judge the relationship of encrypted XML data, and then the structure information 
can be protected. 
7.6 Testing and Evaluation 
7.6.1 The aims of evaluation 
The aims of the evaluation focus on three points. The most important point is that 
the approach can obtain the correct results corresponding to client’s XQuery 
submitted. Through the time cost comparison of index information updating, 
evaluating the efficiency of proposed approach for index information maintaining. 
The efficiency of proposed approach for encrypted XML data query processing is 
compared to existing solutions. 
7.6.2 Evaluation methods 
The input of the scheme is the query request and the portion encrypted XML 
document. The output is the encrypted cipher block or an empty result which 
denoting the data does not contain the relative information queried. 
 
The testing cases deployed to execute evaluation are generated from XMark, and 
DBLP dataset. For the XMark dataset, various scaling factors (0-1, incremental 
step is 0.1) were selected to create from 26.5KB to 113MB of documents. 
 










Table 7.3 lists the encrypted elements in XML data and the number of querying 
elements which are encrypted. 
 
Table 7.3 Basic information for testing cases 
Total elements in XML 
data 
Number of encrypted 
elements or block 
Number of queried 
elements which are 
encrypted 
242 10 10 
242 20 10 
242 30 10 
242 40 10 
242 50 10 
242 60 10 
242 70 10 
242 80 10 
242 90 10 
242 100 10 
 
The experiment based on DBLP dataset mainly focuses on range query. Table 
7.4 lists the basic information of testing cases based on DBLP dataset. The query 
1 and 2 are used to evaluate factor of querying performance based on a very 
large XML data. The query 3 contains both confidential and non-confidential 
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321 10 6 7 4 5 
321 20 9 14 9 12 
321 30 17 23 13 18 
321 40 22 31 21 23 
321 50 28 37 28 29 
321 60 32 43 34 37 
321 70 33 50 42 43 
321 80 42 54 47 47 
321 90 49 61 51 52 
321 100 64 67 58 56 
 
7.6.2 Evaluation results 
Corresponds to Table 7.3, the testing result is shown in Table 7.5. The number of 
elements, which has been decrypted, is corresponding to the number of queried 
elements which were encrypted and containing the query information. The results 
show that the decrypted blocks or elements only contain information relative to 
the submitted query. In addition, all the testing executed can achieve correct 
expected results. Each querying is related to 10 encrypted XML data blocks. With 
the total increasing encrypted XML data blocks, the query process can obtain 
expected results. This indicates that the proposed querying scheme can obtain a 













Table 7.5 Testing results based on XMark dataset 














242 10 10 1.5624 Correct 
242 20 10 1.6241 Correct 
242 30 10 1.7068 Correct 
242 40 10 1.7453 Correct 
242 50 10 1.7908 Correct 
242 60 10 1.8612 Correct 
242 70 10 1.9287 Correct 
242 80 10 1.9876 Correct 
242 90 10 2.1178 Correct 
242 100 10 2.2125 Correct 
 
One of the steps is translating the XQuery submitted to another one, which 
support querying on encrypted XML data block. The aims of this step are 
completing a correct translation with index information. With four kinds of range 
query tested as shown in Table 7.6, the proposed scheme can obtain a correct 
result relative to range query.  
 

















Actual  Queried  Actual  Queried  Actual  Queried  Actual  Queried  
321 10 6 6 7 7 4 4 5 5 
321 20 9 9 14 14 9 9 12 12 
321 30 17 17 23 23 13 13 18 18 
321 40 22 22 31 31 21 21 23 23 
321 50 28 28 37 37 28 28 29 29 
321 60 32 32 43 43 34 34 37 37 
321 70 33 33 50 50 42 42 43 43 
321 80 42 42 54 54 47 47 47 47 
321 90 49 49 61 61 51 51 52 52 
321 100 64 64 67 67 58 58 56 56 
 
With the frequency updating of XML data, it will lead to a changing of index 
information. The advantage of the proposed scheme considers the efficiency of 
index information updating. In order to evaluate the efficiency on index 
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information updating, this section gives an XML data, which contains 242 
elements, based on XMark dataset, and an XML data, which contains 321 
elements, based on DBLP dataset. Through inserting the same number of 
elements (from 10 to 60) as shown in Figure 7.10, the proposed scheme has 
been compared to the scheme of Query-Aware, and hash scheme approaches 
(The details of hash scheme and Query-Aware can be found in Chapter 3). The 
position of XML data to be inserted is generated randomly. 
 
Based on XMark dataset, the proposed scheme has an average of 199.95ms 
updating time cost. However, the time cost for Query-Aware and hash scheme 
are 372ms, and 445.6 respectively. As to DBLP dataset, the average time cost 
for proposed scheme is 189.65ms. Query-Aware, and hash scheme are 367.4ms 
and 452.58ms respectively. Although the time cost of index information updating 
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Figure 7.10 Efficiency of index information updating 
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is increasing as the numbers of inserted nodes increasing, the proposed scheme 
still has almost 48% higher efficiency than Query-Aware, and 57% higher 
efficiency than hash scheme.  
 
Considering the efficiency of index information updating, especially XML data 
changing with a high frequency, existing approaches need to re-label the whole 
XML data to generate encoding values. Based on number list based interval 
labelling scheme, this problem is solved. This means that the XML data updating 
cannot lead to re-label the whole index information. Only the elements to be 
inserted into the original XML data tree will be labelled. Furthermore, hash 
function based scheme needs to hash each possible XPath when XML data 
changing, it will cost a huge of time. 
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The efficiency on encrypted XML data query processing has been evaluated as 
shown in Figure 7.11. The proposed scheme is compared to Query-Aware 
scheme and hash scheme. The size of tested XML data is 34MB with totally 2232 
elements generated from XMark. The evaluated XML data is 97MB with totally 
3521 elements from DBLP dataset. The time required variously depends on the 
numbers of encrypted elements and the size of text node. The proposed scheme 
and Query-Aware scheme has a 31% higher efficiency than hash scheme as 
shown in Figure 7.11. The average time cost for proposed scheme and Query-
Aware scheme are 1.87s and 1.85s respectively. This slight difference is because 
the proposed scheme supports range query, and it needs to compute hash 
values relative to range query. The scheme Query-Aware do not support range 
query. After a client submitted a query, the hash scheme needs to compute hash 
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Figure 7.11 Efficiency evaluation for query processing 
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value of each path in query sentence, and it is a time cost task. So, the hash 
scheme has a low efficiency on encrypted XML data query processing, especially 
when XML data is huge. 
7.7 Discussion and analysis 
A comparison between existing approaches for encrypted XML data query is 
made in this section as shown in Table 7.7. The comparison aspects mainly 
contain index approach, querying process, range querying, and efficiency of 
index information updating. 
 
• Index approach 
Existing schemes for encrypted XML data query are based on index 
mechanism. The index approach is main factor affecting the whole process of 
querying, and also has an important effect on querying efficiency. 
 
• Querying process 
There are different querying processes based on different index approaches. 
It is embodied on communication process between server and client. 
 
• Range querying 
Range querying is used to obtain group results related to a specific value. 
Existing relational database and native XML database both support this kind 
of query. The querying process for encrypted XML data also needs to 
compatible with them. 
 
• Efficiency of index information updating 
The frequency changing of XML data will lead to index information updating. 
In order to improve the efficiency of updating index information, it needs to 
consider mechanism which provides efficiency index information updating, 




Table 7.7 Comparison for encrypted XML data query  
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Based on Table 7.7, the difference between existing approaches is listed. 
• Existing querying scheme are based on index information. The index 
information is maintained at server side or client side. In existing scheme, 
only Sem-Crypt maintains the index information both at server side and 
client side, this increases the communication cost between the server and 
client. 
 
• Only the proposed query scheme considers the efficiency of index 
information updating. Except for the number list based interval labeling 
scheme, other schemes have not considered the efficiency of index 
information updating. When XML data changed, it needs to re-label the 
whole XML data to generate new index information with low efficiency. 
 
• The proposed scheme supports range querying with a simple order 
preserver hash function. Most of existing scheme does not support range 
query. The scheme by Wang adopt B+ tree to support range query, 
however, it will lead to low efficiency of index information updating when 




This chapter presented the number list based interval labeling scheme for 
encrypted XML data. The proposed scheme makes maintaining index information 
more efficient, and it is easy to update XML data with decreasing the number of 
affected nodes to the lowest. In order to improve the efficiency of index 
information updating for encrypted XML data query processing, especially when 
XML data changing frequently, this chapter proposed a structural index based on 
number list based interval labeling scheme. A novel approach was proposed to 
protect structural information for encrypted XML data. The basic idea is that 
encrypted nodes are removed from original XML data, and they consist of an 
encrypted XML data pool. The structural information is hidden through this 
method. The testing results show that the proposed scheme can complete a 
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correct query processing, and support range query. The evaluation results show 
that the proposed scheme supports to maintain index information in an efficient 
way. 
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Chapter 8 XML security in calibration certificate 
management 
 
This chapter describes a case study of XML security in calibration certificate 
management. The security requirement for calibration certificate management is 
analyzed. The system architecture is designed based on the requirement 
analysis. The algorithms relating to XML security are illustrated. The implemented 
results are also presented in this chapter. 
8.1 Introduction 
Based on approaches and schemes of previous chapters, this chapter describes 
a prototype of XML security which allows a programmer to specify the security 
details of XML data. The prototype is described with a working case study of 
calibration certificate management. It includes calibration certificate creation, 
editing, retrieve, and security management in hierarchical environment.  
 
Figure 8.1 is a real calibration certificate expressed in XML format, some details 
are omitted. The tasks related to calibration certificate management are shown in 
Figure 8.2. 
 
001  <Certificate> 
002     <Title>Certificate of calibration</Title> 
003     <ReferenceNumber>TDFRG</ReferenceNumber> 
004     <Description>A single-mode Fibre Attention            
Standard...</Description> 
005     <Data>This reported expanded uncertainty is based 
on...</Data> 
006     <Measurements> 
007       <Description>The measurement of the spectral 
attenuation...</Description> 
008       <Table>Designed figure used in measurement</Table> 
009     </Measurements> 
010     <Results> 
011       <Description>The total attenuation...</Description> 
012       <Graph>Chart related to measurement results</ Graph > 
013       <Table>Figure of measurement results</Table> 
014     <Results> 
   
M
 
015  </Certificate> 
 
Figure 8.1 A certificate report for fault detection 
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The system consists of five major tasks: authorization (T1), certificate retrieve 
(T2), certificate editing or creation (T3), certificate information check (T4), and 
certificate information confidentiality (T5). 
 
The system provides the calibration certificate contents and security 
management in a hierarchical environment. There is more than one user handling 
a single certificate in workflow system. This process depends on workflow of 
calibration certificate generation. The prototype will provide the interface for 
certificate editing, transforming, saving, loading, and searching. XML security 
enables the secure transmission of information at element level of a document for 
a certificate. Integrity ensures that the contents of certificate is not being 
changed, and protect the structural integrity, and context-referential integrity. 
Authentication is satisfied using digital signature. This functionality should provide 
digital signature for any portions of a certificate, and further validate the signed 
certificate. The signature includes a single signature on an XML data, or multi-
signature based on work-flow signing process. XML encryption will be used to 
protect sensitive information of a certificate. This service includes encrypting or 
decrypting an XML-based calibration certificate. The system can retrieve relative 

















8.2 System requirements 
• User authorization 
When user login the system, the system will judge the authorization with 
public key information provided. This process is used to decide the privilege 
of a user. 
• Certificate generation and editing 
Certificate information can be created and edited by an authorized user.  
• Certificate transforming 
A certificate can be viewed in HTML, XHTML, and PDF format. This 
requirement needs that an XML-based certificate can be transformed to other 
format easy to be viewed. 
• Certificate integrity 
As a certificate described in XML format, it needs to protect integrity of 
certificate information, not only considering content integrity, but also 
protecting structural integrity and context-referential integrity.  
• Certificate authentication 
X-certificate is applied to ensure the claimed identity of an entity. In 
authentication, an entity aims at proving its identity to a verifier, and the 
creation of a set of calibration certificate data, which is the whole XML-based 
data or portion of it, is the one claimed. The system allows an authorized user 
verify the validation of certificate. 
• Certificate confidentiality 
Certificate confidentiality ensures that sensitive information of a certificate 
contents or structures may not be viewed by unauthorized entity. The 
prototype should provide a mechanism to keep certificate information or 
portions of information confidential, and the sensitive information can be 
viewed by specific users. 
• Certificate retrieve 
A certificate can be retrieved by a user request. A query processor can 
identify the contents of encrypted certificate or a certificate in plaintext. 
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8.3 System architecture 
Based on requirements above, the system architecture is shown in Figure 8.3. 
The architecture consists of six modules.  
 
 
• Certificate management module 
Certificate management module is the crucial part of the system. It provides 
calibration certificate generation, editing, updating, and certificate retrieve 
service. 
• XML data integrity module 
XML data integrity is applied to support XML signature. Before signing a 
certificate, this module generates hash values for certificate information to be 
signed. The hash value consists of three parts: content integrity, structural 
integrity, and context-referential integrity. The three parts combined using a 
concatenated hash function.  
• XML signature and verification module 
XML signature and verification service provide the XML signature based on 
proposed XML data integrity scheme, and signature verification process. 
Once the user identity is identified, this service will return signed XML data or 
verified result for a signed XML data. 
 















Figure 8.3 System Architecture 
User 














• XML encryption and decryption module 
XML encryption and decryption service provide data confidentiality. Once 
user identity is identified, this service will return encrypted XML data or 
decrypted XML data. 
• Certificate retrieve 
The certificate retrieve is completed by the module of certificate searching. 
Client can set searching conditions for certificate, and the system returns the 
certificate or portions of information which satisfy client’s request. The retrieve 
can be done on information of plain text or encrypted block. If the retrieve are 
relative to encrypted information, client needs to submit a private key at the 
same time. 
• Database 
Because the calibration certificate is expressed in XML format, the system 
chooses XML native database as background database service. The 
deployed product is MarkLogic Server 3.1. It supports flexible XQuery over 
stored XML data. 
8.4 Implementation 
8.4.1 XML data Integrity 
Based on approaches in Chapter 5, CSR based integrity value generation 
consists of three steps as shown in Figure 8.4. In Figure 8.4 CI denotes the 
algorithm for content integrity. STI denotes the algorithm for structure integrity, 
and CRI denotes the algorithm for context-referential integrity. 





















Step 1: The securing process selects elements from DX . bS is the set containing 
all the selected elements in this step. 
Step 2: The securing process performs algorithm CI, structure integrity, and 
context-referential integrity related to bS . 
Step 3: The securing process signs CI, STI, and CRI to generate signatures. 
aS is the set containing all generated signature in this step, where 
)()()()( tScriSstiSciSSa ∪∪∪= , and t is the creation time of XML 
data. 
 
The integrity verification also consists of three steps as shown in Figure 8.5. 
 
 
Step 1: The securing process obtains hash values from signed results, and user’s 
public key should be provided to the algorithm. 
Step 2: System generates hash value of CI, STI, and CRI from original XML data, 
and then creates the final hash values. 
Step 3: The two hash value generated from step1, and step2 are compared, and 
generate the verification results. 
 
The relative algorithms for content integrity generation and structure integrity 




















8.4.2 XML data authentication 
In this section, XML single signature and XML multi-signature generation are 
described separately, and focusing on XML signature generation and verification. 
 
• XML single signature 
Step 1: A hash value is calculated for each XML data fragment being signed. 
This involves applying a set of transforms to the XML fragment, 
calculating the digest on the transformed XML fragment. The 
transformations ensuring the XML fragment is in a normalized form. This 
usually is completed using XML canonicalization. The information from 
this step is represented using a “ds:Reference” element. 
 
Step 2: The “ds:Reference” elements from the previous stage are added to a 
“ds:SignedInfo” element. A hash value is calculated on the “ds:SignedInfo” 
element which involves first applying XML canonicalization. This 
calculated hash value is signed using the signer’s private key to create the 
“ds:SignatureValue” element. A “ds:KeyInfo” element is used to specify 
which key was used to create the signature. The “ds:SignedInfo”, 
“ds:SignatureValue” and “ds:KeyInfo” elements are added to a 
“ds:Signature” element which is the signature results. 
 
When user intends to verify a signature, the following steps can be executed. 
Step 1: A hash value is calculated for each “ds:Reference” element within the 
signature. This involves applying the transforms specified in the reference, 
and then calculating the hash value on the transformed XML fragment. 
The calculated hash value is compared to the one that is within the 
“ds:Reference” element. When they don’t match, the signature validation 
fails. 
 
Step 2: A hash value is calculated on the “ds:SignedInfo” element. This involves 
first applying canonicalization on this element. The hash value of the 
“ds:SignedInfo” element is retrieved from the signature value using the 
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signer’s public key. This hash value is compared with the calculated hash 
value. When they don’t match, the signature validation fails. 
 
• XML multi-signature 
XML single signature only satisfies the requirements of one user authenticating 
an XML data. Based on proposed XML multi-signature scheme in Chapter 6, this 
section also gives a description on how to implement XML multi-signature. The 
process is similar to delegated multi-signature scheme proposed by Wu as 
shown in Figure 8.6.  
 
As shown in Figure 8.6, signers in same group can sign parallel, the different 
group sign in sequential. This signing model can satisfy multi-signature 
generation in a mixed signing process. The parameters transferred are identical 
to the solutions in Chapter 6. The relative algorithms for XML multi-signature is 
listed in Appendix E. 
 
• Presentation for signed results 
The presentation of XML signature view is using XSLT technology. XSL 
transformation can be performed on an XML data source and generate a result 
tree. A general application of XSLT is transforming XML data into HTML or 
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XHTML. The basic steps for transformation are shown in Figure 8.7. First, the 
signed XML data is validated against the XML signature schema, and then the 
basic information of each signature in XML data is extracted and delivered to 
XSLT, also the XPath expressions of the signatures are extracted from the 
element <Reference>. With each XPath and original signed XML data, the XSLT 
generates the resulting view of the document. 
 
8.4.3 XML data encryption and decryption process 
Encryption can be performed based on different types of data, not just XML data. 
The XML encryption specification defines how encryption is applied to XML data. 
It specifies the processes for encrypting and decrypting XML data and the 
representation of the encryption result in XML (Imamura et. al, 2002). 
 
Data is encrypted using XML encryption by the following steps as shown in 
Figure 8.8. 
Multi-signed XML data 
XML syntax validation 
XML signature verification 
Mark the XML element 
with signature XPath 
Verify signature and 
display signer information 





Figure 8.7 Presentation for XML multi-signature 
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Step 1: A random session key is generated. 
Step 2: The data is encrypted using a symmetric algorithm with the session key. 
Symmetric encryption is used for the data for better performance. The 
encrypted data is represented using the “xenc:EncryptedData” element. 
Step 3: The session key is encrypted using an asymmetric algorithm with the 
public key of the receiver. The encrypted session key is represented 
using the “enc:EncryptedKey” element. The “xenc:EncryptedKey” 
element can use a “ds:KeyInfo” element to specify which key was used. 
The encrypted key can be added to the “ds:KeyInfo” element of the 
“xenc:EncryptedData” element or it can exist independently. 
 
Data is decrypted using XML encryption by the following steps as shown in 
Figure 8.9: 
 
Step 1: The encrypted session key within the “xenc:EncryptedKey” element is 
decrypted using the private key of the receiver. The decrypted session 
key is the key that was used to encrypt the data. 
Subject 
private key 
Figure 8.9 Process of XML decryption  
Encrypted XML 
data 
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Step 2: The cipher text within the “xenc:EncryptedData” element is decrypted 
using the session key. 
 
The process for encrypted XML data pool generation can be divided into three 
steps. 
 
Step 1: With XML encryptor, the original XML data can be encrypted as shown in 
Figure 8.10. 
Step 2: Record the cipher block position in encrypted XML data. The position 
information can be used to generate structural index information. 
Step 3: Remove the cipher block into encrypted XML data pool. With the index 
information, it is easy to find the original position of each cipher block. 
 
8.4.4 Encrypted XML data query processing 
The architecture for encrypted XML data query processing was illustrated in 
Chapter 7. This section only gives the algorithm for index information updating 
based on NLBILS. 
 
• Algorithm for index information updating 
Procedure InsertSub(SubTree,Pos) 
// SubTree is the inserted sub-tree; 
// Pos is the (left, right) pair 
foreach node n of SubTree do 
    Initialize the startList and endList of n to be the startList and endList of the current tree 
    SpaceSize=getSpacesize(Pos) 













Figure 8.10 Process for encrypted XML data pool generation 
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    InsertSize=getSubTreeSize(SubTree) 
    for i=1 to SpaceSize do 
        l[i]=getNewLabel(Pos) 
    endfor 
    if SpaceSize>InsertSize then 
       Label the nodes in SubTree, attach the start and end value to the startList and 
endList of the nodes     in SubTree 
    else if 0<SpaceSize<=InsertSize then 
       m=l[SpaceSize/2] 
       foreach node n in SubTree do 
          Attach m to the startList and endList of n 
          Label the nodes in SubTree by a new numbering 
         Attach the start and end position to the startList and endList of the nodes in   
SubTree 
    else 
             ParentSubTree=subtree rooted by the node that SubTree will be attached to 
             foreach node in ParentSubTree do 
                 Remove the last start and end position from the startList and endList of n 
             NewSubTree=ParentSubTree combined with SubTree 
             NewSpaceSize=getSpaceSize(position of root of ParentSubTree) 
             for i=1 to NewSpaceSize do 
                 l[i]=getNewLabel(position of root of ParentSubTree) 
                 k=l[NewSpaceSize/2] 
             foreach node n in NewSubTree do 
                 Attach k to the startList and endList of n 
                 Label the nodes in NewSubTree by a new number 
                 Attach the start and end position to the startList and endList of the nodes in 
NewSubTree 
        endif 
8.5 Implementation results 
8.5.1 Environment of development 
The prototype was developed on a PC with a 2.39 GHz Pentium (R) 4 processor, 
0.99GB of RAM, and the MS Windows XP operating system. The programming 
language is the C#.net. The background database is deployed as MarkLogic 3.1.  
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8.5.2 Implementation results 
This subsection presents the implementation results according to above system 
architecture and algorithms. Based on the system architecture, the system 
interface is shown in Figure 8.11. The functionality of the system includes five 
modules: certificate editing, user authorization, certificate integrity protecting and 
authentication, certificate information confidentiality, and certificate retrieve.  
8.5.2.1 Certificate editing 
The left side of the main interface in Figure 8.11 provides calibration certificate 
creation. The basic information for a certificate includes title, description, 
reference number, issue authority, data information, measurements, results, and 
so on. After inputting the information, user clicks on button “Save” to save created 
certificate. With the help of XSLT, the certificate can be viewed in PDF, XHTML 
format. User can open an existing certificate through menu item “File”, and the 
opened XML data will be displayed on right side of the interface.  
8.5.2.2 User authorization 
After a certificate generated, the administrator can assign the role of each user to 
access the certificate. When a user login as an administrator, the user can open 
Figure 8.11 System interface 
 168
menu item “Management” and click the sub item “Authorization” as the result 
shown in Figure 8.12. 
 
First, the administrator chooses the user name in the list; 
Second, administrator selects the certificate information at the left side in Figure 
8.12; 
Third, the role is assigned to the user with selected privilege.  
 
With three steps above, the system stores the privilege of each user for different 
certificate information. When users do some operation later, the system checks 
their privilege first, if the operation forbidden, system will give information as 
shown in Figure 8.13, otherwise, the operation will be done successfully. 
Figure 8.13 Warning information 
Figure 8.12 Access control authorization 
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8.5.2.3 Certificate information integrity and authentication  
Certificate authentication is completed based on certificate integrity. This means 
that before signing a certificate, user should generate the certificate integrity 
results, and then sign it. When user selects “Signing” under the menu item 
“Signature”, the system will show the interface as in Figure 8.14.  
 
The left side of Figure 8.14 is the XML data to be signed. The context-related 
elements are shown in right side of Figure 8.14. When user selects an element at 
left side, right side will display the relative elements automatically according to 
default records. User can delete or add the new relative XML data in practice. This 
improves the flexibility of context-referential integrity selection. This process can 
be summarized into three steps. 
 
First, user needs to select XML data to be signed by selecting possible XPath 
listed in list-box. Second, user selects context-related XML elements. Finally, 
through clicking on “confirm” button, system will generate integrity results. 
 
Based on generated integrity results, the system can perform a signing process 
or verifying process as shown in Figure 8.15. The right side in Figure 8.15 is the 
Figure 8.14 Certificate information integrity 
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signed results based on integrity CSR, and the signed results can be verified by 
the user. As shown in Figure 8.15, after signed the certificate of calibration, the 
user can verify it successfully. 
 
The following contents depict the detailed components contained in the signature 
results based on CSR and the details of CSR generation. A completely integrity 
results and signed results based on CSR can be found in Figure 8.16. 
 
• Structure integrity result 
Structure integrity result is generated from formula )),(()( vrpathhvST = , h is a 
one-way hash function, r is the root node, and v is the node to be signed.  In this 
case, r =”Certificate”, and v =”myData” denotes the element of “Measurements”. 
 
• XML data content integrity 
)(vCI is used to generate hash values of node to be signed, and v =”myData”. 
 
 
Figure 8.15 Signed results based on CSR 
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• Context-referential integrity 
This result is generated by using function ))(||)(()( wSTwCIhvCRI = , where, v is 
the node to be signed, w  is the context-related element. In this 
case, w =”myRelate” denote the element of “Results”, and v =”myData”. 
 
• Signature value based on integrity results 
After obtained integrity results, the signature can be created by using 






         <Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
        <SignedInfo> 
           <CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315" />  
           <SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1" />  
           <Reference URI="#myData"> 
            <Transforms> 
              <Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature" />  
       </Transforms> 
            <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />     
            <DigestValue>bDDbRiQzAsaD8e5K4svNt/6Mhr8=</DigestValue>  
   </Reference> 
          <CSR name="XML data integrity" xmlns="http://www.example.org"> 
           <STI name="structure integrity" xmlns="http://www.example.org"> 
             <STIGenerate Algorithm="http://www.example.org/xmldsig-csr/#STI" />  
             <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />  
      <DigestValue>49-2A-ED-1A-5A-E1-BD-9C-59-04-19-58-8F-B7-08-5C-19-14-15-11</DigestValue>  
           </STI> 
           <CRI name="Content referential integrity" xmlns="http://www.example.org"> 
            <CRIGenerate Algorithm="http://www.example.org/xmldsig-csr/#CRI" />  
            <RelatedNode>#myRelate</RelatedNode>  
            <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" />  
            <DigestValue>36-C3-C5-A4-02-41-A9-0F-38-B7-C1-7C-7A-A0-A5-DE-7D-3A-75-E9</DigestValue>  
       </CRI> 
 </CSR> 




         <Object Id="myData" />  
</Signature> 
Figure 8.16 Integrity CSR and signed results 
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8.5.2.4 Certificate information confidentiality 
When sensitive information needs to be encrypted, user can click on menu item 
“Encryption”. The system allows user to load a public key, and then selects the 
nodes to be encrypted. The encryption result is shown in Figure 8.17. The 
original XML data is replaced by the element “EncryptedData”. The element 
“EncryptedData” contains the element “EncryptedKey”, and the “CipherData”. 
The element “EncryptedKey” is the encrypted session key using algorithm RSA 
with public key. The element “CipherData” is the encrypted XML data using 
session key with algorithm AES-256. In Figure 8.17, the encrypted element is 
“CertificateDate”. The original XML data element “CertificateDate” can be viewed 
by process of decryption and relative private key. Through clicking the “Decrypt” 
menu item in “Encryption”, user can obtain the original XML data. 
8.5.2.5 Certificate retrieve 
The system also provides functionality of certificate retrieving as shown in Figure 
8.18.  The left side is used to input the query condition, and the right side is used 
to display queried results. 
Figure 8.17 Certificate information confidentiality 
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The querying process can be executed on plaintext or encrypted XML data 
according to the scheme described in Chapter 7. When the user inputs the 
condition of query, the system will search the certificate which is stored in 
database MarkLogic. As shown in Figure 8.18, the querying condition is the 
“CertificateDate”, and the queried results are displayed. In displayed case, the 
element “CertificateDate” is in cipher block. 
8.6 Discussion and analysis 
The relationship of XML data integrity, authentication, and confidentiality is an 
important factor affecting the generation of each result. Generally speaking, XML 
data integrity is the basis of XML digital signature. XML signature signs the hash 
value of XML data instead of XML data itself, and hash value is used to check the 
integrity of XML data. The sequence for XML signature and XML encryption 
generation is various. However, different sequence could generate totally 
different results. This section discusses the relationship of XML data integrity, 
authentication, and confidentiality. 
Figure 8.18 Certificate retrieve 
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8.6.1 The basis of XML signature 
XML digital signature is applied to ensure XML data authentication. Strictly 
speaking, XML signature supports to protect XML data integrity, as well as 




The original XML data and the signature are transferred to the recipient. The 
hash value generated by one-way hash function is used to ensure XML data 
integrity, and it is encrypted with the signer’s private key. The recipient first uses 
the signer’s public key to decrypt the hash result, and uses the same hashing 
algorithm to generate a new hash value of the same XML data. Through 
comparing the new hash result against the original hash value, the integrity is 
ensured. 
 
Compared to traditional data integrity, the XML data integrity model proposed in 
Chapter 5 has advantage of preventing XML signature tampering. Without the 
structure integrity and context-referral integrity, it is easy to copy a signature into 
another XML data and still keeping the valid signature.  
8.6.2 The sequence of XML signature and XML encryption 
Anyone can sign or encrypt portions of an XML data at any order, which mainly 
are encrypted-then-signed, and signed-then-encrypted. The signing or encrypting 
sequence will generate completely different results. The principle for XML 






















Figure 8.19 XML signature validating data integrity 
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application (Bartel et al., 2008). It has presented approach how to handle 
different sequence relating to XML signature and XML encryption as follows. 
 
• Principle 1: Only what is “Seen” should be Signed 
XML signature signs any information indicated by a transform: “only what is 
“seen” should be signed”. It is necessary to secure as exactly as practical the 
information that was presented to the user (Bartel et al., 2008). Note that this can 
be accomplished by literally signing what was presented, such as the screen 
images, auditory or other media. However, this may result in data which is difficult 
for security software to manipulate. Under this situation, one can sign the data 
along with whatever filters, style sheets or other information that generates its 
presentation. 
 
• Principle 2: “See” What is Signed 
“Persons and automated mechanism that trust the validity of a transformed 
document on the basis of a valid signature should operate over the data that was 
transformed (including canonicalization) and signed, not the original pre-
transformed data. This recommendation applies to transforms specified within the 
signature as well as those included as part of the document itself” (Bartel et al., 
2008).  
8.6.2.1 Encrypted-then-signed 
No one should be asked to sign a data that they cannot see, and this situation 
opposite the basic principles of “Only What is “Seen” should be Signed” (Hughes 
et al., 2002). When a data is encrypted, a user cannot infer the information 
through the cipher text. The encrypted-then-signed is meaninglessness in 
applications. 
8.6.2.2 Signed-then-encrypted 
If one intends to sign the plain text which is later encrypted, the person can use 
the transform specified by the W3C (Hughes et al., 2002). It has been noted by 
David Solo that both XML encryption and XML signature can be performed on an 
XML data in any order and any time (Hughes et al., 2002). An example has been 
described by W3C as follows, when a user wishes to order and pay for a product 
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from a company using the trusted payment system Paypal. The company creates 
an order form including the product name, quantity, price, and account 
information. The company signs all of these information (Hughes et al., 2002), 
and encrypts the account information for Paypal only. The company sends the 
order form to the user for confirmation with user’s signature. To validate both 
signatures, Paypal will have to know the encrypted information for validating the 
company’s signature. 
 
However, encryption applied to the signed content may result a signature not to 
be verifiable, and it needs to decrypt the encrypted XML data before the 
signature is verified (Hughes et al., 2002). It needs a mechanism to decrypt only 
signed-then-encrypted portions. There are two cases: one is that the encryption 
and signature order can be derived directly from the content. The other is that 
encrypted content is the signed resources, and it is difficult to derive it directly 
from the content, which defined as order issue within signed resources. W3C has 
proposed the specification of “Decryption Transform for XML Signature” to handle 
these two kinds of situation. 
8.7 Summary 
A case study of XML security in calibration certificate management is designed 
and implemented conforming to the approaches and schemes in previous 
chapters. The results of the tests and analysis show that the prototype can 
benefit the security management of calibration certificate.  
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and future works 
 
This chapter summarizes the outcomes of this research and highlights the 
contributions in the relevant research topics, which were described in previous 
chapters. Future works relative to XML security are also discussed. 
9.1 Contributions and conclusions 
This dissertation aims at improving XML security relative technologies, and 
makes it more practicable and secure. The proposed works have demonstrated 
the feasibility and applicability of presented approaches and schemes with 
systemic validation over the performances of the solutions. It is perceived that the 
dissertation has made several contributions to the domain knowledge.  
9.1.1 Revocation information validation for x.509 digital 
certificate 
The first main contribution of this dissertation is that a novel approach for 
revocation information validation for X.509 digital certificate was proposed. In 
order to alleviate the burden of XKMS for certificate revocation query, the thesis 
proposed a novel idea to make certificate revocation handling and validation 
easier using XML signature technology. Certificate owner’s signature is applied to 
provide evidence for revocation information of the certificate. It does not need to 
query XKMS or CA for revocation information of such certificate, because the 
certificate already contains the status information. It improves the efficiency on 
revocation information checking, further alleviates the burden of XMKS server. 
9.1.2 XML data integrity 
The second main contribution of this dissertation is that an overall XML data 
integrity requirements was presented combining XML data features, and then 
satisfies the requirements with an integrity model for XML data with a high 
efficiency. 
 
• XML data integrity requirements combining XML data features were 
presented under fine-grained XML security. Three aspects are considered 
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including content integrity, structure integrity, and context-referential 
integrity. 
 
• Based on proposed requirements, an integrity approach CSR for XML 
data was set up based on the concatenated hash function. 
 
• Based on the concatenated hash function to generate hash values for 
XML data, the approach has a higher efficiency than the Merkle hash 
function-based hash value-generation process. 
9.1.3 Series-parallel XML multi-signature scheme 
The third main contribution of this research is that an XML multi-signature 
scheme was proposed to satisfy a dependent and independent signing process. 
To the domain knowledge, this is the first XML multi-signature scheme supporting 
series and parallel signing process. 
 
• An XML data integrity-checking pool to provide integrity-checking for 
decomposed XML data was presented. XML data integrity-checking pool 
makes signing XPath expression practicable for XML data. 
 
• A series-parallel XML multi-signature scheme according to a mixed 
dependent and independent signing process was proposed based on 
series-parallel signing group and XML data integrity-checking pool. 
9.1.4 Efficient index information updating for encrypted XML 
data 
The fourth main contribution of this dissertation is that a structural index for 
encrypted XML data with considering both efficiency of index information 
updating and query processing security was proposed. 
 
• The number list based interval labeling scheme for encrypted XML data 
was presented. The proposed scheme is easy to update XML data with 
decreasing the number of affected nodes to the lowest. 
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• In order to improve the efficiency of index information maintaining for 
encrypted XML data query processing, especially when XML data 
changing frequently, the thesis proposed a structural index based on the 
number list based interval labeling scheme.  
 
• A novel approach was proposed to protect structural information for 
encrypted XML data. The basic idea is that encrypted nodes are removed 
from original XML data, and they consist of an encrypted XML data pool. 
The structural information is hided through this method.  
9.2 Future works 
The major disadvantage of proposed integrity approach is that user needs to 
select the context-related elements in the process of signature creation. The 
disadvantage increases complexity of interaction between the user and the 
system. One of the future works will focus on integrating XML data integrity 
constraints into presented solution to capture context-related elements 
automatically. 
 
The implemented prototype only is a demonstration of the proposed solutions to 
solve security issues in calibration certificate management. It needs common 
XML security tools which easy to be integrated into existing applications. Another 
future works is to focus on integrating XML security into native XML database to 
solve the security issues existing in native XML database system, and further 
developing XML security common tools. 
9.2.1 Context-related elements selection 
The problem of selecting the context-related elements within an XML data was 
discussed in Chapter 5. As mentioned, with the development of integrity 
constraints for XML, it is possible to integrate the constraints for XML into 
context-related elements selection. Integrity constraints for XML are defined to 
limit the relationship among XML elements. Existing types of integrity constraints 
include the XML key constraints, referential constraints, and XML semantic 
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constraints. These constraints is used to protect the integrity when XML data 
updating or storage. In the future, these constraints will be introduced into XML 
data integrity for context-related elements selection. 
9.2.2 Integrate XML security into native XML database system 
Native XML database system has been built for several years, such as Marklogic, 
dbXML, Xindice, eXist. These systems just provide a mechanism for XML data 
storage and query, the security issues relative to XML data have not been 
considered. When an XML data is encrypted, how to execute a query on these 
data is not taken into account. The work related to native XML database security 
will be carried out. 
 
• Access control model for portions of XML data in native XML database.  
The major advantage of XML is that it provides a fine-grained access. 
Although native XML database system provides access control 
mechanism, the access control rules only can be defined on entire XML 
data. It has not considered the access control for portions of XML data. 
This indicates that the current access control mechanism has not taken 
XML data feature of fine-grained accessibility into account. 
 
• Development a mechanism for encrypted XML data query processing in 
native XML database 
When a user encrypts portions of XML data for security problem, the 
query processor of native XML database cannot deal with it. Another 
future work is that deploy the proposed encrypted XML data query 
processing into native XML database. In other words, a query processor 
for encrypted XML data will be developed. 
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Appendix B: XMark’s Auction DTD 
<!ELEMENT site            (regions, categories, catgraph, people, open_auctions, 
closed_auctions)> 
<!ELEMENT categories      (category+)> 
<!ELEMENT category        (name, description)> 
<!ATTLIST category        id ID #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT name            (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT description     (text | parlist)> 
<!ELEMENT text            (#PCDATA | bold | keyword | emph)*> 
<!ELEMENT bold    (#PCDATA | bold | keyword | emph)*> 
<!ELEMENT keyword   (#PCDATA | bold | keyword | emph)*> 
<!ELEMENT emph    (#PCDATA | bold | keyword | emph)*> 
<!ELEMENT parlist   (listitem)*> 
<!ELEMENT listitem        (text | parlist)*> 
<!ELEMENT catgraph        (edge*)> 
<!ELEMENT edge            EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST edge            from IDREF #REQUIRED to IDREF #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT regions         (africa, asia, australia, europe, namerica, samerica)> 
<!ELEMENT africa          (item*)> 
<!ELEMENT asia            (item*)> 
<!ELEMENT australia       (item*)> 
<!ELEMENT namerica        (item*)> 
<!ELEMENT samerica        (item*)> 
<!ELEMENT europe          (item*)> 
<!ELEMENT item            (location, quantity, name, payment, description, shipping, 
incategory+, mailbox)> 
<!ATTLIST item            id ID #REQUIRED            featured CDATA #IMPLIED> 
<!ELEMENT location        (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT quantity        (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT payment         (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT shipping        (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT reserve         (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT incategory      EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST incategory      category IDREF #REQUIRED> 
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<!ELEMENT mailbox         (mail*)> 
<!ELEMENT mail            (from, to, date, text)> 
<!ELEMENT from            (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT to              (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT date            (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT itemref         EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST itemref         item IDREF #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT personref       EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST personref       person IDREF #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT people          (person*)> 
<!ELEMENT person          (name, emailaddress, phone?, address?, homepage?, 
creditcard?, profile?, watches?)> 
<!ATTLIST person          id ID #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT emailaddress    (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT phone           (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT address         (street, city, country, province?, zipcode)> 
<!ELEMENT street          (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT city            (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT province        (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT zipcode         (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT country         (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT homepage        (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT creditcard      (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT profile         (interest*, education?, gender?, business, age?)> 
<!ATTLIST profile         income CDATA #IMPLIED> 
<!ELEMENT interest        EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST interest        category IDREF #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT education       (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT income          (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT gender          (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT business        (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT age             (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT watches         (watch*)> 
<!ELEMENT watch           EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST watch           open_auction IDREF #REQUIRED> 
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<!ELEMENT open_auctions   (open_auction*)> 
<!ELEMENT open_auction    (initial, reserve?, bidder*, current, privacy?, itemref, seller, 
annotation, quantity, type, interval)> 
<!ATTLIST open_auction    id ID #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT privacy         (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT initial         (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT bidder          (date, time, personref, increase)> 
<!ELEMENT seller          EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST seller          person IDREF #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT current         (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT increase        (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT type            (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT interval        (start, end)> 
<!ELEMENT start           (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT end             (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT time            (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT status          (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT amount          (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT closed_auctions (closed_auction*)> 
<!ELEMENT closed_auction  (seller, buyer, itemref, price, date, quantity, type, 
annotation?)> 
<!ELEMENT buyer           EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST buyer           person IDREF #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT price           (#PCDATA)> 
<!ELEMENT annotation      (author, description?, happiness)> 
<!ELEMENT author          EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST author          person IDREF #REQUIRED> 
<!ELEMENT happiness       (#PCDATA)> 
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Appendix D: Relative algorithms for XML data 
integrity 
 
• Algorithm for content integrity (CI) 
Input: 1. An element or sub XML data  
          2. Hash algorithm, default value is SHA1. 
Output: Hash value of inputted XML data. 
            XmlNode xnodworking; 
            string TempNode = xnod.Name;  
            string strValue = (string)xnod.Value; 
            if (strValue != null) 
                seinode = seinode + "-" + strValue; 
            else 
                seinode = seinode + "-" + xnod.Name; 
            endif 
            if (xnod.NodeType == XmlNodeType.Element) 
               if (xnod.HasChildNodes) 
                   xnodworking = xnod.FirstChild; 
                    while (xnodworking != null) 
                        CI(xnodworking); 
                        xnodworking = xnodworking.NextSibling; 
                    endwhile 
                endif 
            endif 
            //Multi variant hash result 
            byte[] btr = UTF8Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(seinode); 
            SHA1CryptoServiceProvider shar = new SHA1CryptoServiceProvider(); 
            byte[] outputr = shar.ComputeHash(btr); 
            TempNode = BitConverter.ToString(outputr); 
            return TempNode //Return hashed result of content integrity 
 
• Algorithm for structure integrity 
Input:  an element or a sub XML data, and start level, default value is 1 
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Output: Path string from root to target element 
 
            XmlNode xnodeworking; 
            string strVal = (string)xnode.Value; 
            if (strVal!= null) 
                  strVal = ":" + strVal; 
            else 
                Tpath = Tpath + "/" + xnode.Name + intLevel.ToString();  
               // Record parent  information and level information 
                XmlNamedNodeMap mapAttributes = xnod.Attributes; 
                foreach (XmlNode xnodAttributes in mapAttributes) 
                    if ((xnodAttributes.Value == "myData") && (getpath == false)) 
                        Fpath = Tpath; 
                        getpath = true; 
                    endif 
             endif 
            if (xnode.NodeType == XmlNodeType.Element) 
                if (xnod.HasChildNodes) 
                    position = 0; //Record position information of an element among its sibling 
                    xnodeworking = xnode.FirstChild; 
                    while (xnodeworking!= null) 
                        STI(xnodeworking, intLevel + 1); 
                        xnodeworking = xnodeworking.NextSibling; 
                        if (xnodeworking!= null) 
                            position = position + 1; 
                        endif 
                    endwhile 
                endif 
            endif 
            Return Tpath 
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Appendix E: Relative algorithms for XML multi-
signature 
• Algorithm for XPath possible in DTD 
Input: XML documents 
Output: XPath sets 
private void structure(XmlNode xnod) 
            XmlNode xnodworking; 
            XmlNode TempNode; 
            string TempPath = ""; 
            if (xnod.NodeType == XmlNodeType.Element) 
                TempNode = xnod; 
                TempPath = TempNode.Name; 
                TempNode = TempNode.ParentNode; 
                while (TempNode.Name != "#document") 
                    TempPath = TempNode.Name + "/" + TempPath; 
                    TempNode = TempNode.ParentNode; 
                endwhile 
                myCheck.Items.Add(TempPath); 
                if (TempPath != myCheck.Items[0].ToString()) 
                  myRelatives.Items.Add(TempPath); 
                endif 
                if (xnod.HasChildNodes) 
                    xnodworking = xnod.FirstChild; 
                    if (xnodworking.NodeType == XmlNodeType.Element) 
                       while (xnodworking != null) 
                            structure(xnodworking); 
                            xnodworking = xnodworking.NextSibling; 
                       endwhile 
                    endif 
                endif 
            endif 
 
• Algorithm for series-parallel graph to sub signing group 
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Input: node set N and edge setG  
Output: Converted subgroup kG  
// Initial matrix 
For (i=0 to row(Gk)-1) do 
    For (j=0 to col(Gk)-1) do  
      Gk(i,j)=0; 
endfor 
For (i=0 to row(G)-1) do 
      m=G(i,0); 
      flagI=true; 
      j1=0; 
      while (flagI) and (j1<=row(GK)-1) do 
            R1=0; 
            while (flagI) and (R1<=row(GK)-1) do 
                  If (GK(j1, R1)==m) then 
                      flagI=false; 
                  R1= R1+1 
             endwhile 
             j1= j1+1; 
       endwhile 
     flagT=true; 
      j2=0; 
      while (flagT) and (j2<=row(GK)-1) do 
            R2=0; 
            While (flagT) and (R2<=row(GK)-1) do 
                 If (GK(j1, R2)==m) then 
                      flagT =false; 
                  R2= R2+1 
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             endwhile 
             j2= j2+1; 
      endwhile 
If ((not flagI) and (not flagT)) then 
    G[0]=m;  G[1]=n; 
endif 
If ((flagI) and (not flagT)) then 
   G[j1]=n; 
endif 
If ((flagI) and (flagT)) then 
  While (j2<= j1) do 
    G[j2]=0; G[j1+1]=n; 
  endwhile 
endif 
endfor 
 
